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While educator incentive plans are not new, they have gained traction in the current 
education policy landscape.  Perhaps one contributor to their resurgence has been the Teacher 
Incentive Fund (TIF), which has awarded nearly $2.5 billion to 131 recipients since 2006.  
Despite the popularity of educator incentive programs, we know little about the opportunity 
costs associated with implementing these reforms. This study provides information about the 
costs associated with implementing TIF-supported educator incentive projects in three public 
school districts.  In this study, I use data from documents as well as individual and focus 
group interviews to perform a resource-cost analysis of the implementation of the three 
incentive projects.  I rely on the “ingredients” method (Levin & McEwan, 2001) to identify 
the full range of resources required to implement these projects for one academic year (2012-
13).  I determine the opportunity costs associated with these resources, and I detail the extent 
to which the districts that implemented the incentive projects were able to rely on TIF funds 
 
 
to support the implementation.  I also investigate whether or not the incentive projects were 
associated with what Rice and Malen (2003) refer to as “human costs” of educational reform.  
I find that the opportunity costs associated with implementing the educator incentive projects 
were high: estimated one-year operating costs were over $1 million in all three sites, and 
implementation of the costliest project required resources valued at over $6 million. These 
costs were considerably higher than expenditures, which illuminates the presence of “hidden” 
opportunity costs that do not show up on budgets or performance reports but exist 
nonetheless.  For all three projects included in the study, TIF covered almost all fiscal outlays 
related to project implementation, but it did not cover all opportunity costs.  Finally, I find 
that investing time and effort in project implementation did impose human costs on some 
project participants.  In highlighting the range of resources required to implement these 
incentive plans and calculating the opportunity costs associated with those resources, this 
study adds to the literature on educator incentives, the literature on cost analysis, and the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Calls for attention to educator quality come from policymakers, practitioners, 
politicians, and interested citizens from a variety of backgrounds.  These calls demand that 
high-quality administrators and teachers staff all of our schools and work with all of our 
students.  They stress the need to recruit and retain the best and the brightest educators in all 
schools, not just those in wealthy communities.  Some argue that good teachers should 
receive high compensation and that low-performers should exit the profession.  These 
exhortations to heed educator quality are persistent and pervasive parts of the discussion 
surrounding education in the United States. 
Perhaps one reason that many of these calls are so pervasive is that they have a basis 
in both common sense and research.  Quality teachers are vitally important to the success of 
students – they are, in fact, the most important in-school resource to which students have 
access (Rice, 2003) – and building administrators are key in creating successful and attractive 
working environments for teachers (Ladd, 2011).  Unfortunately, high-quality teachers and 
administrators are not distributed equitably across schools (Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, & 
Wheeler, 2007; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002).  Traditional educator salary schedules 
are rarely structured to alleviate that issue (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2011) or to reward 
educators for characteristics or behaviors that are tightly linked to student achievement 
(Ballou & Podgursky, 1997).  Amidst this backdrop, educator compensation reform in 
general and educator incentive plans in particular have gained attention.  Educator incentive 
plans are a set of initiatives that provide monetary awards to educators for their performance 




advocates of educator incentives argue that the awards will improve educator quality and/or 
effort and, ultimately, raise student achievement.   
The theory of action behind educator incentive programs suggests that the use of 
targeted incentives might create a “productivity effect” (Glazerman, 2004, p. 2) and improve 
educators’ performance by rewarding behaviors that will increase student achievement or by 
encouraging educators to engage in activities that might build their capacity to help students 
succeed (Malen et al., 2009; 2011).  Targeted incentives might also create a “composition 
effect” (Glazerman, 2004, p. 2) whereby they encourage high-quality potential educators to 
enter the profession or encourage educators to serve in traditionally hard-to-staff subjects or 
schools (Malen et al., 2009; 2011).  To achieve these effects, educator incentive plans 
attempt to reward demonstrated performance, to encourage investments in or extensions of 
practice, and to improve educator supply and distribution.  
In recent years, many educator incentive plans have received financial support from 
the federal government’s Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), a grant program first funded under 
the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2006.  While educator incentive programs certainly existed before 
TIF, the TIF program represents a significant public investment in educator incentive plans.  
To date, Congress has appropriated approximately $2.2 billion to TIF, and between 2006 and 
2012, the TIF program awarded approximately $2.5 billion to 131 recipients (Humphrey et 
al., 2012; Personal communication with TIF program personnel, 2013; U.S. Department of 
Education, 2014).1  Some evidence suggests that investments in TIF could continue; for 
instance, in January 2015, Senator Alexander, the chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on 
1 Differences between appropriations and awards are mainly due to the fact that, because TIF grants cover five-
year periods, recent awardees have not received all of their money yet.  In order for the Department of 
Education to continue to pay the awards, Congress will have to appropriate funds in future years. 
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Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) for the 114th Congress, proposed a bill to 
reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the primary piece of 
federal legislation that deals with K-12 education in the United States.  Senator Alexander’s 
bill included a provision that would solidify TIF as a distinct program authorized under 
ESEA, a first for the grant, which “has never actually been officially enshrined in law” 
through ESEA (Camera & Klein, 2015, para. 22). 
Over its life, TIF has supported educator incentive projects2 with a variety of designs.  
Many TIF-funded projects were designed by the school districts that implemented them; in 
these cases, local personnel crafted projects whose components (ostensibly) took into account 
local preferences regarding what behaviors to reward and how to reward these behaviors.  
These homegrown projects display different patterns regarding project design elements such 
as eligibility to participate in the projects, bases for incentive rewards, and the size of the 
awards (Center for Educator Compensation Reform [CECR], 2012).  While many TIF-
supported projects were designed by local implementers, a substantial number of TIF 
projects instead chose to implement the System for Teacher and Student Advancement 
(commonly referred to as TAP), a nationally-recognized educator incentive program model.  
TAP began in 1999 as an initiative of the Milken Family Foundation and is currently 
operated through the National Institute for Excellence in Teaching (NIET).  The TAP model 
includes “multiple career paths,” “ongoing applied professional growth,” “instructionally 
focused accountability,” and “performance-based compensation” (NIET, 2014).  Whether 
2 In this dissertation, while I use terms such as “program,” “plan,” and “initiative” to describe educator incentive 
programs in general, I use the term “project” to describe TIF-supported educator incentives programs, including 
the three particular educator incentive plans from which I collected and analyzed data.  This choice is 
intentional.  I use the term “project” so that my use of language adheres to conventions surrounding the TIF 
policy.  In this particular grant environment, TIF itself is referred to as a “program” and the incentive plans that 
TIF supports are referred to as “projects.” 
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locally-developed or TAP, the proliferation of educator incentive plans across the country 
has been aided by the infusion of over $2 billion of Teacher Incentive Fund money to support 
incentive projects throughout the United States.  
Knowledge about appropriations to the TIF program and the amount that TIF has 
promised to local grantees does not reveal the entirety of TIF projects’ costs.  Appropriation 
numbers and grant amounts do not provide information regarding the full range of costs 
related to TIF programs – both in terms of whether local implementers actually spent all of 
the federal government’s money and in terms local fiscal and non-fiscal contributions to the 
programs.  Additionally, they tell us little about these projects’ costs to society as a whole.  
That is, by themselves, these numbers do not illuminate what society gives up in order to 
invest resources (e.g., public money, private money, implementers’ time and expertise) in 
these projects rather than to direct these resources elsewhere.   
This lack of knowledge is problematic.  Making judgments about whether or not to 
invest resources in educator incentive policies like TIF requires, among other things, 
comprehensive and nuanced knowledge about the full range of fiscal and non-fiscal resources 
that these programs require, the value of those resources, and the opportunity costs associated 
with choosing to invest time, energy, and money in these programs rather than other policies.  
Without information about the opportunity costs associated with the implementation of 
educator incentive programs (and, ideally, the effectiveness of the programs at achieving 
desired outcomes), policymakers are poorly equipped to make decisions about the allocation 
of finite resources.  Further, without knowledge about the costs of programs like educator 
incentives, researchers, policymakers, and practitioners miss opportunities to have rich and 




one set of programs over another and the implications of those tradeoffs for educators, 
students, and others in society. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this dissertation is to begin to fill the gap in knowledge about the costs 
of educator incentive plans.  In this study, I analyze the full range of fiscal and non-fiscal 
resources required to implement educator incentive plans and the opportunity costs 
associated with consuming those resources.3  The findings of this study illuminate three sets 
of interrelated issues: the magnitude of costs associated with implementing three different 
TIF-supported educator incentive projects; the extent to which the districts used TIF money 
to cover the cost of implementing the educator incentive projects in the 2012-13 school year; 
and whether or not participants’ investment of time and energy to implement these educator 
incentive projects imposed human costs (or “reform-related sacrifices made by individuals 
and groups of individuals in [an] organization”; Rice & Malen, 2003, p. 639) on those who 
were associated with the project.4  Taken together, these three sets of findings provide a 
relatively comprehensive portrait of the resources required for one year of implementing 
grant-supported educator incentive projects in local districts and the opportunity costs 
associated with using those resources for incentive plans rather than other purposes. 
Research Questions 
The dissertation answers the following research questions: 
3 Other, non-implementation costs associated with TIF programs also exist.  For instance, these programs are 
accompanied by planning and evaluation costs.  Due to data limitations, planning and evaluation costs are not 
the focus of the current study. 
4 Other aspects of project implementation, including but not limited to the process of linking educator 
compensation to performance, might also be associated with human costs.  The only human costs I focus on in 
this study are those associated with investing time and energy into project implementation. 
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1. What is the full range of resources required to implement different TIF-supported 
educator incentive models?  What opportunity costs are associated with these 
resources?   
2. What are the total societal costs of various models of educator incentive 
programs, and how is the cost burden borne by TIF and non-TIF sources? 
3. In what ways can knowledge about the costs of educator incentive programs 
inform research and policy? 
Data and Methods 
The data that I use to answer these questions come from three public school districts 
that received a TIF grant to implement an educator incentive project.  From each of these 
districts, I gathered data from documents as well as individual and focus group interviews to 
learn about the resources required to implement the projects during the 2012-13 school year.  
Document data included information that described the projects (such as project brochures, 
handouts, and reports) and information from budgets, grant performance reports, and 
incentive payout records.  Interview data came from district administrators as well as school 
administrators and teachers.  These field data provided information about the resources that 
the projects required; I supplemented these data with price information from a number of 
government and commercial sources, which I explain in more detail in Chapter 3.  In order to 
provide context regarding the TIF program as a whole, I gathered information from personnel 
who worked with the TIF program at the U. S. Department of Education. 
I use these data to perform a cost analysis of the three educator incentive projects.  
Multiple types of cost analysis exist, including cost-feasibility analysis, cost-effectiveness 




analyses provide systematic information regarding the resources required to pursue a 
particular course of action and the opportunity costs associated with those resources; two of 
these analyses (cost-effectiveness analyses and cost-benefit analyses) pair these cost data 
with information about program results to provide ratios of costs to outcomes.  Cost-
effectiveness analyses require analysts to compare multiple programs with the same outcome, 
and cost-benefit analyses require that outcomes can be translated into monetary terms so that 
analysts can investigate monetary cost-to-benefit ratios (Levin & McEwan, 2001; Rice, 
1997).   
As I describe in more detail in Chapter 2, literature on the outcomes of educator 
incentive programs is in an emergent state, and effectiveness data that would be sufficient for 
cross-project comparisons are not available for the all of projects I include in this study.   At 
this stage, then, cost-feasibility analysis represents an important first step in understanding 
the costs associated with educator incentive plans.  This type of analysis lays the groundwork 
for future cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit studies, which can take place once a greater 
consensus develops within the literature on the effectiveness of educator incentive plans.  A 
cost-feasibility study also provides valuable insight in its own right regarding the opportunity 
costs associated with implementing educator incentives, a key part of educator incentives that 
is understudied in the literature. 
In this study, I use the “ingredients” approach to perform a cost-feasibility analysis of 
the three TIF-supported educator incentive projects.  Through this approach, I unpack the full 
range of resources required to implement each of the projects for one year.  I then determine 
the opportunity costs associated with using the required resources for the incentive projects 




order to provide a more complete picture of the opportunity costs associated with the 
incentive plans in the study, I pair the information from the cost-feasibility analysis with a 
preliminary discussion of the human costs associated with investing time and energy (that is, 
burdens over and above the time itself) into implementing these multidimensional initiatives. 
Significance of the Study 
This study adds to both the literature on educator incentives and the literature on cost 
analysis.  In terms of the literature on educator incentives, this study provides a snapshot of 
the opportunity costs associated with implementing educator incentives for one year, which 
is an aspect of these prominent reforms that is currently poorly understood.  It also 
illuminates the extent to which TIF covers the costs of the projects, which is an important 
addition to the literature on the sustainability of educator incentive plans, since TIF grantees 
that aim to continue their incentive plans after the life of the grant need to understand the 
extent to which outside sources currently support the projects.  This study’s investigation of 
the existence of human costs associated with investing time and energy into the incentive 
projects is a valuable addition to the literature on the implementation of educator incentives, 
which often talks about the strain of program implementation but does not inspect these 
burdens through the lens of human cost. 
This study contributes to the body of cost research by addressing issues – both 
common and uncommon – with cost analysis.  In this study, I address common challenges, 
such as how to present accurate and comparable cost estimates in the face of matters that can 
affect the interpretation of cost data, such as differences in program size and location.  I also 
confront uncommon issues, such as the necessity to recognize difficult-to-quantify human 




incorporate this important yet often neglected piece of the opportunity cost puzzle into the 
body of research on the cost of educational initiatives. 
Limitations 
While this study adds to the literature on educator incentives, increases the body of 
cost analyses of educational initiatives, and contains insights for policymakers and 
practitioners who might consider an educator incentive plan as a possible policy option, it has 
limitations.  First, this study is limited in scope.  It only assesses (a) the costs of district-level 
projects, as opposed to those located in states or charter schools; (b) the costs of 
implementing the projects for one academic year (2012-13), rather than the longitudinal costs 
of the entire projects (including, for instance, project planning, multiple years of project 
implementation, and project evaluation); and (c) the cost-feasibility of these projects, as 
opposed to the cost-effectiveness or the cost-benefit of the projects.  Second, the fact that I 
collected data from key project implementers rather than all project participants influences 
the study’s estimates of the magnitude of project costs; the fact that each of the projects 
changed slightly over time means that the project cost estimates are only applicable to the 
projects as they were structured during the 2012-13 school year.  Third, while this study 
illuminates the extent to which districts used TIF and non-TIF funds to cover project costs, it 
does not identify the extent to which specific non-TIF entities (e.g., districts and employees 
within them) bore the costs of project implementation.  Finally, this dissertation’s human cost 
findings are limited to a discussion of the burdens associated with participants’ investment of 
time and energy into project implementation and shed light only on the existence of these 






Educator evaluation and compensation reform proposals in general and educator 
incentives in particular are popular, perhaps due to their political attractiveness and perhaps 
due to their real or perceived ability to deal with shortcomings in the educator labor market.  
The federal Teacher Incentive Fund program marks substantial and sustained federal 
investments in these types of programs.  This study presents a systematic analysis of the 
resources required to implement certain types of TIF-supported educator incentive projects 
and highlights the opportunity costs associated with the choice to invest in these initiatives.  
In doing so, it adds to the growing body of education research that focuses on the costs 
associated with educational reform generally and educator incentives specifically.  It also 
provides meaningful information for discussions regarding program adoption and program 
implementation, because policymakers who promote educator incentive programs and 
researchers who study them should have a thorough understanding of the costs associated 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter presents a review of various streams of literature that contextualize both 
the policy at the center of the study and the method of analysis that I use to investigate the 
policy.  First, the chapter provides background for the dissertation’s policy focus by situating 
educator incentive plans within the larger discussion of human capital issues in education.  
Second, the chapter provides background for the method of the study by explaining 
fundamental concepts upon which resource-cost analyses rest.  In both sections, I rely on 
conceptual as well as empirical literature that I gathered through searches of scholarly 
databases (such as ERIC, Education Source, and Google Scholar), searches of education 
policy journals (such as Education Finance and Policy, Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis, Educational Administration Quarterly, and others), and reviews of the references of 
articles I found through searches of databases and journals.  In both sections of the literature 
review, I provide overviews and appraisals of the literature that form the basis of the review. 
Human Capital and Educator Policy 
Like any enterprise, education requires investments of capital, and while material 
resources such as school buildings, computers, and books are certainly important for the 
educational process, education relies particularly heavily on human capital, or the “value of 
human skill and other acquired abilities” (Cohn & Geske, 2004, p. 14).  The educational 
process requires high-quality teachers who use their knowledge and skills to help students 
learn and achieve.  Although a variety of in-school and out-of-school factors impact students, 
research demonstrates that high-quality teachers are the most important school-level resource 
for student success (Rice, 2003).  Given the importance of teacher quality in particular and 




distribute human capital in ways that align with fundamental values, such as the important 
policy goals of quality, efficiency, and equity (Mitchell & Encarnation, 1984).  Simply put, a 
well-functioning educational system requires skilled and knowledgeable educators who are 
distributed across schools such that, first, no school has too many or too few effective 
educators and, second, all students – regardless of whether or not they are growing up in 
privileged contexts – have access to effective educators.  This section of the literature review 
deals with human capital issues in education and how educator incentive programs aim to 
address these issues.   
  These discussions help to situate the current study, which focuses on the costs 
associated with three educator incentive projects that have received TIF grants, in a larger 
context.  I draw literature on human capital issues in education mainly from scholarly sources 
such as peer-reviewed journal articles and scholarly books, and I supplement that 
information, where necessary, with work from research and policy organizations.  The 
literature on educator incentives comes from more mixed sources.  I draw literature on the 
conceptual foundations of educator incentive plans and some empirical literature on extant 
incentive programs from peer-reviewed sources, but due to the emerging nature of the 
conversation around educator incentives, I supplement these sources more heavily with 
information from non-peer-reviewed reports.  My use of this “multivocal” (Ogawa & Malen, 
1991) collection of sources allows for a more complete picture of an educational policy that 
is supported by an ever-growing and changing body of research. 
Human Capital Issues in Education  
In this section, I discuss matters related to how policymakers and practitioners (a) 




and distribution of human capital across schools.  Because human capital is so important for 
education, considerable effort has gone into thinking about how to measure its quality, how 
to increase its supply, and how to distribute it equitably and efficiently across schools.  
Generally, the body of human capital research in education is larger for teachers than it is for 
school administrators.  Accordingly, in the following sections of the literature review, I focus 
more heavily on teachers than I do on school administrators, though I incorporate 
information about administrators – typically, school principals – at the end of each section. 
Identifying and measuring educator excellence.  Understanding whether students 
and schools have access to effective teachers requires the ability to identify and measure 
excellence.  In recent years, new approaches to teacher evaluation have gained attention and 
traction, particularly in the face of criticisms over the accuracy and utility of traditional 
methods of teacher evaluation.  Below, I describe traditional approaches to teacher 
evaluation, and I then outline several contemporary responses to teacher evaluation that 
attempt to address criticisms related to traditional approaches.  
Traditional approaches to teacher evaluation.  While teacher evaluation is not a 
recent concept or practice (see, for instance, Miel, 1948), it garnered renewed attention in the 
early 1980s.  According to Wise, Darling-Hammond, McLaughlin, and Bernstein (1985), 
Teacher evaluation attracted new interest in April 1983, when the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education published A Nation at Risk: The Imperative 
for Educational Reform. … Increasingly, educational policymakers consider better 
teachers and better teaching the keys to better education. … As unremarkable as this 
consensus now seems, it reverses educational policy trends of the past 2 decades.  
Teacher-proof curriculum, test-based instructional management, and student 
competence testing initiatives were all based on the premise that education could be 
improved without improving the quality of teachers (pp. 60-62).   
 
A discussion of  teacher evaluation practices at that time identified several different potential 




of indirect measures (such as training or experience), classroom observations, student ratings, 
peer review, links to student achievement, and self-evaluation (Darling-Hammond, Wise, & 
Pease, 1983, pp. 304-308).  Despite the existence of multiple methods of assessing teacher 
performance, Darling-Hammond and colleagues (1983) pointed out that classroom 
observations, “usually coupled with teacher interviews or conferences, [were] the mainstay 
of most teacher evaluations” (p. 306).  Indeed, this primacy of classroom observations 
endured at multiple points in time across the next decades.  For instance, a 1985 survey of 
teachers in the 100 largest school districts in the United States found that observations by 
school administrators were the most common form of teacher evaluation (Ellett & Garland, 
1987).  On a national survey during the 1992-93 school year, 92 percent of public elementary 
school teachers reported undergoing formal classroom observations (Nolin, Rowand, & 
Farris, 1994, p. 5).   A 1995 survey – an updated look at teachers in the 100 largest school 
districts in the United States – again found that observations by school administrators were 
the most common form of teacher evaluation (Loup, Garland, Ellett, & Rugutt, 1996).   
Despite their widespread use, these traditional classroom observations have been the 
focus of scrutiny and reform.  Research has found that the percentage of teachers who receive 
formal ratings of unsatisfactory performance based on these observations does not match the 
percentage of teachers whom administrators perceive to be incompetent (Tucker, 1997), and 
reformers have derided these systems as little more than low-stakes, “drive-by,” checklist-
based, binary (satisfactory or unsatisfactory) assessments of teacher performance (Toch & 
Rothman, 2008) that fail to adequately identify teacher quality or provide sufficient feedback 
for educator growth (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009).  Additionally, recent 




on teacher evaluation as a target of change (Hallgren, James-Burdumy, & Perez-Johnson, 
2014).  Specifically, some of the award criteria for Race to the Top, the “largest competitive 
grant program ever administered by the U. S. Department of Education,” were related to 
states’ approaches to teacher evaluation, “includ[ing] whether states proposed to: 
1. Establish clear approaches to measuring student achievement growth for 
individual students. 
2. Design and implement rigorous, transparent, fair evaluation systems for teachers. 
3. Differentiate effectiveness using multiple rating categories that take student 
achievement growth into account as a significant factor and are designed with 
teacher involvement. 
4. Conduct annual evaluations that include timely and constructive feedback and 
provide teachers with data on student achievement growth for their students, 
classes, and schools. 
5. Use evaluations to inform decisions about staff development, compensation, 
promotion, tenure, certification, and removal of ineffective teachers” (Hallgren et 
al., 2014, p. 2). 
 
In response to critiques, calls for reform, and perceived inadequacies in teacher 
evaluation practices based on classroom observations using traditional rubrics, educational 
institutions have increasingly turned to alternative (and sometimes multiple) methods of 
teacher evaluation.  The following sections detail three alternative approaches to teacher 
evaluation. 
Contemporary responses to teacher evaluation.  Three alternatives, which I discuss 
below, include standards-based evaluations, evaluations based on student assessment results, 
and evaluations based on student learning objectives. 
Standards-based evaluations. One departure from traditional approaches is the use of 
standards-based evaluations such as the Danielson (2007) Framework for Teaching or the 
TAP program’s Teaching Skills, Knowledge, and Responsibilities Performance Standards 
rubric (NIET, 2014).  Like traditional approaches, standards-based evaluations rely on 




The hallmarks of these evaluations are the practice of judging teacher performance using 
rubrics tied to multiple standards and domains of practice; using multilevel rating systems 
(e.g., “distinguished,” “accomplished,” “proficient,” “developing,” “not demonstrated”), 
either for ratings on domains of practice or for overall ratings of teacher performance; and 
using additional information (beyond what was observed during a classroom visit, such as 
classroom artifacts) in the evaluation (Shakman et al., 2012).  According to Odden (2004), 
“[a] standards-based teacher evaluation system requires the following: 
1. A set of teaching standards that describes in considerable detail what teachers 
need to know and be able to do. 
2. A set of procedures for collecting multiple forms of data on [a] teacher’s 
performance for each of the standards. 
3. A related set of scoring rubrics that provide guidance to assessors or evaluators on 
how to score the various pieces of data to various performance levels and a 
scheme to aggregate all microscores to an overall score for a teacher’s 
instructional performance. 
4. A way to use the performance evaluation results in a new knowledge- and skills-
based salary schedule if the evaluation is to be used to trigger fiscal incentives” 
(p. 127). 
 
Research on the use of standards-based evaluations finds that higher teacher 
standards-based evaluation ratings are associated with larger student standardized assessment 
score gains and positive student engagement and classroom experiences (Kane & Staiger, 
2012).  Further, research from an evaluation reform in Chicago (Sporte, Stevens, Healy, 
Jiang, & Hart, 2013) finds that educators perceived the new evaluation to be a potential 
avenue for meaningful discussions of professional practice because it provided supervisors 
detailed rubrics and required them to gather fine-grained information about teachers’ work.  
This study also reports that educators perceived that the standards-based evaluation, unlike 
previous traditional evaluations, could provide teachers useful feedback on their strengths as 




challenging and resource intensive (Sporte et al., 2013).  Additional research on standards-
based evaluations suggests that reliable evaluation results require ratings from multiple 
observations and observers (Ho & Kane, 2013; Kane & Staiger, 2012).  Further, Papay 
(2012) argues that districts that seek to implement standards-based evaluations should not 
only ensure that the standards and rubrics they choose conform to or be adapted to local 
context, but also that the districts adopt or create standards regarding how assessors should 
carry out the evaluations and pay attention to the systems’ costly and time intensive nature. 
Evaluations based on student assessment results.  Another departure from traditional 
classroom evaluation approaches is the practice of using statistical models to link teacher 
evaluation to student outcomes on standardized tests.  While evaluations could be tied to 
student test scores in a variety of ways,5 one approach that has gained considerable attention 
in recent years has been the use of teacher-level value-added models (VAMs).  A large body 
of research has emerged surrounding these increasingly adopted yet highly controversial 
models; the following paragraphs present a brief overview of the debate. 
Many researchers present cautions regarding the practice of linking teacher 
performance with student achievement data for a number of reasons.  First, the data required 
to construct teacher value-added models rule out teachers whose students do not take 
standardized tests on a regular basis (e.g., teachers of young students or teachers of non-
tested subjects).  Second, controversy exists even for the creation of VAMs for teachers in 
tested subjects and grades.  For instance, given the collective nature of teaching and learning, 
these models are accompanied by challenging questions surrounding attempts to isolate the 
55 States, districts, and schools have used a variety of student-assessment-based evaluations that vary on several 
dimensions.  Some focus on school-wide achievement while others focus on classroom-based achievement.  
Some focus on student growth while others focus on the extent to which students meet a standard of proficiency 
(Humphrey et al., 2012).  I focus on teacher-level VAMs in this discussion given their growing popularity, their 
apparent political appeal, and the large body of research on the use of these tools. 
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impact of a single teacher on a student’s performance (Amor, Tucker, & Ozek, 2013). 
Furthermore, Rothstein (2009) advises against making causal claims regarding teachers’ 
impact on student achievement due to bias introduced by nonrandom student assignment into 
classrooms.  McCaffrey, Sass, Lockwood, and Mihaly (2009) caution that the use of a single 
year of student data in evaluation decisions can be problematic, since “estimates based on 
very few students will tend to be extremely unstable across time” (p. 587) and because “there 
is considerable year-to-year variability in teacher performance measures even after 
accounting for sampling error” (592).  This variability can be consequential; in their study, 
teachers who were in the top and bottom quintiles of performance one year were not 
necessarily in those same quintiles the next year.  In fact, some teachers even switched from 
the top to the bottom quintile and vice versa (McCaffrey et al., 2009).  Additional research 
has found that different VAM specifications – none of which was inherently superior to 
another – produced different results and would lead to different conclusions regarding 
teacher effectiveness (Goldhaber, Goldschmidt, & Tseng, 2013; Sass, Semykina, & Harris, 
2014).   
Despite complications associated with VAMs’ ability to serve as valid and reliable 
measures of teacher performance, many researchers have concluded that, under the right 
conditions, these approaches to teacher evaluation are still worthwhile.  Some have argued 
that while VAMs are imperfect, they are helpful because (a) they are relatively low-cost, 
given that they rely on data that districts already collect (Lefgren & Sims, 2014); (b) the 
reliability of VAMs is comparable to the reliability of evaluation methods used in other 




teacher quality than extant alternatives, such as seniority (Glazerman et al., 2010, pp. 7-8, 10-
11).  Glazerman and colleagues (2010) contend,  
Critics of value-added methods have raised concerns about the statistical validity, 
reliability, and corruptibility of value-added measures.  We believe the correct 
response to these concerns is to improve value-added measures continually and to use 
them wisely, not to discard or ignore the data (p. 2).   
  
A large body of research has attempted to do just that.  This set of studies, most of 
which acknowledge limitations associated with the use of VAMs, aims to identify model 
specifications that can reduce the degree of bias in estimates of teacher quality based on 
VAM results (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2013; Condie, Lefgren, & Sims, 2014; Kinsler, 
2012; Ishii & Rivkin, 2009; Koedel & Betts, 2010; Koedel & Betts, 2011; Lefgren & Sims, 
2012; McCaffrey et al., 2009). 
Evaluations based on student learning objectives.  Even if VAMs and other test-
based measures of educator performance were completely free of bias, they nevertheless 
would be unable to capture the quality of teachers for whom ample standardized student test 
data are unavailable.  Thus, amid a desire to base teacher evaluation on student outcomes in 
some way, a third departure from traditional educator evaluation has emerged.  Given that 
VAMs and other test-based measures may not be “available or appropriate for all teachers 
and subjects,” states and districts have begun to use student learning objectives (SLOs) to 
evaluate teachers (Lacireno-Paquet, Morgan, & Mello, 2014, p. 1).  SLO-based evaluation is 
an increasingly popular policy option; 30 states had SLO policies in 2014 (Lacireno-Paquet 
et al., 2014).  According to Lachlan-Haché, Cushing, and Bivona (2012),  
Student learning objectives are a set of goals that measure educators’ progress in 
achieving student growth targets.  In short, educators or educator teams establish 
learning targets for groups of students based on available data; monitor student 
growth toward the targets; and, at the end of an agreed-upon time period, determine 





SLO development processes typically require that teachers (a) identify standards for their 
subjects, be they locally developed or tied to extant benchmarks including but not limited to 
state standards (Lacireno-Paquet et al., 2014); (b) analyze student data (broadly-considered) 
to determine an appropriate goal for student growth on a teacher-created or externally-
developed assignment or assessment; (c) identify a timeframe within which to meet the goal; 
and (d) receive approval from an evaluator (often though not necessarily the school principal 
or other administrator) to use the student growth goal as an SLO.  Prior to the end of the 
period in which the educator is supposed to meet the SLO, evaluators and teachers can meet 
to discuss progress toward reaching the goal.  At the end of the period, evaluators assess 
whether the teacher attained the SLO, and the evaluator and the teacher meet to discuss the 
process and the evaluation results (Lachlan-Haché et al., 2012). 
Research on the suitability of SLOs as tools for teacher evaluation is limited but 
emerging.  Gill, Bruch, and Booker (2013) reviewed literature on the reliability and validity 
of using student learning objectives to measure teacher quality.  The authors found little 
statistical evidence regarding how reliable or valid SLOs are; most quantitative studies of 
SLOs simply reported the percentage of teachers who met their objectives.  According to 
these studies, most teachers did meet their SLOs, but the percentages of teachers who met 
SLOs were generally lower than the percentages of teachers who received satisfactory ratings 
on traditional classroom observation rubrics.  Gill et al. (2013) also reviewed SLO studies 
that highlighted implementation issues.  These studies found that (a) SLO initiatives can be 
very time-consuming for both teachers and evaluators, (b) teachers need ample direction to 




to set meaningful and appropriate objectives, and (d) SLO systems may raise issues regarding 
the equity and fairness of using non-standardized measures to evaluate teachers. 
Approaches to school administrator evaluation.  As I mention above, research on 
teacher evaluation dominates the discussion regarding educator (i.e., teacher and 
administrator) evaluation.  However, a growing body of literature has begun to focus on 
principal evaluation (Davis, Kearney, Sanders, Thomas, & Leon, 2011).  Many of the issues 
that research on teacher evaluation has highlighted – such as critiques of extant evaluation 
approaches and concerns over the use of student achievement data in evaluations – also 
appear in this growing conversation around principal evaluation.  For instance, a recent 
literature review of scholarship on principal evaluation reports that “[m]ethods and tools used 
to evaluate principals vary widely” across districts and that “[m]ost district-developed 
principal evaluation systems lack validity and reliability” (Davis et al., 2011, p. 13).   
Perhaps in the face of critiques of principal evaluation systems or perhaps due to 
pressure from policies like Race to the Top, a growing number of states and districts are 
incorporating student test score data in their principal evaluation systems (Fuller & 
Hollingworth, 2014).  As was the case with teacher evaluations based on student 
achievement data, researchers express cautions and, sometimes, concern about the use of 
student test scores to evaluate principal effectiveness.  Grissom, Kalogrides, and Loeb (2015) 
test different methods of linking principal performance to student achievement and find that 
estimates of principal effectiveness vary depending on the model.  Fuller and Hollingworth 
(2014) examine the assumptions that undergird multiple approaches to linking student 
achievement data to principal evaluations and proffer the view that “even the most 




scores] are flawed and produce inaccurate results” (p. 491).  It seems, then, that despite the 
need for additional research on the evaluation of school administrators, evidence from extant 
studies generally highlights issues that are similar to the issues surrounding teacher 
evaluation. 
Investing in human capital.  The previous paragraphs suggest that policymakers and 
practitioners have paid a great deal of attention to identifying and measuring teacher quality.  
A second human capital issue that has received considerable attention is the matter of 
increasing teachers’ capacity to improve student outcomes.6  This section outlines two major 
activities geared toward increasing the capacity of current educators: professional 
development and the provision of job expansion and job redesign opportunities for teachers. 
Teacher professional development.  One way to invest in human capital is to provide 
teachers with initial and ongoing professional development.  The following paragraphs 
provide background on professional development in education by highlighting different 
forms that professional development can take, accepted standards for high-quality 
professional development, research on effective professional development, and information 
about how much districts spend on professional development.   
Professional development can take a variety of forms. Choy and Chen (1998) note 
that “[t]raditional formats for [ongoing professional development activities] include half- or 
full-day workshops and programs sponsored by districts, schools, professional associations, 
and other organizations, and courses taken outside the K-12 education system, such as 
university extension, adult education, or college courses” (p. 26).  National Center for 
6 Investments in human capital can take place prior to teachers’ entry into the profession (for instance, in a 
teacher education or preparation program) or while teachers are already in the profession.  While investments at 
both stages are important, the discussion here focuses on investments that take place while teachers are already 
in the profession. 
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Education Statistics (NCES) data suggest that many teachers experience these types of 
traditional professional development; in 1999-2000, 95 percent of public school teachers and 
87 percent of private school teachers reported attending a workshop, conference, or training 
(Choy, Chen, & Bugarin, 2006, p. 48).   
In this 1999-2000 survey, perhaps in response to evolving understandings regarding 
how professional development could or should be structured, NCES collected information 
about new forms of professional development, including “regularly scheduled collaboration 
with other teachers on issues of instruction” and “individual or collaborative research on a 
topic of interest” (Choy et al., 2006, p. 48).  While a large percentage of teachers did report 
participating in traditional, workshop- or class-based professional development (see the 
previous paragraph for details), 74 percent of public school teachers and 60 percent of private 
school teachers reported that they engaged in regularly scheduled collaboration with other 
teachers on issues of instruction, and 47 percent of public school teachers and 45 percent of 
private school teachers reported engaging in individual or collaborative research on a topic of 
interest (Choy et al., 2006, p. 48). 
Over time, researchers have argued for increased attention to standards for high-
quality professional development.  For instance, Hawley and Valli (2007) argue that high-
quality professional development should: (1) be based on analyses of student performance; 
(2) “be primarily school based and built into the day-to-day work of teaching”; (3) be based 
on input from teachers themselves; (4) “reflect the best research on the given topic”; (5) 
focus on student learning; (6) “provide experiential opportunities to gain an understanding of 
and reflect on the research and theory underlying the knowledge and skills being learned”; 




continuous and ongoing”; (9) “be connected to a comprehensive change process focused on 
specific goals for improving student learning”; and (10) be evaluated based on student 
outcomes as well as changes in instructional practices (Hawley & Valli, 2007, pp. 120-130). 
While some agreement over standards for professional development exists, research 
on the effectiveness of different forms of professional development is relatively scant.  Hill, 
Beisiegel, & Jacob (2013), for instance, argue that much of the research on professional 
development does not adequately illuminate which features of professional development 
improve teacher and student performance.  Still, some research does provide information 
about professional development effectiveness.  For instance, Desimone, Porter, Garet, Yoon, 
& Birman (2002) found benefits associated with professional development that relied on 
teacher collaboration, that promoted teachers’ active (rather than passive) engagement with 
the professional development topic, and that was compatible with their context (e.g., that 
aligned with other work that they did or with their prior knowledge).  Additionally, a study of 
current and former State Teachers of the Year reported that several supports, including 
professional development opportunities such as “collaboration with colleagues,” “common 
planning time,” “professional learning communities,” and “self-directed professional growth 
plans,” were important supports for novice teachers.  This study also found that, compared to 
the percentage of teachers who rated district-sponsored professional development as “very 
important,” a higher percentage of current and former State Teachers of the Year rated self-
selected professional development as “very important” during their career stage (the point in 
their careers when they were no longer novice teachers but had not yet taken on additional 




Research on how much districts spend on professional development is also very 
scant.  Extant information from a small number of studies suggests that spending on 
professional development makes up “between 2% and 4% of districts’ operating 
expenditures, though some studies suggest that these expenditures could consume more than 
8% of operating expenses” (Rice & Hoyer, 2014, p. 560). 
Job expansion and job redesign opportunities for teachers.  While investments in 
human capital often occur through professional development, investments in human capital 
can also take the form of providing teachers the opportunity to participate in job expansion or 
job redesign opportunities.  Job expansion opportunities allow teachers to take on additional 
responsibilities in the form of relatively short-term special projects that supplement their 
traditional roles in the classroom (Malen, Murphy, and Hart, 1988; also called “job 
enlargement” by Brandt, 1990).  Job redesign opportunities, on the other hand, actually 
reconceptualize teachers’ work by allowing them to take on new roles that might include 
“formal staff development, peer supervision, curriculum-instructional improvement, and 
broad decisionmaking responsibilities, as well as classroom teaching assignments” (Malen, 
Murphy, and Hart, 1988, p. 119).   
Nationally representative data collected at different points in time suggest that many 
teachers have participated in job redesign and/or expansion opportunities.  According to 
NCES data, “about 11 percent of all teachers served as a mentor or master teacher in a formal 
teacher induction program in 1993-94” (Choy & Chen, 1998, p. 26).  In the 1999-2000 
school year, 42 percent of public school teachers and 41 percent of private school teachers 




15 percent of private school teachers presented at workshops, conferences, or trainings (Choy 
et al., 2006, p. 48). 
Evidence from the survey of current and former State Teachers of the Year suggests 
that serving in a job expansion and/or redesign role is influential for those who take on the 
added responsibility.  Over a third of career teachers who had taken on one of these roles 
reported that these responsibilities were among the three most important professional 
supports during their career stage (Behrstock-Sherratt et al., 2014, p. 16, 18).  Additionally, 
substantial percentages (ranging from over a third to over half) of teacher leaders who had 
participated in a variety of job expansion and redesign activities such as “develop[ing] 
curricula,” “present[ing] at conferences or to peer groups,” “becom[ing] a mentor or 
instructional coach,” “deliver[ing] professional development,” and “provid[ing] formal 
coaching or mentoring to colleagues to improve their instructional practice” reported that 
these responsibilities were among the three most important supports during the teacher leader 
stages of their careers (Behrstock-Sherratt et al., 2014, p. 21). 
Professional development for school administrators.  As was the case for educator 
evaluation, a great deal of scholarly literature regarding professional development focuses on 
teachers.  Some sources, however, do provide insight into the types of professional 
development available to school administrators.  Peterson (2002) reports that principals 
might engage in many different types of professional development, including “workshops, 
short academies, and longer professional development opportunities” (p. 217) led by a 
variety of professional organizations and other institutions (e.g., districts, universities, 
professional development companies, and school reform developers).  Peterson (2002) claims 




connect to professional groups” (p. 217).  Some studies that focus on the professional 
development of school administrators suggest that the qualities that might render teacher 
professional development high-quality, such as being job-embedded, differentiated, 
experiential, and focused on student outcomes (see, for instance, Hawley & Valli, 2007), are 
also important for administrator professional development (Malen et al., 2015; Peterson, 
2002). 
Attracting and distributing human capital.  The previous two sections outline 
issues related to measuring human capital and investing in human capital.  A third human 
capital consideration relates to increasing the supply of effective teachers by attracting high 
performers into the profession and by distributing human capital across schools equitably and 
efficiently.  In terms of supply, some research suggests that the teaching profession struggles 
to attract and retain high-ability employees.  For instance, while college graduates who 
become teachers demonstrate higher academic ability than all college enrollees, college 
graduates who become teachers demonstrate lower academic ability than the subset of 
college-goers who actually obtain a college degree (Corcoran, Evans, & Schwab, 2004; 
Guarino, Santibañez, & Daley, 2006; Hanushek & Pace, 1995).  Furthermore, teachers with 
higher exam scores and degrees from selective postsecondary institutions tend to stay in 
teaching for a shorter time than their peers (Guarino, Brown, & Wyse, 2011; Murnane & 
Olsen, 1990; Murnane, Singer, Willett, Kemper, & Olsen, 1991). 
Furthermore, while all schools demand high quality educators, not all schools 
consistently meet this demand.  Schools with high percentages of economically 
disadvantaged students, low-achieving students, students of color, and students with special 




without these characteristics (Clotfelter et al., 2011; Clotfelter et al., 2007; Guarino et al., 
2006; Guarino et al., 2011; Lankford et al., 2002).  Urban schools, on average, have less 
qualified teachers than do nonurban schools (Guarino et al., 2006; Lankford et al., 2002).  
Given that teachers tend to prefer to work in or near where they grew up (Boyd, Lankford, 
Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2005; Reininger, 2012), the fact that lower percentages of students from 
urban and poor schools receive bachelor’s degrees puts these schools at a recruitment 
disadvantage (Reininger, 2012).  Additionally, low achieving schools face a serious attrition 
problem; even among schools with high concentrations of students of color and students 
living in poverty, those with lower-achieving students have greater problems with educator 
retention (Guarino et al., 2011; Hanushek, Rivkin, & Kain, 2004).  Patterns of the 
distribution of school administrators follow these same trends, such that some schools, like 
those with high proportions of students of color, struggle to retain school administrators 
(Baker, Punswick, & Belt, 2010; Clotfelter et al., 2007; Gates, Ringel, Santibañez, Chung, & 
Ross, 2003; Loeb, Kalogrides, & Horng, 2010).   
Policymakers and practitioners have attempted to correct the problem of inequitable 
distribution of educators across schools in various ways.  For instance, the federal 
government and some states have implemented student loan forgiveness plans for educators 
who work in hard-to-staff areas (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2014; Office of 
Federal Student Aid, n.d.).  Other efforts to address this issue include residency programs 
that specifically place teachers and administrators in schools that have struggled with 
recruitment and retention (Berry, Montgomery, Curtis, Hernandez, Wurtzel, & Snyder, 
2008).  One prominent attempt to address staffing difficulties in certain types of schools has 




incentives may stand alone or may be embedded within more multi-faceted educator 
incentive plans, the initiatives at the center of this study and the focus of the next section of 
this chapter. 
An Attempt to Address Human Capital Issues: Educator Incentive Plans 
While a variety of factors have likely contributed to challenges related to measuring 
and investing in educator excellence and the inequitable distribution of educators across 
schools, the current salary structure for educators is frequently cited as a driver of human 
capital problems in education (Kelley, 1997).  Teachers’ salary schedules provide pay 
increases based on years of experience and on attainment of degrees; consequently, critics of 
these schedules argue that they reward “membership, longevity, and course-taking” (Kelley, 
1997, p. 25) over performance or quality.  Reliance on traditional salary schedules may be 
problematic, observers contend, because as “teachers age and move down (experience) and 
across (education) salary schedules, school districts will find themselves devoting ever larger 
expenditures to schedule-driven pay increases that are unlikely to have any significant effect 
on student achievement” (Podgursky & Springer, 2007, p. 944). 
Proponents of rethinking traditional salary schedules have offered a variety of 
alternative compensation proposals, including front-loading teacher pay by providing large 
raises to teachers early in their careers (Vigdor, 2008) and completely restructuring teacher 
compensation systems into comprehensive, tiered structures of career advancement (Johnson 
& Papay, 2009).  In addition, reformers have called for the creation and implementation of 
educator incentive plans.  In the following sections, I provide information about educator 
incentive programs.  First, I outline the theory of action behind educator incentives.  Then, I 




deal of attention to the different bases for awards that incentive plans might adopt, since I 
chose educator incentive plans to include in this dissertation based on their bases for awards.  
I next describe research on issues related to the implementation and effectiveness of extant 
educator incentive programs.  Finally, I turn to a discussion of the Teacher Incentive Fund 
(TIF), a federal grant program that provides monetary support for the creation and 
implementation of educator incentive plans across the country. 
Theory of action behind educator incentive plans.  Educator incentive plans 
provide targeted monetary awards to current and potential educators in an effort to change 
their behavior (or to reinforce currently-practiced desired behavior) and, ultimately, improve 
student performance.  These monetary awards could come as supplements to the traditional 
educator salary schedule or they could supplant parts of or entire traditional compensation 
schemes.  Often, program participants and incentive recipients are teachers, but building 
administrators and other school personnel (instructional and non-instructional) have also 
participated in some educator incentive programs.  Some programs mandate that educators 
participate, while others allow potential participants to opt into or out of programs 
voluntarily. 
Incentive plans vary in terms of who designed the program.  In some cases, the 
districts or schools that implement the programs design their own programs, whereas in other 
cases, local implementers adopt an external model.  A prominent external model – and the 
most common external model among recipients of TIF grants, which I discuss in more detail 
in a later section of this review – is TAP.  According to a 2010 report, “TAP’s 5,000 
participating teachers serve approximately 72,000 students and in 200 schools” (Rotherham, 




career paths” for educators), professional development, “instructionally focused 
accountability,” and performance-based rewards for teacher and administrator effectiveness 
based on student achievement measures and results from a performance evaluation (NIET, 
2014).  School systems (usually states or districts) that are interested in adopting the TAP 
model work with NIET to implement the program in their jurisdictions; schools within those 
systems must hold a vote on the implementation of the program and must apply to NIET in 
order to become TAP sites (NIET, 2014). 
The theory of action behind educator incentive plans suggests that these programs 
might impact human capital and ultimately improve student achievement through two 
mechanisms.  First, they could address issues related to measuring and investing in human 
capital by engendering a “productivity effect” (Glazerman, 2004, p. 2); that is, they could 
reward current or future educators’ for demonstrated performance or their participation in 
activities presumed to be associated with improved performance (Baumann et al., 2011).  
Educator incentive programs might impact educators’ performance by paying educators for 
their contributions to improved student achievement, rather than for years of experience or 
the acquisition of graduate degrees.  Programs may also impact performance by encouraging 
educators to participate in professional development, job expansion, or job redesign 
opportunities, which might increase their ability to improve student outcomes (Malen et al., 
2009).   
Second, programs (or parts of them) could impact human capital issues by affecting 
the supply and distribution of educators (Malen et al., 2009).  In terms of supply, the 
financial awards associated with these programs could generate a “composition effect” by 




2004, p. 2).  That is, high-quality prospective employees who value the opportunity to 
receive compensation based on performance may be motivated to become educators in a 
system where educator compensation is tied to educators’ impact, whereas these same high-
quality potential employees (or, at least, fewer of them) may not join the educator labor 
market given current compensation practices.7  In terms of distribution, these programs could 
be structured to provide educators with a financial award that might persuade them to “make 
job choices that will result in a more equitable distribution of high quality staff” across 
schools, grades, or subject areas (Malen et al., 2009, p. 2).  That is, incentives could 
encourage current and potential educators to take positions in schools that traditionally 
struggle with recruitment and retention or in subjects that are traditionally hard-to-staff (like 
mathematics, science, and special education).   
These productivity and distributive goals are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they are 
often found together in incentive plans.  Furthermore, a productivity/performance award may 
theoretically, in and of itself, serve to enhance supply; for instance, talented individuals who 
might otherwise not have become teachers due to dissatisfaction with current educator 
compensation policies might become teachers in a system where they will be paid based on 
their performance.  However, despite the overlap between these two mechanisms, they are 
conceptually distinct and could be addressed directly by different types of financial awards.   
Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the theory of action behind educator incentives. 
 
 
7 Note that this composition effect has, at least in theory, long term benefits for the educator labor market.  This 
composition mechanism would take many years to have an effect, so its results would likely not be evident for 
quite some time after program implementation.  See especially Hanushek and Linseth (2009) for an elaboration 
of this argument. 
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Figure 1. Theory of action behind educator incentive programs 
 
Note: This figure is an adaptation of similar conceptual maps in Glazerman (2004, p. 4) and Baumann et al. 
(2011, p. 9).  
 
Design features of incentive plans.  Educator incentive plans vary on a number of 
dimensions.  First, incentive initiatives vary in terms of who is eligible to participate in the 
program (Malen et al., 2009).  Some programs limit participation to school administrators, 
others limit participation to teachers, and still others are open to both administrators and 
teachers.  Among programs that allow teachers to participate, plans may restrict eligibility to 
particular types of teachers (e.g., those in tested subjects and grades) or may be open to all 
teachers.  Some programs expand eligibility and allow non-teacher instructional staff, 
support staff, and other staff to participate (Humphrey et al., 2012; Malen et al., 2009).  Some 
incentive initiatives allow eligible participants to volunteer to join the programs, while other 
programs mandate program involvement (Malen et al., 2009).  The level at which eligible 
participants can earn awards also varies: Some programs stipulate that eligible participants 
can earn awards as individuals, whereas other programs allow participants to earn awards 
collectively, such as when programs award groups of participants or entire schools 



















Second, programs vary in terms of the nature of the award (Malen et al., 2009).  Plans 
could provide awards that supplement educators’ base salary, or plans could be part of a new 
compensation structure wherein the incentive pay constitutes educators’ entire salaries 
(Glazerman, 2004).  Incentive plans could provide participants a bonus (paid out all at once 
or spread over time), or they could increase participants’ salary (Glazerman, 2004; Malen et 
al., 2009).  The nature of the award in incentive plans also varies in terms of its size; some 
programs offer incentives that are a small percentage of current educator salary, while other 
programs offer relatively large incentives (Glazerman, 2004; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
Third, incentive plans can vary in terms of the basis for financial awards (Malen et 
al., 2009).  Because I categorized incentive programs by bases for award and chose from 
among the categories to select incentive plans to include in this study, understanding the 
potential bases for awards in incentive plans is central to this dissertation.  Accordingly, I 
provide a more detailed explanation of potential bases for awards in the next section. 
More on program design: Potential bases for awards in incentive plans.  
Incentive plans can provide payments to educators based on three distinct types of awards, 
each of which is related to one of the major human capital issues outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter (identifying and measuring performance; investing in human capital; and 
impacting the supply and distribution of educators).  The following paragraphs address each 
of the three categories. 
Demonstrated performance.  First, plans might capitalize on new approaches to 
identifying and measuring educator quality in an attempt to reward educators for 
demonstrated performance.  In many cases, these awards are based, at least in part, on 




student achievement on standardized tests.  Student achievement may be determined in 
absolute terms, based on achievement of some level of proficiency, or on value-added terms, 
based on students’ growth or actual versus predicted scores on standardized tests (Humphrey 
et al., 2012).   Awards may also be based on SLOs, reduced discipline referrals, increases in 
graduation rates, or improvements in student satisfaction of school culture.  Contributions to 
positive student outcomes may be measured at the school level; the group, grade, or team 
level; the classroom level; or some combination of these (Heneman, Milanowski, & Kimball, 
2007; Humphrey et al., 2012).  Programs may also allocate performance-based awards for 
high scores on an observation of performance (Malen et al., 2009).  Many current programs 
that base awards (or parts of awards) on performance observations have abandoned checklist-
style evaluations in favor of more comprehensive standards-based evaluations like the 
Framework for Teaching developed by Charlotte Danielson (Danielson, 2007) or the TAP 
Teaching Skills, Knowledge, and Responsibilities Performance Standards (NIET, 2014).   
Investments in or extensions of practice.  Second, programs might allocate awards to 
educators for investments in or extensions of practice.  Among these types of awards are 
payments for educators’ knowledge and skills, demonstrated by activities like earning 
advanced degrees or obtaining National Board for Professional Teaching Standards 
certification (Heneman, Milanowski, & Kimball, 2007; Milanowski, Odden, & Youngs, 
1998; Podgursky & Springer, 2007) and payments for educators’ engagement in professional 
development activities (Malen et al., 2009).  Some programs also provide financial incentives 
for educators who undertake job expansion opportunities by performing special projects that 
might help educators or students perform well.  Other programs offer and provide rewards 




Educator supply and distribution.  Third, educator incentive programs might allocate 
awards in an attempt increase the supply of effective educators or to alter patterns of educator 
distribution by recruiting and retaining educators in persistently hard-to-staff schools or 
subjects.  Some programs attempt to achieve this end by providing explicit bonuses for 
working in hard-to-staff schools or subjects.  Other programs might lack a separate hard-to-
staff bonus but might instead locate incentive projects only in specific schools, thereby 
creating a de facto hard-to-staff program component.  Either way, the goal is increase the 
supply of high-quality educators and to encourage educators to work in locations or take on 
assignments that they might otherwise not have (Heneman, Milanowski, & Kimball, 2007; 
Humphrey et al., 2012). 
Issues related to educator incentives in practice.  The previous two sections outline 
the theory behind educator incentives and the potential bases for awards in educator incentive 
plans.  This section shifts from these conceptual considerations to an empirical discussion of 
issues related to the implementation and effectiveness of specific educator incentive plans.  
This section helps to contextualize the current study by explaining how projects like those at 
the center of this dissertation have played out in practice.  The paragraphs on implementation 
are particularly relevant insofar as they shed light on the resources required to implement 
educator incentives projects and the issues that administrators and teachers have faced as 
they have attempted to leverage those resources into successful projects.  The section on 
effectiveness is relevant to the current study insofar as it creates a space for discussion 
surrounding why educator incentive programs might be attractive to the policymakers and 




effectiveness develops, studies like these may serve as a potential basis for future cost-
effectiveness studies of these types of reforms. 
Implementation of educator incentive plans. Studies of the implementation of 
educator incentives highlight several challenges associated with implementing these plans.  A 
multi-year implementation study of one TIF grantee (Rice et al., 2012) categorized 
implementation challenges into four main categories: (1) stakeholder support; (2) 
measurement; (3) capacity; and (4) alignment.  Because findings from studies of other 
educator incentives programs often fit into one or more of those categories, I organize the 
following paragraphs around those four main challenges. 
Stakeholder support.  Research on educator incentives suggests that these programs 
have faced challenges related to gaining and maintaining support from key stakeholders such 
as teachers, administrators, and their unions.  Stakeholder support issues are important 
because programs that fail to obtain initially or sustain over time the support of these key 
stakeholders may be politically infeasible.  They may also be difficult or impossible to 
implement with fidelity if key personnel are unable or unwilling to put time and effort into 
program work.  Furthermore, stakeholder support issues can undercut the goals of incentive 
programs if they upset high-quality educators – the administrators and teachers that incentive 
programs aim to reward. 
Many stakeholder support issues highlighted in the literature on educator incentives 
relate to communication shortcomings, which can undercut key stakeholders’ support of the 
programs.  For instance, studies of an educator incentive project in Prince George’s County, 
Maryland, found that communication between project administrators and participating 




regarding an educator incentive plan in Washington County, Maryland, found that clear 
communication between the district and school sites was difficult (Measurement, Inc., 2011), 
and a study of a state-supported program in Texas highlighted communication difficulties 
between the state and participating districts (Springer et al., 2010).  Furthermore, studies of 
incentive plans in Ohio and New York City found that some participants still had 
misunderstandings of the projects even after they had been in place for a few years 
(MacAllum, Wells, & Ristow, 2011; Marsh et al., 2011).  An early implementation report of 
cohort 3 Teacher Incentive Fund evaluation districts found that, after one year of 
implementation, project participants’ understandings of the measures used to determine their 
awards and the size of their awards differed from district reports of these same topics (Max et 
al., 2014).  
Other stakeholder support issues have extended beyond communication challenges.  
Concerns regarding project fairness have also threatened educators’ support for incentive 
plans.  For instance, educators in Prince George’s County, Maryland, expressed concerns 
about whether or not requirements for participating in the incentive project and earning a 
payout were fair (Malen et al., 2009; Malen et al., 2011; Rice, Malen, Jackson, & Hoyer, 
2015).  Participants in an educator incentive plan in New York City expressed concerns 
regarding the composition of decision-making bodies and the extent to which teachers’ 
opinions mattered in program planning and implementation.  They also highlighted concerns 
over the fairness of the plan’s payout structure (Marsh et al., 2011).  The first implementation 
report of cohort 1 and 2 Teacher Incentive Fund grantees found evidence of fairness concerns 




linked educator performance to incentive pay; and whether or not project implementers were 
able to distribute awards accurately and without error (Humphrey et al., 2012). 
Measurement.  Educator incentives have also faced challenges associated with the 
projects’ attempts to identify and measure educator performance.  Some of these concerns 
have been related to stakeholder support issues; as outlined in the previous paragraphs, 
participants in a number of educator incentive projects were confused about performance 
measures or reported concerns regarding the fairness of the measures used to identify and 
assess educator performance.   
Measurement issues have not only been related to communication problems or 
concerns about fairness, however.  Incentive plans also have been accompanied by concerns 
over the extent to which the performance measures embedded within the programs accurately 
captured student progress or the quality of educators’ work.  Accuracy concerns have been 
linked to both test-based measures of educator performance and standards-based evaluations.  
For instance, research on an educator incentive project in Maryland found that some 
participants were skeptical that the student achievement measures presented an accurate 
portrait of their work (Malen et al., 2011).  Additionally, researchers who studied educator 
incentives in several Ohio school districts noted that teachers reported that they preferred 
school-based rather than classroom-based measures due, among other reasons, to “suspicion 
and distrust of value-added metrics” (MacAllum et al., 2011, p. 56).  Regarding standards-
based evaluations, some studies of educator incentives have found that teachers – especially 
those who teach young children, who teach children with special needs, and who teach 




the standards-based evaluation to their work (Malen et al., 2009, 2011; Measurement, Inc., 
2012). 
Capacity.  Many studies demonstrate that incentive plans have struggled to create 
district- and school-level capacity to implement the multiple moving parts of the projects.8  
Research on the implementation of an educator incentive project in Prince George’s County, 
Maryland, found evidence that the project required extensive district- and school-level 
capacity and that, despite multiple efforts to address these requirements, project 
administrators and participants struggled with project administration, implementation, and 
data management.  Capacity issues continued to be pervasive well into the life of the 
program.  Of particular note is that demands on educators’ time – related to the project as a 
whole but particularly associated with the new standards-based teacher evaluation system – 
were heavy and persistent (Malen et al., 2009, 2011, 2015; Rice et al., 2012).  Concerns 
about increased workload associated with projects and their standards-based evaluations were 
echoed in an evaluation of another educator incentive project, where school-level 
administrators and teachers reported that participation in the project was “time-consuming” 
(Measurement, Inc., 2012, p. 25).  
Additional capacity issues surfaced regarding the extent to which incentive projects 
would be able to sustain themselves after the expiration of external funding sources.  
Evaluations of multiple projects that had received federal Teacher Incentive Fund grants – 
four districts in Ohio and one in Maryland – found evidence that project participants and 
8 While they are not studies of educator incentive plans, per se, studies of teacher evaluation systems are 
instructive because these systems are often part of educator incentive programs.  For instance, research on the 
REACH teacher evaluation system in Chicago found that administrators had to spend a great deal of time 
implementing the new teacher evaluation system (Sporte et al., 2013), and a study on an intensive teacher 
recruitment/retention policy found that the amount of time that administrators spent on teacher evaluations 
increased during the implementation of the program (Chambers, Reyes, Wang, & O’Neil, 2014). 
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implementers lacked confidence in the sustainability of the projects beyond the life of the 
federal funds (MacAllum et al., 2011; Malen et al., 2011, 2015).  Additionally, a first 
implementation report on the entire group of cohort 1 and 2 Teacher Incentive Fund grantees 
highlights sustainability as an important issue facing the grantees and reports the strategies 
that grantees had been pursuing in attempts to gather additional funds to sustain their 
projects.  The implementation report notes that while several grantees secured additional 
external funding to continue their projects, “these sources of outside funding will themselves 
run out at some point [and] [g]rantees have been slower to make fundamental changes to 
build sustainability into their performance pay plan” (Humphrey et al., 2012, p. 53).  An 
evaluation of a state-funded incentive program in Texas found that district-level project 
implementers expressed concerns over “insufficient and unstable state funding,” which, in 
some cases, led sites to discontinue their projects (Springer et al., 2010, p. 19, 27).    
Alignment.  Finally, research on educator incentive plans demonstrates that 
implementers of these projects need to pay attention to aligning the reform with other district 
and school priorities and initiatives.  For instance, research on a TIF-supported educator 
incentive project in Maryland reported issues surrounding the project’s alignment with (a) 
broad district goals, (b) district management strategies, (c) instructional initiatives and 
programs, and (d) key features of the work carried out in schools.  Despite multiple efforts to 
address each of these facets of alignment, the project still faced the challenge of seeming 
disconnected from the work of administrators and teachers, or, worse, adding more work to 
already overloaded educators and creating a situation wherein “the presence of multiple 
initiatives can undercut [educators’] ability to implement any of those initiatives effectively” 




Effectiveness of educator incentive plans.  Research on the implementation of 
educator incentives resides alongside research on the effectiveness of educator incentive 
plans.  In addition to the ultimate goal of improving outcomes for students, educator 
incentive programs have intermediate goals of improving educator distribution or 
performance (Glazerman, 2004; Malen et al., 2009; Malen et al., 2011).  Evidence regarding 
the impact of incentive programs on administrator, teacher, and student performance, as well 
as program effects on educator retention, distribution, and recruitment into the profession is 
emerging.  In the following sections, I first summarize research regarding the impact of 
educator incentives on student achievement.  Then, I turn to a discussion of research on 
intermediate outcomes, such as the recruitment or retention of high-quality educators and 
improvements in educators’ practice. 
Evidence of the impact of educator incentive plans on student achievement.   
Evidence on the ability of incentive projects to raise student achievement is mixed.  In the 
following paragraphs, I first describe experimental evidence on two different incentive 
projects and then discuss non-experimental research on several projects. 
Experimental research from two districts – one that provided bonuses based on 
individual teachers’ performance and another that provided bonuses to entire schools based 
on school-wide student performance – did not find compelling evidence to suggest that the 
projects improved student achievement.  In the Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) 
experiment, researchers randomly assigned a group of participating middle school 




control groups.9  Researchers found only a modest and inconsistent impact of teacher 
eligibility for an incentive on student achievement; while treatment teachers’ students’ scores 
were better in the fifth grade (the youngest students in the study), the researchers did not find 
similar results for other grades, and the effects for the fifth graders did not persist over time 
(Springer et al., 2012).  A second experiment, the Schoolwide Performance Bonus Program 
(SPBP), took place in New York City and provided incentives based on school-wide 
achievement to schools that had been randomly assigned the opportunity to participate in 
SPBP.10  Two studies of this program generally found no statistically significant positive 
impact of the program on student achievement (Fryer, 2011; Marsh et al., 2011); in fact, one 
of the studies found statistically significant negative effects on students’ state assessment 
scores in treatment middle schools and on graduation rates in treatment high schools (Fryer, 
2011). 
Non-experimental research (i.e., research that did not rely on random assignment) on 
educator incentives provide additional insight into the potential impact of educator incentives 
on student achievement.  A number of non-experimental studies have investigated TAP, a 
prominent educator incentive model.  Studies of the TAP model report mixed and largely 
inconclusive findings on the relationship between the program and student achievement.  In 
an analysis of “thirty-two TAP schools and roughly 1,200 non-TAP schools from two states 
over a five year period from 2002-03 to 2006-07” (Springer, Ballou, & Peng, 2014, p. 195), 
researchers used different model specifications (ordinary least squares regression, models 
9 In the POINT experiment, while the researchers used random assignment to distribute the teachers to the 
treatment and control groups, teachers volunteered to be members of the pool of teachers eligible for the 
experiment. 
10 In the SPBP experiment, researchers identified a pool of high-needs schools and randomly assigned these 
schools to the treatment group (had the opportunity to opt into SPBP) and control group (did not have the 




                                                 
 
that included school fixed effects, models with matched samples, and an ordered-probit 
selection correction model) and found that students in TAP schools demonstrated higher 
achievement than their peers in non-TAP schools, but only in elementary schools.  In 
secondary schools, TAP effects were usually negative, sometimes statistically significantly 
so (Springer et al., 2014).  A set of propensity score analyses that compared TAP schools to 
non-TAP schools, this time in Chicago, found that the program had no consistent, discernible 
relationship with student achievement (Glazerman & Seifullah 2010; Glazerman & Seifullah, 
2012).11 A third analysis of TAP programs in the Ohio TIF (OTIF) project,12 which used a 
matched comparison, difference-in-differences design, found no relationship between TAP 
and improved student achievement (MacAllum et al., 2011). 
Evaluations of several locally-developed educator incentives generally suggest 
slightly more positive (though sometimes limited) relationships between the programs and 
improved student outcomes.  While a study of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) 
program found no evidence that the program had an impact on student achievement (Springer 
et al., 2009), a study of a different Texas program (District Awards for Teacher Excellence, 
or D.A.T.E.) found larger student achievement gains in participating schools, compared to 
non-participating schools (Springer et al., 2010).  Additionally, findings related to the 
locally-developed OTIF projects found small positive associations between students’ reading 
achievement scores and the incentive plans in one of the districts (MacAllum et al., 2011).  A 
11 Glazerman and Seifullah (2012) used different models to estimate the relationship between TAP and student 
performance.  While the authors found a potential positive impact of TAP on student achievement under some 
conditions, these findings did not hold under all conditions.  Glazerman and Seifullah (2012) also report 
findings from an experimental design, where some schools were randomly assigned to begin implementing TAP 
one year prior to other schools.  The authors found no impact due to an additional year of TAP implementation.  
Additionally, Glazerman and Seifullah (2012) report that implementation of TAP in these schools may not have 
been complete; after the third year of project implementation, NIET informed the district that project 
implementation did not adhere strongly enough to the TAP model. 
12 The initial OTIF project included four districts.  Two of those districts implemented a TAP project, while the 
other two implemented locally-developed models (MacAllum et al., 2011). 
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study of Denver’s ProComp program after its fourth year of implementation found little 
evidence that the program affected student achievement through increasing educator 
productivity and modest evidence that the program might have had a positive impact on 
student achievement by changing the composition of the local teacher labor market (i.e., 
attracting new, high-quality educators to work in Denver schools).  Still, the authors 
cautioned against wholehearted attribution of teacher or student improvement to the 
ProComp program, since the findings “may also reflect other policies and contextual factors 
at play” in the district (Wiley, et al., 2010, p. 26).  Propensity score matched comparison 
findings from multi-year evaluations (after the second, third, and fourth years of program 
implementation) of the Mission Possible program in Guilford County, North Carolina, 
suggest that the program had positive impacts on student achievement gains, but statistically 
significant findings were limited to single subjects and grades (6th grade math for years two 
and three; 7th grade math for year four; Bayonas, 2009; 2010; 2011).   
Evidence of the impact of educator incentive plans on intermediate outcomes.  While 
the ultimate goal of an educator incentive program is to improve student achievement, the 
theory of action suggests that a variety of intermediate goals – including the recruitment and 
retention of high-quality educators, the improvement of teachers’ instructional performance, 
and the improvement of administrators’ building leadership – could help bring about the 
ultimate goal of student achievement.  The following paragraphs first present information 
about educator recruitment and/or retention and then present information about educator 
behavior. 
Some research on the relationship between educator incentive plans and educator 




plans and desired outcomes.  Early evidence from an experiment that involved cohort 3 
Teacher Incentive Fund grantees suggests a small positive impact of participation in a 
performance pay program on retention.  A higher percentage of principals and teachers in 
treatment schools (compared to educators in the control schools) reported that they remained 
in their schools because of TIF; still, the effect was small, since only 10 percent of principals 
and three percent of teachers in the treatment schools reported that they stayed in their 
schools because of TIF (Max et al., 2014, p. 79).  The impact of the incentive projects on 
recruitment, however, was less clear.  The study found that while a higher percentage of 
principals in the treatment schools reported that they used discussions of bonuses to try to 
recruit teachers to their schools, there was no difference between treatment and control 
schools’ principals’ success in actually recruiting educators to their buildings (Max et al., 
2014, pp. 76-77).  Another study, which focused on the ProComp program in Denver, 
presented descriptive evidence to suggest that teacher retention improved while the incentive 
plans were in place (Wiley et al., 2010).  Regression discontinuity results from a study of an 
educator incentive program in Washington, D.C. found that during the second year of 
program implementation, low-performing teachers, who, under the terms of the incentive 
plan were at risk of losing their jobs, were more likely to exit the system, compared to more 
highly-rated teachers (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013). 
Literature on the relationship between incentive projects and instructional 
performance also tends to highlight positive findings; evaluations of two district programs 
and one statewide program found perceived improvements in educators’ practice and 
increased collaboration among educators (MacAllum et al., 2011; Measurement, Inc., 2012; 




that program participants perceived the educator incentive program (or perhaps more 
accurately, the standards-based performance evaluation and inducements to engage in 
professional development that were embedded within the program) to have a positive impact 
on teacher instructional practice and administrators’ ability to have meaningful conversations 
with teachers about classroom instruction (Malen et al., 2011).  Regression discontinuity 
results from the Washington, D.C., study indicated that teachers who initially received high 
performance ratings, who would be eligible for permanent salary increases if they received 
high performance ratings for a second year in a row, demonstrated improved performance in 
the following year.  Additionally, teachers who received low ratings in the second year of the 
program, and thus could face dismissal if they received low ratings the next year, 
demonstrated improved performance during the third year of the program (Dee & Wyckoff, 
2013). 
The studies I reviewed in the preceding paragraphs attempt to uncover the extent to 
which educator incentives can be linked to improvements in student performance, educator 
distribution, and educator performance.  While some studies could discern no association 
between incentive plans and anticipated effects (particularly with respect to student 
achievement), some studies found effects on student achievement, and other studies 
suggested that the plans may have been related to other desired outcomes (e.g., educator 
retention or improvements in instructional performance).   It is important to note that, in 
general, the studies I discuss above took place relatively early in program implementation.  
Some proponents of educator incentives argue that we should not expect to see program 
benefits early in program implementation because the theory of action behind incentive plans 




Lindseth, 2009).  That is, the theory of action behind these programs suggests that they may 
not only promote current educators to behave in certain ways but may also alter the 
composition of the educator labor market by encouraging talented individuals who may not 
have otherwise considered education to enter the profession.   
The Teacher Incentive Fund.  Despite implementation challenges, alongside limited 
positive evidence regarding their effectiveness, and amid continued support of a promising 
theory of action, educator incentives remain popular policy options.  In recent years, 
expanding numbers of educator incentive projects have been implemented across the United 
States due to financial support from the federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF).  In this 
section, I provide an overview of the TIF grant program.  Then, I present a brief description 
of the projects that have received TIF grants. 
Overview of the TIF grant program. Congress created the TIF grant program through 
the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2006.  Between the policy’s creation and fiscal year 2014, Congress 
appropriated over $2 billion for grant awards and national activities (such as technical 
assistance to grant recipients and program evaluation).13  The Teacher Incentive Fund has the 
following four goals: 
• “Improving student achievement by increasing teacher and principal effectiveness; 
• Reforming teacher and principal compensation systems so that teachers and principals 
are rewarded for increases in student achievement; 
• Increasing the number of effective teachers teaching poor, minority, and 
disadvantaged students in hard-to-staff subjects; and 
• Creating sustainable performance-based compensation systems” 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2012d). 
13 The total current appropriations amount differs from the total current grant award amount (table 1) for two 
reasons.  First, not all funds appropriated for TIF must be used for awards; according to the statute, the U.S. 
Department of Education may use up to five percent of appropriations to TIF for national activities (Personal 
communication with TIF program personnel, 2013).  Second, because the Department awards five-year awards 
to grantees, some of the awarded amounts will need to be funded by future allocations. 
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While the requirements for TIF grants have changed slightly over the life of the grant 
program, these priorities have remained constant.  In general, TIF grantees must provide 
educators (administrators and teachers) in high-needs schools with additional compensation 
for improving student achievement.  Grantees may also base awards on employment in hard-
to-staff schools or subject areas and on educators’ assumption of additional leadership 
opportunities (either job expansion opportunities, which provide educators the chance to 
perform extra work that aligns with their current job descriptions, or job redesign 
opportunities, which reconceptualize educators’ work and allow them to take on roles that are 
distinct from those in their original job descriptions).  Regardless of whether or not educators 
receive payments for professional development, TIF-supported projects must provide 
meaningful and timely professional development for administrators and teachers (Humphrey, 
et al., 2012; U.S. Department of Education, 2012a).   
There have been four rounds of TIF competitions.  Cohort 1 and 2 grantees (awarded 
in 2006 and 2007, respectively) were only required to include administrators in their 
programs and could choose whether or not to provide teachers the opportunity to participate.  
In cohort 3 (awarded in 2010), the Department of Education did require that grantees include 
teachers.  Additionally, grantees had to base incentives for teachers on “an objective, 
evidence-based rubric for teacher evaluations” in addition to student achievement gains 
(Humphrey, et al., 2012, p. 3).  During the application process, prospective cohort 3 grantees 
could opt to apply for the general TIF competition or for a national evaluation competition, 
wherein the grantees would agree to participate in a program evaluation sponsored by the U. 
S. Department of Education (Humphrey, et al., 2012).  The 2012 round (cohort 4) included 




responsibilities” (U.S. Department of Education, 2012a, p. 12) had to be primarily based on 
classroom-level gains in student achievement (as opposed to grade-, team-, or school-level 
improvement).  Further, applicants for the fourth grant administration had to provide 
evidence of “an LEA-wide human capital management system (HCMS) with educator 
evaluation systems at the center … [and] LEA-wide educator evaluation systems based, in 
significant part, on student growth” (U.S. Department of Education, 2012a, pp. 11-12).  
Additionally, prospective cohort 4 grantees could apply for the general TIF competition or 
could choose to apply in a separate pool for educator incentive programs that focused on 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (U.S. Department of Education, 2012a).   
Across the four rounds of grants, the TIF program has awarded approximately $2.5 
billion to 131 recipients (Humphrey et al., 2012; U.S. Department of Education, 2012d).  Six 
of those recipients have left the program, either through voluntary withdrawals or through 
failure to meet grant requirements.  Table 1 provides a breakdown of awards to grantees who 



























Cohort 1 15 $3,577,483 $32,350,615 $220,870,122 
Cohort 2 17 $1,058,058 $26,328,669 $199,559,714 
Cohort 3 58 $607,211 $59,007,705 $1,086,892,678 
Cohort 4 35 $4,530,500 $62,282,839 $986,560,954 
Total Across 
All Cohortsb 
125 $607,211 $62,282,839 $2,493,883,468 
Source: Personal communication with TIF program personnel and the Center for Educator Compensation 
Reform (CECR) 
a This table does not include information on grantees that left the program: Mare Island Technical Academy 
(cohort 1), Lynwood Unified School District (cohort 2), the College-Ready Promise (cohort 3), Chicago Public 
Schools (cohort 3), New York City Department of Education (cohort 3), and Milwaukee Public schools (cohort 
3).  Information on grant closure can be found in Humphrey et al. (2012) and at 
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/apps/index.html (accessed on June 17, 2014). 
b Recipients in later cohorts have not completed their five-year grant period, so they have not yet received their 
entire grants.  Whether or not programs actually receive this amount depends upon sufficient appropriations to 
TIF by Congress. 
 
For the first three cohorts, TIF “increasing share” requirements stated that the TIF 
grant awards could not be the only source of funds that supported the projects’ incentive 
payments.  In cohorts 1 and 2, grantees were required to increase the share of non-TIF funds 
used to allocate performance-based awards such that, by the last year of the grant period, 75 
percent of the funds used for awards had to come from non-TIF sources.  For the third grant 
cohort, the TIF requirement no longer stated that 75 percent of performance awards had to 
come from a non-TIF source, but grantees were still required to increase the share of 
performance-based compensation that came from sources other than the grant each year 
(Humphrey et al., 2012).  In contrast to the first three cohorts, cohort 4 grantees do not face a 
cost-sharing requirement (U.S. Department of Education, 2012a). 
Overview of TIF-supported projects.  TIF has funded a wide range of educator 
incentive projects, many of which were developed by the grantee that would eventually 




chose to implement a plan that an external partner had already created.  When the projects 
included external partners, the external partner was often TAP (which I describe above, in the 
section on the theory of action behind educator incentive projects).  Seven of the 33 cohort 1 
and 2 projects operated TAP; among the 62 cohort 3 grantees, at least 15 operated a TAP 
project (CECR, 2012); and at least three (and potentially more) of the 35 winners of cohort 4 
grants planned to operate TAP (U.S. Department of Education, 2012b).  Perhaps because of 
the varied nature of their origins, TIF projects reflect a variety of structures in terms of how 
they approach demonstrated performance, investments in or extensions of practice, and 
educator supply and distribution.  The following paragraphs provide an overview of how TIF 
projects address these issues. 
Demonstrated performance.  TIF requires that grantees base awards on demonstrated 
performance.  Most TIF projects base awards on multiple measures of demonstrated 
performance (i.e., test-based student achievement measures and other types of evaluations). 
Cohort 1 and 214 grantees were required to provide differentiated, performance-based 
compensation for school administrators, but they had the choice of whether or not to provide 
differentiated, performance-based compensation for teachers.  Thirty-one of the 33 projects 
did decide to include teachers (Humphrey et al., 2012).  All 33 projects used student 
achievement data in determinations of administrator effectiveness; of these: 
• ten projects used a value-added model,  
• 12 used some other type of growth model,  
14 Findings in the following sections come from project evaluations sponsored by the U.S. Department of 
Education.  I report findings for cohorts 1 and 2 separately from findings for cohort 3, because the studies used 
different units of analyses.  The study on cohorts 1 and 2 focused on grantees, whereas the study for cohort 3 
focused on participating districts (which does not translate evenly to grantees, because some grantees included 
multiple districts).  Cohort 4 grantees are in the early stages of implementation, and the Department of 
Education has not yet released a study pertaining to these projects. 
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• one project based the award on student achievement levels, and  
• ten used some combination of value-added, growth, and achievement levels 
(Humphrey et al., 2012, p. 15).   
Thirty projects used student achievement data in determinations of teacher effectiveness; of 
these: 
• 12 used a value-added model,  
• seven used some other type of growth model, and  
• 11 used some combination of value-added, growth, and student achievement 
levels (Humphrey et al., 2012, p. 13).   
Eighteen projects based administrators’ performance pay on standards-based evaluations 
(Humphrey et al., 2012, p. 17), and 16 projects tied teachers’ performance pay to 
performance on a standards-based evaluation (Humphrey et al., 2012, p. 15). 
Cohort 3 grantees were required to provide differentiated compensation based on 
student achievement and observations for both school administrators and teachers.  High 
percentages of participating districts met these requirements.  For administrators: 
• 92 percent of responding districts reported that they had used student 
achievement to determine administrator performance.  More specifically: 
o 90 percent reported that they used growth measures15 and  
o 65 percent reported that they used student achievement levels, and  
• 75 percent of responding districts reported that they had used observations to 
determine administrator performance (Max et al., 2014, p. 27).16   
15 In the study of cohort 3 grantees, growth measures included value-added models and other methods for 
determining growth. 
16 Findings for cohort 3 grantees were based on a survey of districts that received TIF grants.  The study had an 
overall response rate of 90.7 percent (Max et al., 2014, p. B-3). 
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For teachers: 
• 83 percent of responding districts reported that they used student 
achievement to determine teacher performance.  More specifically: 
o 76 percent of responding districts reported that they used growth 
measures, and  
o 45 percent of responding districts reported that they used student 
achievement levels. 
• Nearly all (98 percent) of responding districts had met the requirement to 
base measures of teacher effectiveness on observations (Max et al., 2014, p. 
26). 
In sum, these findings demonstrate that the majority of districts (over three quarters in all 
cases) did meet requirements to base administrators’ and teachers’ incentives on student test 
scores and standards-based evaluations. 
Investments in or extensions of practice. Many TIF projects have included 
investments in or extensions of practice, including professional development, job redesign, 
and job expansion opportunities, and some projects have attached payments to these types of 
activities. Among cohort 1 and 2 grantees, 10 projects offered teachers payments for 
participating in professional development opportunities.  Thirteen projects included a job 
redesign component whereby teachers could take on responsibilities as coaches, master 
teachers, or mentor teachers (Humphrey et al., 2012, p. 18). 
Provision of professional development (regardless of whether bonuses were explicitly 
tied to participation in professional development) was a requirement for cohort 3 grantees.  




development; only 16 percent did so for administrators, and only 28 percent did so for 
teachers (Max et al., 2014, p. 32).  Few cohort 3 grantees included job redesign and 
expansion opportunities for administrators.  Only 15 percent of responding districts reported 
that they provided bonuses to administrators for assuming additional responsibilities.  Job 
redesign opportunities for teachers, however, were more common; about two-thirds of 
responding districts reported that they allowed teachers to serve as mentor teachers, and 55 
percent of districts reported that they allowed teachers to serve as master or lead teachers.  
Many districts offered job expansion opportunities, including but not limited to activities like 
serving on a leadership team or becoming a department chair (Max et al., 2014, p. 32). 
Educator supply and distribution. Many TIF projects have attempted to affect the 
supply and distribution of teachers, either by explicitly attaching bonuses to teaching in hard-
to-staff subjects and schools or by locating the projects only in particular schools in the 
district (in an effort to attract educators to those schools rather than to other schools).  Even 
when the projects were in all schools in a district, some grantees “reported, to varying 
extents, that they hoped TIF would give them a competitive advantage in the local labor 
market in which they are not perceived as the most desirable employer” (Humphrey et al. 
2012, p. 17). 
According to Humphrey et al. (2012), among cohort 1 and 2 grantees: 
Five grantees (out of the 31 grantees that included teachers in their project) gave 
additional compensation to teachers for working in hard-to-staff schools, five 
grantees (out of the 33 that included administrators in their project) gave 
administrators incentive awards for working in such schools, and in eight grantees, 
teachers received awards for teaching hard-to-staff subjects.  Additionally, five 
grantees (out of the 33 grantees) targeted higher need schools in their state or district 





Among cohort 3 respondents, 17 percent reported that they provided bonuses to 
teachers for teaching in hard-to-staff schools, and 24 percent reported that they provided 
bonuses to teachers for teaching in hard-to-staff subjects (Max et al., 2014, p. 32). 
Summary: Human Capital in Education 
The TIF grant program and the projects that receive TIF support exist in a landscape 
of policies that attempt to address human capital issues in education.  In this section of the 
literature review, I have presented an overview of this landscape and the ways in which 
educator incentive plans fit into this arena.  For instance, one major human capital issue 
surrounds the evaluation of educator performance.  Educator incentives in general and TIF 
projects in particular attempt to address this issue by attaching payments to educators’ 
demonstrated performance, often based on student achievement and standards-based 
evaluations.  A second major human capital issue surrounds investments in educator capital; 
educator incentive plans aim to invest in or extend educator practice by providing 
opportunities for professional development, job redesign opportunities, and/or job expansion 
opportunities.  Finally, a third major human capital issue surrounds ensuring an adequate 
supply of effective educators and distributing these educators across schools equitably and 
efficiently.  Educator incentive projects seek to address educator supply and distribution by 
providing payments for working in hard-to-staff schools or subjects or by leveraging targeted 
project implementation (i.e., being located only in certain schools or districts) to encourage 
educators to work in settings they might otherwise not have chosen.   
Research on educator incentive projects highlights that these programs face a variety 
of implementation challenges, particularly in the areas of stakeholder support, measurement, 




program effectiveness generally do not suggest that the projects raise student achievement; 
non-experimental research, however, has found evidence that incentive plans may have 
positive (though, in some cases, limited) associations with improvements in student 
performance, educator distribution, and educator practice.   
Perhaps due, at least in part, to the support from the Teacher Incentive Fund, school 
districts across the nation have adopted educator incentive plans.  In the face of limited, 
suggestive evidence that educator incentive plans may have a positive impact on the 
composition of the teacher labor market (by inducing potentially-high-performing educators 
into the profession) and given that educator incentive plans have proliferated despite lack of 
conclusive evidence of positive impacts on student achievement and educator performance, it 
is important to have a more informed understanding of their costs.  This dissertation adds to 
the body of research on educator incentives by performing a cost analysis of the 
implementation of these complex human capital reforms.  In the next section of the literature 
review, I discuss in more detail the concept of cost and how other researchers have applied 
that concept to education research. 
Conceptual Foundation: Opportunity Cost 
This dissertation examines educator incentive plans through the lens of opportunity 
cost.  In this section of the literature review, I rely mainly on scholarly (peer-reviewed) 
sources to provide background on opportunity cost.  I also use information from a research 
center dedicated to the promotion of cost analysis in education.  In this section, I first provide 
a definition of opportunity cost, and I explain how researchers have studied this concept.  
Second, I provide an overview of issues that researchers who investigate opportunity cost 




Definition of Opportunity Cost 
The fundamental concept upon which this study relies is opportunity cost, or “the 
value of all that must be sacrificed to do [an activity]” (Frank, 2008, p. 7).  The pursuit of any 
activity requires resources – be they money or time or some other resources – and choosing 
to employ resources to engage in one activity means that it is no longer possible to employ 
those specific resources for another activity.  Thus, the cost of the endeavor is the loss of the 
opportunity to pursue alternative activities and reap whatever benefits those alternatives 
might have yielded (Fowler & Monk, 2001).  This view of cost is expansive; it encompasses 
the value of all of the resources – fiscal and non-fiscal – required to pursue a goal.  
According to Levin and McEwan (2001), 
Although this may appear to be a peculiar way to view costs, it is probably more 
familiar to each of us than it appears at first glance. … In cases in which the only cost 
is the expenditure of funds that could have been used for other goods and services, the 
sacrifice or cost can be stated in terms of expenditure.  However, in daily usage, we 
also make statements like, “It cost me two lucrative sales,” in the case of a 
salesperson who missed two sales appointments because he or she was tied up in a 
traffic jam.  In some cases we may even find that the pursuit of an activity “cost us a 
friendship.” In each of these cases, a loss was incurred… (p. 44). 
 
Because opportunity costs are comprised of all monetary and non-monetary resources 
required to achieve some goal, they are distinct from expenditures, or transfers of money 
from one party to another.  The relationship between costs and expenditures varies.  In some 
cases, costs are higher than expenditures.  Costs outpace expenditures when the pursuit of a 
goal requires the investment of non-fiscal resources (e.g., time, effort, donated goods), over 
and above the investment of money required to achieve the goal.  In other cases, costs are 
lower than expenditures; expenditures associated with the pursuit of an activity outpace costs 
when someone who pursues a goal spends fiscal resources unnecessarily, inefficiently, or 




desired outcome.  Finally, (as mentioned by Levin and McEwan, 2001, quoted above), costs 
might equal expenditures when the only resources required to pursue a goal are monetary 
resources and when the person who uses those monetary resources does so efficiently.   
Opportunity costs may be borne by a variety of individuals.  Understanding who 
bears the opportunity costs of an activity requires acknowledgement of the societal cost of an 
endeavor, or the total opportunity cost of that endeavor to society as a whole.17  Sometimes, 
only those people who are participating in the activity incur the opportunity costs.  In cases 
like these, the total societal opportunity cost associated with the activity is simply the sum of 
the costs borne by all of the participants.  Often, however, activities have an external cost, or 
“a cost that falls on people who are not directly involved in an activity” (Frank, 2008, p. 16).  
In these cases, the societal opportunity cost of the activity is the sum of the costs borne by 
participants plus all of the external costs associated with the activity. 
Those who seek to study opportunity costs can engage in resource-cost studies.  
Resource-cost studies are distinct from fiscal analyses that rely on an accounting model, 
which systematically account for organizations’ actual expenditures and provide a function 
and object categorization of the items on which organizations spent their money.18  
Resource-cost studies, on the other hand, systematically identify the resources required to 
pursue an activity (regardless of whether those resources are associated with actual 
expenditures) and calculate the opportunity costs associated with all of those resources 
(Chambers, 1999; Hartman, Bolton, & Monk, 2001).  Resource-cost analyses rely on the 
“ingredients method” and require that researchers identify all of the components of the 
17 Some economic literature refers to this concept as “social cost.”  In order to ensure that this concept is not 
confused with the human cost category of social cost (which I describe in more detail below), in this 
dissertation I use the term “societal cost.” 
18 In educational organizations, functions might include administration and instruction, and objects might 
include personnel, facilities, materials, and travel. 
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activity under investigation, catalog the full range of resources (or “ingredients”) necessary 
to carry out all of the activity’s components, and determine the costs associated with using 
those resources (Hartman et al., 2001; Levin & McEwan, 2001).  Analysts can also use 
resource-cost studies to shed light on the distribution of costs across different members of 
society; they do so by determining which stakeholders (e.g., organizations, workers, 
taxpayers) contribute which resources to the endeavor and how much those resources cost 
(Levin & McEwan, 2001).  
Different types of analyses (cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit, and cost-feasibility 
analyses) could result from a resource-cost study.  Cost-effectiveness studies allow analysts 
to compare ratios of costs and effects across programs with similar desired outcomes.  Cost-
benefit studies allow analysts to understand whether and by how much the benefits (defined 
in monetary terms) of any intervention or set of interventions outweigh their costs.  Cost-
feasibility studies allow analysts to provide a systematic account of the costs associated with 
implementing a policy (Levin & McEwan, 2001).  While these types of analyses answer 
slightly different questions and therefore explore the relationship between the costs and 
effects of educational programs in different ways, all three provide comprehensive 
information regarding the costs associated with the necessary resources for educational 
interventions; all but one (cost-feasibility analysis) also include information regarding 
program effectiveness. 
While the field of education research may have been slow to adopt cost analysis as a 
lens through which to analyze educational interventions (Levin, 2001; Rice, 2002), 
opportunity-cost-conscious educational researchers have continued to advocate for an 




provide a comprehensive explanation of how to apply systematic cost analysis techniques in 
a primer on the method, and Levin and Belfield (2013) explain the method and provide 
recommendations for cost studies.  McEwan (2002) and Hummel-Rossi and Ashdown (2002) 
outline several criteria that would signal a high-quality cost template study, and Rice (1997) 
suggests possibilities for cost analyses and provides guidance on how to approach these 
studies.  These writers argue for expanding the number of high-quality cost studies to which 
the research and policy communities have access, so that those who study and consider 
implementing various educational policies are able to understand the costs that accompany 
them. 
Over time, cost analyses of educational initiatives have become more widely 
available.  A number of cost studies provide information regarding the resources required to 
implement programs, the costs associated with those resources, and the implications of those 
findings for policymaking and policy implementation more broadly.  For instance, Rice and 
Brent’s (2002) analysis of the resources required to implement an alternative teacher 
certification program, Barnett (1985) and Masse and Barnett’s (2002) studies of early 
childhood education programs, and Rice and Hall’s (2008) investigation of National Board 
for Professional Teaching Standards certification all shed light on the opportunity costs that 
members of society bear in order to invest in the programs under study.  In addition to 
providing information about societal opportunity costs, King’s (1994) study about the costs 
associated with implementing prominent whole-school reform models and Rice’s (2001) 
analysis of the costs associated with creating comprehensive community support networks 
for children highlight issues related to resource substitution.  Levin, Catlin, and Elson (2007) 




implementation affects resource use and, consequently, cost.  In order to highlight how cost 
studies inform our thinking about opportunity costs, I briefly describe three of these studies 
below and use them in subsequent sections to illustrate how they illuminate programs’ 
opportunity costs and deal with issues common to cost analyses.  
Levin, Catlin, and Elson (2007) use the ingredients method to perform a resource-cost 
analysis of three adolescent literacy interventions (READ 180, Questioning the Author, and 
Reading Apprenticeship).  The authors present a number of cost templates, or detailed tables 
of the ingredients necessary to implement the interventions and the costs associated with the 
ingredients.  The templates outline costs for multiple sites that implemented each of the three 
programs in the study. The authors argue that (a) even for established educational 
interventions, variability in implementation exists across participating district and/or school 
sites; (b) variability in local program implementation impacts initiative resource requirements 
and, therefore, total and per-participant program cost; and (c) attention to implementation 
variability and associated resource variation is necessary in discussions of initiative adoption, 
implementation, and effectiveness. 
Rice and Hall (2008) identify the opportunity costs associated with four National 
Board certification support programs.  The authors explain the construction and interpretation 
of cost templates that outline (a) program-related costs (or costs related to running or 
participating in a National Board support program); (b) process-related costs (or costs related 
to engaging in the National Board certification process); and (c) other costs.  The authors 
present a comparison of the costs associated with various models of National Board support 
programs to the costs of obtaining a master’s degree (another popular option for teacher 




that while the costs of the National Board support programs varied across the initiatives in 
the study, the largest cost in all four sites was associated with uncompensated participant 
time.  They also conclude that the National Board support programs were less costly than 
were various types of engagement (full-time, night-time, summer-time) in a master’s 
program. 
Hollands and colleagues (2014) pair cost information with data on program effects to 
present a cost-effectiveness analysis of five different high school completion interventions 
(Talent Search, Job Corps, JOBSTART, the National Guard Youth Challenge [NGYC], and 
New Chance).  In this study, the researchers applied the ingredients method to determine the 
costs associated with implementing Talent Search in five different sites.  They relied on 
previously-released studies of the costs associated with implementing the other four high 
school completion initiatives; however, because the prior cost studies did not rely on the 
ingredients method, the researchers modified the cost estimates in an attempt to make the 
estimates more comparable across programs.  This study compares the cost-effectiveness 
ratios of each of the high school completion initiatives.  It also provides insights regarding 
challenges associated with such comparisons, such the difficulty of comparing ratios across 
programs when cost data come from different sources or methods and the difficulty of 
comparing ratios across programs when there are slight variations in (what might appear to 
be) similar desired outcomes.  The findings highlight that differences in program structure 
and target populations impact cost-effectiveness ratios.  The authors argue that analysts 
should gather and analyze cost data at the same time as they gather and analyze 
implementation and effectiveness data; that researchers should provide site-specific cost, 




method can help decision-makers choose among alternative educational initiatives by helping 
them match the programs’ requirements with resources that are available in their contexts. 
Issues Related to Conducting Analyses of Opportunity Cost 
The three studies I describe above are resource-cost studies that use the ingredients 
method.  As I mention above, those who engage in resource-cost studies move one step 
beyond the accounting categories of function (e.g., administration, instruction, support) and 
object (e.g., personnel, facilities, materials, travel) to identify the ingredients that fall within 
these broad function-object categories.  Taking the extra step to identify the ingredients that 
are necessary to pursue an activity allows analysts to provide a more nuanced and accurate 
view of opportunity costs than is possible with budget-focused function-object analyses, 
which can distort costs by failing to distinguish them from expenditures and can hide the 
costs of activities by lumping them together with other activities (Levin & McEwan, 2001; 
Levin et al., 2012; Odden, Archibald, Fermanich, & Gallagher, 2002).19  According to 
Hollands and colleagues (2014), “By focusing on ingredients, this approach [the ingredients 
or resource-cost approach] begins not with a budget but with the details of the intervention 
and its resource requirements” (p. 309).  Paying close attention to the activity or intervention 
itself and the ingredients necessary to pursue it puts the focus of the analysis squarely on cost 
(the value of all resources required to pursue a goal) rather than expenditure (the exchange of 
money from one party to another).   
19 Here, I discuss analyses that rely on budgets in accounting terms.  I do not mean to suggest that use of the 
accounting model is never appropriate nor do I mean to suggest that the accounting model is inferior to the 
resource-cost model.  These two approaches simply have different goals: the accounting approach allows for a 
clear understanding of where expenditures have gone, while the resource-cost approach takes an economist’s 
perspective and details opportunity costs associated with activities. For a longer discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of both the accounting and the resource-cost models, see Hartman et al., 2001. 
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Cost analyses require a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the program 
under study.  Researchers must be able to differentiate the intervention itself from other 
activities that, though possibly related, are distinct from the program under study.  Especially 
in the case of programs that might be replicated (or, in the language of many school reform 
efforts, brought to scale), analysts need to be able to determine the program model and 
identify the extent to which the program’s costs build incrementally on the costs of related 
activities and the extent to which they do not.  It is through this detailed understanding of the 
programs (or, in many cases, program models) that scholars can identify the resources 
necessary to implement the intervention and evaluate the costs associated with those 
resources (Levin & McEwan, 2001; Rice & Hall, 2008). 
One way that many resource-cost scholars organize the resources and associated costs 
of the program under study – and the way recommended by Levin and McEwan (2001) and 
Levin and Belfield (2013), prominent proponents of the ingredients method of resource-cost 
analyses – is through the use of a cost template, or a spreadsheet that systematically lists all 
of the types and quantities of resources necessary to implement the program (Levin & 
McEwan, 2001; Rice, 1997).  This approach allows analysts to create a comprehensive yet 
transparent tool to systematically account for all of the ingredients (e.g., personnel, facilities, 
equipment and materials, travel and transportation, and other) required to implement a 
program and the costs associated with those ingredients.  While opportunity costs are distinct 
from expenditures, analysts can use market values of goods and services to estimate costs 
once researchers have compiled a list of resources necessary to implement a program (Levin 
& McEwan, 2001).  That is, it is possible to monetize most, if not all, of the resources 




opportunity cost.  Though some resources are challenging to monetize, this approach is 
useful because it provides a relatively understandable (though imperfect) measure of the 
sacrifices associated with pursuing a goal.  Insofar as scholars who monetize resources to 
present a quantitative value for the opportunity costs associated with an intervention keep 
careful track of the decisions they made along the way that might impact their studies’ 
findings, these quantitative values can be very useful in helping readers understand the 
magnitude of the costs associated with choosing to invest in one course of action over 
another.  Additionally, the templates allow readers to see how altered assumptions and the 
imposition of local conditions might impact the cost of educational interventions (Rice, 
1997). 
Creating a cost template requires researchers to address a number of issues associated 
with estimating opportunity costs.  These issues include: (a) comparability of costs across 
programs in different locations; (b) issues associated with time; (c) issues associated with 
program scale; (d) substitutability of resources; (d) the distribution of costs across 
stakeholders; and (e) program outcomes (Levin & McEwan, 2001).  I briefly describe each of 
these issues below and provide examples of how the three studies I described above (Levin, 
Catlin, and Elson, 2007; Rice and Hall, 2008; and Hollands et al., 2014) addressed them. 
Comparability of costs across programs in different locations.  While cost studies 
are not generalizable in the way that statistical analyses are, they often deal with cross-
program analyses and thus must produce comparable opportunity cost estimates for each of 
the programs in the study.  Cost studies must address the fact that prices of resources often 
vary across geographical regions.  For instance, personnel costs, which often drive the costs 




While some differences in costs across locales are the result of policy decisions, other 
differences, such as differences in the cost of living in different geographical areas, are 
outside the control of local decision-makers.  Cost analyses that seek to compare costs across 
programs in different locations need to address the issue of cost differences that are outside 
the control of the local policymakers (Taylor & Fowler, 2006). 
Researchers can address this issue by substituting a standardized value for the more 
particular value that is only relevant to one geographical location. Each of the three studies 
that I describe above (Hollands, et al., 2014; Levin et al., 2007; Rice & Hall, 2008) addressed 
this issue by using national prices (or national averages, in the case of costs like salaries) in 
order to standardize values across programs in various locations.  In an effort to recognize 
both the broad and particular applications of their research, Rice and Hall (2008) used 
national averages to assign values to resources to allow for cross-program comparison, but 
they also note that decision-makers can use the cost templates they created to inform local 
decisions by inserting context-specific values instead of national estimates (p. 347). 
Issues with time.  Cost comparability is impacted not only by geographical 
differences in the value of resources but also by temporal differences in the value of goods 
and services.  Three issues with time (annualizing multiyear costs, dealing with inflation, and 
dealing with future costs) are particularly relevant to studies of opportunity cost. 
Annualizing multiyear costs.  When program implementers are able to use a resource 
over a period of several years, they only incur part of the cost of the resource each year.  As 
resources like facilities and equipment age, they depreciate in value; that is, they become 
more and more “used up” as the years pass and are therefore less valuable over time.  




opportunity cost to program implementers, since they have given up the opportunity to use 
the resources associated with these facilities or equipment to purse some other activity (Levin 
& McEwan, 2001, pp. 66-67).  Given these considerations associated with the multiyear 
nature of some resources, in order to obtain a one-year cost estimate (which aids in 
comparing across programs), those engaged in a cost analysis must account for the multiyear 
nature of resources.   
In their cost analysis of multiple interventions aimed at improving adolescent literacy, 
Levin et al. (2007) provided a description of their approach to annualizing multiyear costs.  
Regarding resources used over multiple years of the reading interventions, the authors write, 
…[U]sing proper costing techniques, these costs were annualized where appropriate.  
That is, only that portion of the cost of such ingredients that should be charged to a 
single year of use is included in these estimates.  To annualize costs, we assumed five 
years of program implementation at a 5% discount rate. (p. 71) 
 
The choices that the authors made regarding how to deal with the multiyear nature of 
resources reflect both depreciation and investments in the undepreciated portion of the 
resource.  The assumption of five years of program implementation relates to depreciation; 
that is, this choice assumes that the resource will be “used up” in five years.  The assumption 
of a five percent discount rate relates to the undepreciated portion of the resource; that is, if 
the program implementers had not chosen to purchase materials to implement the program, 
they could have saved the money and would have gained interest on that money.  The authors 
then were able to use an annualization formula (see Levin & McEwan, 2001, pp. 68-69 for an 
example) to account for the multiyear lifespan of the resources required for the reading 
programs and obtain a single-year value associated with the resources in their cost study. 
Dealing with inflation.  A second time-related issue that cost analyses must face is 




good or a service”) over time (Mankiw, 2010, p. 80).  In order to compare costs across time, 
scholars need to “remov[e] the effects of inflation” from the analysis – or, in other words, 
they need to deflate the costs (Fowler & Monk, 2001, p, 57).  Educational researchers can 
choose from a variety of cost deflators, including the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the 
School Price Index (SPI), the Net Services Index (NSI), the Inflationary Cost-of-Education 
Index (ICEI), and the Employment Cost Index (ECI).  Each of these deflators has 
methodological and technical strengths and weaknesses; scholars must weigh these strengths 
and weaknesses to choose the deflator that is most appropriate for the particular study in 
question (Fowler & Monk, 2001).  Regardless of the deflator used, when researchers study 
programs that have been implemented at different points in time, they must make the results 
of the cost analysis easier to understand and compare by explicitly controlling for inflation 
and providing the readers a temporal context for the numbers that they read in the report 
(Levin & McEwan, 2001).   
One of the cost studies I describe above, Hollands and colleagues’ (2014) study of 
multiple high school completion programs, had to address the issue of inflation.  In that 
study, the authors drew upon previously-released studies of the costs associated with 
implementing four of the five high school completion programs in the study.20  In order to 
compare cost information from different years, Hollands et al. (2014) used the CPI-All Urban 
Consumers and the CPI for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers to standardize cost 
data to 2010 dollars (p. 313).  Doing so allowed the authors to compare the costs of all five 
high school completion programs, despite the fact that information regarding the value of the 
resources required to implement the interventions originally came from different years. 
20 Recall that the researchers performed the ingredients method to analyze the costs associated with Talent 
Search but that they relied on prior studies to gather cost information for JOBSTART, New Chance, National 
Guard Youth Challenge (NGYC), and Job Corps. 
69 
 
                                                 
 
Dealing with future costs.  Scholars who engage in cost analyses may need to 
discount future costs, or mathematically account for the fact that an expenditure in the future 
is less costly than an expenditure in the present.  Present costs are more costly than future 
costs because those who pay for a resource now rather than in the future have lost the 
opportunity to use the money elsewhere in the meantime, such as in an investment or a 
savings account where they could have been earning interest (Levin & McEwan, 2001).     
Again, Hollands and colleagues (2014) provide a good example of how to deal with 
future costs.  One of the high school completion interventions in the study provided services 
to program participants over a number of years, whereas the others did not.  The authors note 
that in order to compare the costs of the program that incurred both present and future costs 
to the costs of the programs that only incurred present costs, they needed to discount future 
costs in the multi-year program.  To do so, they used the length of time over which the costs 
would be distributed and chose an interest rate to calculate the present value of the costs 
associated with the multi-year program (Hollands et al., 2014, p. 313; for an explanation of 
the formula used to calculate the present value of costs, see Levin & McEwan, 2001, p. 92).  
Determining the single-year, present value of future costs allowed the researchers to compare 
costs across programs that varied in when they had to expend resources. 
Issues with program scale.  Researchers who study the costs of educational 
interventions must also pay attention to program scale, or the relative size of the programs, 
and how program scale relates to the costs associated with the program.  That is, while the 
total societal cost of a program is an important piece of information in its own right, it does 
not provide all of the relevant information about the costs of the program.  A program with 




over a large number of participants; conversely, a program with apparently low total societal 
opportunity costs might spread those costs over a relatively small number of participants.  
Given these possibilities and the possibilities that programs could have increasing returns to 
scale (lower costs per unit of output at larger scale), constant returns to scale (the same cost 
per unit of output at large and small scales), or decreasing returns to scale (higher costs of 
output at larger scale; Frank, 2008), cost analyses should pay attention to issues of the size of 
the programs.  
All three studies (Hollands et al., 2014; Levin et al., 2007; Rice & Hall, 2008) 
addressed issues of program scale by presenting per-student or per-participant costs 
associated with the programs that they analyzed.  These per-participant numbers allow 
readers to understand not only the total cost of the programs but also how these total costs 
were spread over those who were served by the program.  For instance, Rice and Hall (2008) 
reported the annual total societal costs associated with implementing the four National Board 
Certification programs in their study alongside the cost per participant.  This juxtaposition 
allowed the reader to see that the program that appeared to be the least costly (at a total cost 
of $279,128, whereas the rest of the programs each had a cost of over one million dollars) 
was the most costly per participant (with a per-participant cost of $31,014, whereas the rest 
of the programs each recorded a per-participant cost of under $25,000; Rice & Hall, 2008, p. 
354).  Thus, both pieces of information, in concert with each other, provide a much more 
complete picture of program costs than either piece of information would have been able to 
convey by itself. 
Distribution of costs across stakeholders.  Often, the costs associated with pursing a 




Therefore, cost analyses should discuss the distribution of costs across different populations 
and stakeholder groups.  In the case of education policies and practices, interested parties 
may include governments and boards of education (federal, state, and local), participants in 
the educational process (such as teachers, students, families, and community members), 
business partners, and foundations.  Understanding who bears which costs and who reaps 
which benefits is important for consumers of cost analyses who need to determine if these 
programs are desirable and feasible in their contexts (Levin & McEwan, 2001; Rice, 1997).  
In their analysis of the costs associated with National Board certification preparation 
programs, Rice and Hall (2008) present an account of the distribution of per-participant 
program costs across multiple stakeholders, including program staff (such as teacher mentors 
and directors, who contributed uncompensated time to the programs), the teacher candidates 
themselves, the state, the district, the school, the university, the union, a grant, businesses or 
business consortia, and the National Board itself (p. 360).  By providing an account of the 
extent to which various groups bore the costs of the preparation programs, the authors were 
able to identify how the distribution of costs across stakeholders affected the burdens that 
different stakeholder groups in the various sites assumed when they implemented the 
programs. 
Substitutability of resources. The set of resources required to pursue an activity – 
and therefore, incur an opportunity cost – are not necessarily fixed.  That is, in some 
instances, it may be possible to pursue a course of action using more than one combination of 
resources.  According to Rice (1997), “[i]n cases where the resources required [to pursue an 
action] are either unavailable or unproductive, substitutions may be feasible but may have 




price of one combination of resources is lower than another set of resources, the cost 
associated with pursuing the activity is reduced when those involved in the activity use the 
lower-priced set of resources (Frank, 2008).  Additionally, to the extent that different people 
bear different amounts of the cost, depending on the set of resources used, those involved 
with pursuing the activity can alter the distribution of the cost to different stakeholders 
depending on which basket of resources they choose to use (Rice & Malen, 2003). 
Levin and colleagues’ (2007) description of the costs associated with implementing 
adolescent literacy interventions provides insight into resource substitution, particularly with 
respect to their discussion of the third reading intervention they studied (Reading 
Apprenticeship).  The authors report that the two sites that implemented this intervention had 
very different costs associated with professional development due to the resources they 
employed to engage in this program component.  One site relied upon trainers from the 
program developer to provide training and professional development for participating 
educators, while another site relied upon a “train-the-trainers” model, wherein only a small 
number of the district’s educators received training from the (more expensive) program 
developers and then provided this information to their colleagues within the district (Levin et 
al., 2007). 
Dealing with program outcomes.  Opportunity cost analyses, by their very nature, 
require reflection on outcomes.  According to Rice (1997),  
The opportunity cost of a particular resource is the value of the next best use of that 
resource or the benefit forgone by using a resource a particular way.  Consequently, a 
cost analysis involves a consideration of outcomes, while an expenditure analysis 
does not. (p. 311)  
 
While all types of opportunity cost analyses require the acknowledgment that 




another end, two types of cost analyses explicitly deal with program outcomes and 
incorporate them into study findings.  Cost-effectiveness analyses, which provide ratios of 
costs to measures of program effectiveness, allow for comparisons of programs that have the 
same desired outcomes.  Cost-benefit analyses, which provide ratios of costs to monetized 
benefits, allow for comparisons of programs with similar or different desired outcomes 
(Levin & McEwan, 2001; Rice, 1997).  Due to their focus on both inputs and outcomes, both 
cost-effectiveness analyses and cost-benefit analyses shed light on programs’ “bang for the 
buck,” or the relationship between resources and program outcomes. 
In their study of high school completion interventions, Hollands and colleagues 
(2014) pair cost data with outcome data to provide readers with an understanding of the 
relationship between the resources required to implement the programs and the programs’ 
success in helping young people earn high school credentials.  Because the programs in the 
study had similar desired outcomes – that is, improving the rates at which students completed 
high school – the authors were able to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis.  In addition to 
presenting cost-effectiveness ratios for each of the five high school completion intervention 
models they studied, they also presented ratios of costs to program effects for different 
iterations of one of the programs (Talent Search), which demonstrates that even within one 
program model, differences in local implementation and resource use can affect programs’ 
cost-effectiveness (Hollands et al., 2014, pp. 313-316). 
An Additional Piece of the Puzzle: Human Cost 
As the preceding sections make clear, opportunity cost is a comprehensive concept 
that encompasses all of the resources that are necessary to pursue a particular course of 




or “reform-related sacrifices made by individuals and groups of individuals in [an] 
organization” (Rice & Malen, 2003, p. 639).  Human costs represent an additional set of 
considerations that have implications for implementation and sustainability.  Rice and Malen 
(2003) describe three types of human costs: (1) “task costs,” or “the time and effort that 
individuals in the organization expend to meet work demands” (p. 640); (2) “psychological 
costs,” or “burdens borne by individuals often in the form of a general loss of professional 
efficacy and self-worth” (p. 640); and (3) “social costs,” or “tolls paid collectively in the 
form of worker turnover and loss of community, trust, and collegiality between employees” 
(p. 640).  The authors argue that these three types of human costs are interrelated and that 
they “may interact in important ways” (p. 640) such that the presence of one or more of these 
costs may heighten or even produce additional costs.  
Rice and Malen (2003) provide examples of human costs in their examination of a 
school reconstitution initiative in six schools.  This initiative required, in most cases, that the 
schools remove their principals and replace them with new leadership, and it mandated that 
all others who sought to staff the school – including those who had taught at the school in the 
previous year – would need to apply and interview for positions in the schools.  Rice and 
Malen (2003) found evidence of task, psychological, and social costs associated with the 
reform.  For instance, district and site personnel faced tasks costs associated with spending 
time and energy filling staffing vacancies, attending additional professional development 
sessions, and re-building schools’ operational capacity (p. 648).  They also found evidence of 
psychological costs that were associated with a reform that teachers perceived to be an 




social costs, which occurred when the reconstitution efforts undermined the stability of the 
workforce and reduced trust among colleagues (pp. 651-653).   
Despite being difficult to quantify, human costs are real, and since they constitute part 
of what must be given up to pursue an activity, any attempt to discuss opportunity costs 
should recognize them.  In fact, Rice and Malen (2003) state, 
We contend that human costs are particularly relevant to personnel-dependent 
enterprises like education.  Although the productivity of many industries is a function 
of resources other than personnel, most efforts in the field of education are contingent 
on the capacity and commitment of the people who live and work in schools.  We 
also argue that human costs are critical in personnel-targeted interventions where the 
primary mechanism of reform is a dramatic change in the roles and responsibilities of 
those who work in schools… (pp. 639-640). 
 
Since this dissertation focuses on educator incentives, which are educational human capital 
initiatives that clearly impact “the roles and responsibilities of those who work in schools,” I 
focus a portion of the analysis on the human costs associated with educator incentives. 
Summary: Conceptual Foundation: Opportunity Cost 
This dissertation relies on the concept of opportunity cost, or the “the value of all that 
must be sacrificed to do [an activity]” (Frank, 2008, p. 7).  In order to capture the total 
societal opportunity costs associated with implementing three TIF-supported educator 
incentive projects, I engage in a resource-cost analysis that relies on the “ingredients” 
approach.  Resource-cost studies commonly face a variety of issues, such as how to compare 
the costs of programs in different locations; how to address the ways in which time can 
impact the prices of goods and services; how to address the ways in which the size of 
programs can impact cross-program comparisons; how to acknowledge the potential 
substitutability of resources; how to discuss the distribution of costs across stakeholders; and 




complete picture of the opportunity costs associated with the incentive initiatives, I also 
incorporate into this study the notion of human costs, or “reform-related sacrifices made by 
individuals and groups of individuals in [an] organization” (Rice & Malen, 2003, p. 639).  
Summary 
This chapter reviews several streams of literature in order to contextualize the current 
study.  The first section of this literature review focuses on human capital in education.  
Within that section, I discuss three major human capital considerations (identifying and 
measuring human capital, investing in human capital, and addressing the supply and 
distribution of human capital).  I then introduce educator incentive plans, which attempt to 
address each of these three considerations, and which are the focus of this dissertation.  I 
explain the theory of action behind educator incentives, the potential bases for payments in 
incentive plans, and research on the implementation and effectiveness of these initiatives.  
Then, I provide an overview of the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which supported all of the 
educator incentive plans included in this study.  Because I use the lens of opportunity cost to 
analyze educator incentives, I use the second part of this chapter to introduce the concept of 
cost and other theoretical underpinnings of the analysis.  I define opportunity cost, highlight 
issues common to cost studies, and introduce the concept of human cost. 
This chapter serves to look outside the current study and explain the landscape in 
which it sits.  The next chapter focuses squarely on the current study and provides details 
about the methods I used to perform a cost analysis on the implementation of TIF-supported 




CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
 
This chapter provides a description of the data and methods in this dissertation.  I 
begin the discussion with an account of the steps I took to select three districts to participate 
in the study.  Then, I present brief descriptions of the districts included in the study and their 
incentive projects.  Next, I describe the field data that I collected on the educator incentive 
plans in these three districts.  Finally, I outline how I (a) used the “ingredients” approach to 
resource-cost analysis (Levin & McEwan, 2001) to determine the magnitude of costs and the 
extent to which TIF and non-TIF sources bore those costs and (b) analyzed my field data to 
gather insights about the human costs of these reforms. 
Site Selection Procedures 
Site selection involved two main steps.  First, I determined what types of TIF-
supported educator incentive projects I would include in the study.  Second, I selected actual 
projects to participate in the research.  I chose to study three district-level (as opposed to 
state-level or charter-school-based) incentive plans in order to increase comparability across 
sites.   Both site selection steps involved a variety of activities, which I discuss in the 
following paragraphs. 
Selection of Project Types 
As I describe in Chapter 2, the TIF program supports incentive projects that display a 
wide variety of designs.  The goal for this study was to select sites that would simultaneously 
(a) exemplify elements of project design that are relatively common across TIF grantees (and 
therefore highlight potential project “models”) and (b) vary from each other in ways that 
would presumably affect project costs.  In order to select the types of projects that I would 




characteristics displayed in different TIF projects.  I relied primarily on three sources to learn 
about TIF projects’ characteristics: the U.S. Department of Education website, the Center for 
Educator Compensation Reform (CECR) website (which itself is associated with the U.S. 
Department of Education), and the first implementation report of the first two TIF cohorts, 
which was commissioned and funded by the U. S. Department of Education (Humphrey et 
al., 2012).  I used this information to consider aspects of the projects that might impact their 
opportunity costs.  Review of TIF information from these sources provided clear information 
about (a) whether the project was developed by the district that implemented it or whether it 
adopted an externally-developed model and (b) the project designs, particularly whether and 
how they based awards on demonstrated performance, investments in or extensions of 
practice, and educator supply and distribution.  Because these distinctions could impact 
opportunity costs, I decided to focus on them.  I discuss each in turn. 
Locally-developed project versus externally-developed model.  While many TIF 
projects have been developed locally, substantial numbers of TIF projects participate in TAP, 
a fairly standardized educator incentive model (see Chapter 2 for more detailed information 
regarding TAP and the number of TIF-supported TAP projects).  Given the prevalence of 
both locally-developed projects and TAP projects among TIF recipients, I chose to include at 
least one type of each.  The inclusion of both types of projects acknowledges the variety of 
projects that actually exists in practice; it also allows for an investigation regarding whether 
or not the choice to implement an externally-developed project versus an internally-
developed project impacts the opportunity costs associated with project implementation 
(beyond development costs, which I do not capture in this analysis).  For example, 




activities like traveling to developer trainings, whereas participants of locally-developed 
projects may not face the same travel requirements.21   
Bases for payouts.  As I outline in Chapter 2, educator incentive projects can base 
payouts on demonstrated performance, investments in or extensions of practice, and educator 
supply and distribution.  In this dissertation, I chose to include projects that varied in terms of 
how they structured their investments in or extensions of practice components; I chose two 
projects that included a job redesign element and one project that did not.    I included 
projects that differed along this dimension for two main reasons: impact on project cost and 
variability in project design. 
First, project inclusion or exclusion of a job redesign may have implications for the 
costs associated with project implementation.  Because job redesign projects alter the job 
descriptions of participating educators, they place an obligation on schools or districts to 
compensate educators for these new positions, either through bonuses or permanent salary 
increases.  Job redesign projects also place an obligation on educators to invest time and 
effort in performing in ways consistent with the new responsibilities.  Thus, variations in 
resource obligations brought about by inclusion or exclusion of job redesign components are 
worthy of investigation given the possibly sizeable and potentially long-term obligations 
associated with a job redesign element.   
Second, while the presence or absence of job redesign in the TIF-supported educator 
incentives varied across projects, other aspects of project design (specifically, standards-
based evaluations, reliance on student test scores, and professional development) did not vary 
21 Conversely, it is possible that implementers of externally-developed models benefit from economies of scale, 
while their counterparts in locally-developed projects need to spend time and effort on initial project planning 




                                                 
 
quite as much or lend themselves to clear-cut distinctions in project type.  For instance, in the 
case of demonstrated performance, the majority of TIF projects across all cohorts used 
standards-based evaluations and student test scores as the bases for awards; nearly all 
projects from more recent cohorts included these types of evaluations.  Additionally, 
providing professional development – another form of investing in or extending practice, 
along with job redesigns – was a requirement for cohort 3 grantees.   
Based on these considerations, I decided that the three TIF projects I would select for 
in-depth investigation would be: (1) a district-implemented project that participated in an 
externally-developed model (TAP); (2) a project developed and implemented at the district 
level that included a job redesign component; and (3) a project developed and implemented 
at the district level that did not include a job redesign component.  
Selection of Districts 
Once I had determined what types of projects to include in the study, I began to 
identify districts as potential study sites.  In addition to possessing the characteristics outlined 
above, each of the sites that I chose to include in the study would have to meet three criteria, 
which are either similar to criteria used in other studies (Rice & Hall) or align with 
recommendations from the cost analysis literature (Levin & Belfield, 2013; Levin & 
McEwan, 2001): 
 (a) The projects needed to be clearly defined. Interventions in this study needed to 
have recognizable project components.  In order to capture accurately the costs 
associated with the projects, I needed to be able to identify which administrators’ and 
educators’ activities were associated with the project.  If boundaries between the 




would not have been possible to discern what resources were required to implement 
the project.  Furthermore, as Rice and Hall (2008) point out, “programs that are 
specified in such a way that they can be replicated … can be understood as a ‘model’” 
(p. 344).  If projects’ components are clear enough that the project models can be 
replicated in other sites, then cost analyses of those projects have increased utility, 
since they shed light on the resources needed to implement those models. 
(b) The projects needed to be fully implemented at the time of the study.  In order to 
gain realistic information about resources associated with project implementation, the 
projects included in this study had to be interventions that district and site personnel 
were currently putting into practice.  If that were not the case (e.g., because the 
districts were still creating the project and planning for implementation, or because 
districts had discontinued use of the project), it would have been difficult to gather 
accurate information about the resources required to implement the incentive plan, 
which is a bedrock of resource-cost analysis (Levin & Belfield, 2013; Levin & 
McEwan, 2001).  Such difficulties could have a major effect on findings related to 
project cost; faulty information regarding the resources required to implement the 
projects could result cost estimates that are drastically higher or lower than they 
should be.  
 (c) They needed to be feasible, accessible study sites.  Projects in this study needed to 
be located in sites that were open to participation in the analysis.  Logistically, it was 
necessary that I gain access to projects in order to speak with district and school 
personnel so that I could understand the projects and identify the resources required 




program under study is necessary for a resource-cost study (Levin & Belfield, 2013; 
Levin & McEwan, 2001).  Thus, projects in this study needed to have personnel who 
were knowledgeable about the project and were willing to share that expertise with 
me. 
In order to select sites for the study that met these criteria, I began to narrow down the 
pool of TIF grantees that I would consider for the study.  I decided only to consider projects 
from the third TIF grant cohort.  At the time of site selection, grants for projects in the first 
and second cohorts were nearing their end.  Given the serious concerns related to sustaining 
the projects after the expiration of the TIF grant (see, for instance, Humphrey et al., 2012, 
which reports sustainability challenges – some with the potential to render projects unable to 
persist – for grantees from the first and second cohorts, pp. 53-54), I decided not to include 
grantees from these initial rounds of TIF.  Conversely, grants in the fourth cohort were just 
beginning, and I would not have had an opportunity to study project implementation in many 
(or potentially any) of these sites, since a review of preliminary information about these 
grantees suggested that many projects were engaging in a planning year prior to 
implementation.  Because all three project types were district-level initiatives, I removed 
projects that were not located in traditional public school districts (i.e., statewide projects or 
projects located in charter schools) from the list to arrive at a list of 38 potential study sites.22   
I then used a two-pronged approach to contact districts for consideration for the 
study.  I sought the assistance of an expert on educator incentives who electronically 
introduced me to contacts in several districts; I also located project director emails on district 
websites and reached out directly to administrators in other districts.  Either directly or 
22 This list included Chicago Public Schools, New York City Department of Education, and Milwaukee Public 
Schools.  Although these grantees eventually pulled out of the TIF grant (see notes on Table 1 in Chapter 2), I 
was unaware of this development at the time I created the list of potential study sites. 
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through the assistance of the educator incentive expert, I was able to contact 14 of the 
possible 38 districts on the list.  I ultimately chose three sites based on the projects’ 
alignment with one of the three project types and on districts’ willingness to participate in the 
study.  I call these three projects the TAP project, the job redesign (JR) project, and the non-
job redesign (non-JR) project.23  In the next section, I provide an overview of the districts 
where the projects in this study were located.   
Overview of Study Sites 
In the first part of this section, I present brief descriptions of the projects included in 
the cost analysis and the districts in which these projects are located.  In the second part of 
this section, I highlight a number of benefits and limitations associated with the sites that I 
included in the study. 
Site Descriptions 
As I note above, I chose to study a TAP project, a locally-designed project with a job 
redesign component, and a locally-designed project without a job redesign component.  I 
allowed other aspects of project design (such as eligibility, size of the awards, and whether 
the project was voluntary or mandatory) to vary; I also allowed district contextual factors 
(such as district and project size) to vary.  In the following paragraphs, I provide an overview 
of the projects.24  Table 2, located at the end of these site descriptions, presents a summary 
view of each project’s key features and payment structures.   
TAP project.  The following paragraphs provide a brief introduction to the TAP 
project included in this study. 
23 One of the study sites allowed me to perform research in the district on the condition that I keep the name of 
the district confidential.  Because I could not reveal one of the district names, I chose not to use the real names 
of any of the three districts. 
24 In order to maintain site confidentiality, in the descriptions of the study sites, I do not list the amount of the 
projects’ TIF grants. 
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District and school context.  The TAP project is located in a large suburban25 public 
school district in the South.26  According to a district official, this district serves urban, 
suburban, and rural students.  The district’s TIF grant application stated that the schools that 
would be included in the TIF grant project had higher-than-district-average percentages of 
students approved for free or reduced-price school lunch.  A larger percentage of students in 
the proposed schools were below proficiency on student achievement measures, compared to 
the district average, and some of the proposed schools were deemed in need of improvement 
due to failure to meet adequate yearly progress (AYP) for several years.  Several of the 
proposed schools had high percentages of teacher turnover; some of these schools had faced 
difficulties retaining principals as well.  The district’s TIF application attributed these 
staffing issues to an average teacher salary that is lower than the averages for surrounding 
districts. 
Project description.  Prior to applying for a TIF grant, the district had piloted TAP in 
a small number of schools, and the district applied for TIF in order to expand the program to 
additional schools.  Not all schools in the district participate in the TAP project; TIF supports 
the implementation of TAP in a select number of the district’s elementary, middle, and high 
schools.  In total, TIF-supported TAP schools comprise less than 20 percent of all schools in 
the district.27  Before they joined TAP, educators in the new, TIF-supported TAP schools had 
to vote on whether to become a TAP school.  Once educators in the schools voted to 
25 This category aligns with the district’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core of 
Data (CCD) locale code.  The CCD definition of a large suburb is a “territory outside a principal city and inside 
an urbanized area with a population of 250,000 or more.” For more information, see 
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/commonfiles/glossary.asp. 
26 References to regions correspond to Census designations. 
27 The data in this study pertain only to the TIF-supported TAP schools, not the schools that had been 
implementing TAP prior to the district’s receipt of the TIF grant.  Additionally, for this project and for the non-
JR project, I do not provide the exact number of schools that participated in the incentive projects in efforts to 
protect the confidentiality of the districts. 
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implement TAP, program participation was mandatory – all administrators and teachers 
within these schools had to participate in the TAP evaluations and professional development.   
Like all TAP programs, school administrators and teachers participate in the project.  
Payments for demonstrated performance are based on standards-based evaluations and 
classroom-based and school-wide student achievement.  Half of participants’ performance 
awards depend on the results of their standards-based evaluation; the other half of educators’ 
performance awards are based on student achievement.  Principals in participating schools 
are eligible to receive up to $10,000 in demonstrated performance awards, and assistant 
principals are eligible to receive up to $5,000.  The project has no set maximum teacher 
payout for demonstrated performance; rather, teachers receive payouts from a $2,500-per-
teacher pool based on their performance relative to similarly situated teachers in the same 
school (e.g., career teachers in tested subjects/grades, mentor teachers in nontested 
subjects/grades).   
Investments in and extensions of practice in this TAP project include a job redesign 
(in the form of the creation of master and mentor teacher positions) and professional 
development for both administrators and teachers.  Building administrators, master teachers, 
and mentor teachers (all members of TAP Leadership Teams, or TLTs) engage in initial and 
ongoing training on the TAP model within their schools, within the district, and at national 
conferences.  Teachers in TAP schools participate in weekly professional development 
sessions called cluster meetings.  While stipends are associated with serving as a master or 
mentor teacher (which averaged approximately $11,000 for masters and $4,500 for mentors 
in the 2012-13 school year), no explicit payments are associated with the initial and ongoing 




Payments for the educator distribution component are in the form of $3,000 retention 
bonuses to educators in select schools.  The target population for this retention bonus 
changed across the life of the grant; initially, retention bonuses were available for educators 
of certain high school subjects, but by the third year of the grant (the year for this current 
study), those bonuses were available to educators only at TIF-supported TAP schools that 
had undergone a school restructuring reform. 
JR project.  The second project in this study is the locally-developed project that 
includes a job redesign for teachers.  In this case, the TIF-supported educator incentive 
project operates in all schools in the district. 
District and school context.  The JR project district is located in a remote town28 in 
the South.29  According to the district’s TIF application, over three-quarters of the district’s 
students were approved for free or reduced-price school lunch.  Compared to state averages, 
lower percentages of students in the district graduated from high school and higher 
percentages of students scored below proficiency levels on reading and mathematics 
assessments.  In its TIF application, the district reported that it struggled to recruit and retain 
educators, which it attributed, at least in part, to limited opportunities for professional 
development and inadequate possibilities for career advancement. 
Project description.  While the JR project, as it was structured at the time of the 
study, came into existence with the receipt of TIF funds, it was not the first educator 
incentive program in the district.  According to district documents and a district official, the 
JR project grew out of an earlier program that had been supported by state funds.  All full-
28 This category aligns with the district’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core of 
Data (CCD) locale code.  The CCD definition of a remote town is a “territory inside an urban cluster that is 
more than 35 miles [from] an urbanized area.”  For more information, see 
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/commonfiles/glossary.asp. 
29 References to regions correspond to Census designations. 
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time school district employees are eligible to participate in the JR project and participation is 
voluntary.  The TIF-supported JR project includes payments for demonstrated performance, 
which are based on a standards-based evaluation component, a student achievement 
component, and a school culture component, which includes criteria such as reductions in 
student discipline referrals, improvements in students’ perception of school climate, and 
improvements in school-wide student achievement.  Principals are eligible for up to $5,000 
in demonstrated performance payouts; half of this total is based on the results of their 
standards-based evaluation and the other half is based on their schools’ attainment of school 
culture goals.  Assistant principals are eligible for up to $2,400 (up to $1,000 for results of 
standards-based evaluation; up to $1,000 for student achievement, and $400 for school 
culture); teachers are eligible for up to $1,400 (up to $500 for standards-based evaluation, up 
to $500 for student achievement, and $400 for school culture); and other school and district 
personnel are eligible for up to $400 (school culture, for school-based employees, and 
district-wide student achievement, for district employees). 
The JR project provides a variety of opportunities for educators to invest in or extend 
their practice.  Teachers have access to a job redesign component wherein master teachers 
and peer coaches serve a finite term and, presumably, return to the classroom.  That job 
redesign component is accompanied by a payout of $3,000 (for master teachers) or $1,300 
(for peer coaches).  Additional opportunities to invest in or extend practice also exist.  
Different types of employees are able to pursue these opportunities and are therefore eligible 
for different types of incentives.  School administrators and teachers both participate in 
professional development, although only teachers can receive a payout for participation.  




payments for becoming the sponsor of an extracurricular activity, for becoming a 
department- or grade-level chair, for obtaining National Board certification, or for leading 
professional development sessions.  One opportunity (performing a collaborative project that 
involves students in school improvement) is open to teachers, assistant principals, and other 
certified district personnel.  The final opportunity (an attendance bonus) is open to all 
employees who participate in the JR project.30  Given the differential access to the 
opportunities, the potential payout amounts vary across different categories of personnel.  
Principals are eligible for up to $500 for investments in or extensions of practice, assistant 
principals are eligible for up to $2,166, teachers are eligible for up to $4,966, and other 
personnel are eligible for up to $2,166. 
While the district in which JR project is located also offers a recruitment bonus to 
new teachers, the new educators would receive this payment regardless of whether or not 
they chose to participate in the JR project.  Therefore, I do not include this recruitment bonus 
as part of the costs associated with implementing the JR project.   
Non-JR Project.  Unlike the first two projects in the study, the third district’s 
educator incentive project does not include a pathway for teachers to become master or 
mentor teachers or to participate in another type of job redesign.  The following paragraphs 
describe the third project in more detail.   
District and school context.  The non-JR project is located in a midsize suburban31 
public school district in the South.32    According to the district’s TIF application, the 
30 I include the attendance bonus in the discussion of investments in or extensions of practice because job 
attendance seems to be a minimum requirement of improving one’s job performance. 
31 This category aligns with the district’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core of 
Data (CCD) locale code.  The CCD definition of a midsize suburb is a “territory outside a principal city and 
inside an urbanized area with population less than 250,000 and greater than or equal to 100,000.”  For more 
information, see http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/commonfiles/glossary.asp. 
32 References to regions correspond to Census designations. 
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percentages of students approved for free or reduced-price school lunch at the schools that 
were proposed to participate in the non-JR project ranged from 45 percent to 85 percent, and 
60 percent of the proposed schools failed to make AYP in the 2009-10 school year.  The 
grant application reported that, in general, compared to district averages, higher percentages 
of teachers in the target schools had standard certification and lower percentages of teachers 
in the target schools had advanced certification. 
Project description.  The non-JR project is new to the district. The TIF grant 
application documents suggest that district officials hoped to design the project so that it 
would align with the state’s forthcoming new educator evaluation structures.  Not all schools 
in the district participate in the non-JR project; it operates in just over 10 percent of the 
district’s schools and includes only elementary and middle schools.  Building administrators 
in non-JR project schools have to participate, but teachers can voluntarily opt in.   
The project includes payments for demonstrated performance (based on standards-
based evaluation and school-wide and classroom-based student achievement).  
Administrators in non-JR project schools are eligible to receive a performance payout of up 
to $8,000; participating teachers are eligible for a performance award of up to $5,000.  All 
non-JR project educators (school administrators and teachers) are eligible to receive payouts 
based on the results of their standards-based evaluations and on student achievement.  
Additionally, part of school administrators’ performance payouts are associated with 
improving student behavior outcomes (increasing attendance and reducing discipline 
referrals).  While half of teachers’ performance payouts are based on standards-based 




are based on results of their standards-based evaluations, 50 percent are based on student 
achievement, and five percent are based on improvements in student behavior outcomes.   
The non-JR project also includes opportunities for investment in or extension of 
practice.  Both administrators and teachers participate in professional development, which 
can take a variety of forms.  While administrators do not receive payment for professional 
development, teachers receive $25 per hour for participating in professional development. 
Teachers have an additional opportunity to extend their practice by serving as district-to-
school communication liaisons, and they can receive a payment for acting in this role.33  
Because this activity does not fundamentally alter the job description of the teachers who 
take it on (the hallmark of a job redesign activity, as defined by Malen et al., 1988; see 
Chapter 2 for more information), I consider it to be only what Malen et al. (1988) term a job 
expansion activity.  That is, the teachers are able to take on more responsibility, but at the 
core, their jobs as classroom teachers remain the same. 
The non-JR project also includes retention bonuses for both administrators and 
teachers who remain in the project in good standing.34  Building administrators’ retention 
bonuses are $2,000.  Teachers’ retention bonuses increase each year they remain in the 
project; these bonuses start at $2,000 for teachers’ first year, increase to $4,000 for teachers’ 
second year, increase again to $6,000 for teachers’ third year, and increase again to $8,000 
for teachers who remain in the non-JR project for four years.   
 
 
33 In the fourth year of the grant (the 2013-14 school year), these teachers also became responsible for 
conducting informal peer observations.  While this could be considered to be a job redesign, it occurred after the 
study year (2012-13). 




                                                 
 
Table 2. Key project features and project payout structures: 2012-13 
 TAP Project JR Project Non-JR Project 
 TEACHERS 
Maximum payout for 
demonstrated performance 
$2,500 in pool per teachera 
- Standards-based 
evaluation 





- Student achievement 




- Student achievement 
Maximum payout for investments 
in or extensions of practice 





Master teacher: average of 
$11,000 
Mentor teacher: average of 
$4,500 





Master teacher: $3,000 
Peer coach: $1,300 






Maximum payout for impacting 
the supply and distribution of 
educators 
$3,000 retention bonus Nonec Increasing amount 
depending on year in 
project ($2,000 or $4,000 
possible in 2012-13) 
 
Maximum total payout $19,611 $9,366 $11,150 
 SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS 
Maximum payout for 
demonstrated performance 
Principals: $10,000 
Asst. principals: $5,000 
- Standards-based 
evaluation 
- Student achievement 
Principals: $5,000 
Asst. principals: $2,400 
- Standards-based 
evaluation 
- Student achievement 





- Student achievement 





Maximum payout for investments 
in or extensions of practice 
N/A Job Expansion, PD, and 
Other:  
Principals: $500 




Maximum payout for impacting 
the supply and distribution of 
educators 
N/A N/Ac $2,000 retention bonusd 
 
Maximum total payout Principals: $10,000 
Asst. principals: $5,000 
Principals: $5,500 
Asst. principals: $4,566 
Principals and asst. 
principals: $10,000 
 OTHER PERSONNEL 
Maximum payout for 
demonstrated performance 
N/A $400 
- School culture or student 
achievement 
N/A 
Maximum payout for investments 
in or extensions of practice 






Maximum payout for impacting 
the supply and distribution of 
educators 
N/A N/A N/A 
Maximum total payout N/A $2,566 N/A 
a In the TAP project, there was no maximum payout amount for teachers based on demonstrated performance.  Teachers’ payouts were allocated based on 
teachers’ performance relative to other similarly situated teachers.  The maximum payout amount in the final row of the table includes the maximum actual 
demonstrated performance teacher payout for the study year (2012-13). 
b In the first year, school administrators’ demonstrated performance payouts could reach $10,000.   
c While the JR project documentation discusses a recruitment incentive for teachers new to the district, any new teacher would get this incentive, regardless of 
whether or not s/he decided to participate in the JR project.  
d This bonus was not available to school administrators during the first year of implementation.  Administrators became eligible for retention bonuses in the 




Benefits and Limitations of Study Sites 
Two issues in the selection of sites for this study warrant attention.  First, the designs 
of the projects in this study include some degree of overlap.  For instance, all of the projects 
include standards-based evaluation, all base performance awards on school-wide and 
classroom-based student achievement, all include professional development, two have job 
redesign opportunities, two have job expansion opportunities, and two have retention 
bonuses.  Still, it makes sense to investigate all three projects, because even though the 
projects’ designs contain overlap in these broad categories, the projects vary in how they 
approach these components. 
Second, it is important to note that all of the projects are located in the South and 
none are located in an urban district.  While the projects in this study are not located in the 
type of community in which the majority of TIF projects are located (only 35 percent of TIF 
projects are in local education agencies (LEAs) not located in cities), they are more reflective 
of the geographic locale of TIF projects: over half (53 percent) of TIF grants across all four 
cohorts are located in the South.35  These considerations notwithstanding, generalizability is 
not the goal of this study.  Instead, this three-site resource-cost study can illuminate 
implications for policy and practice through capturing the costs associated with a range of 
project designs.  Furthermore, the provision of cost templates that outline all of the resources 
required to implement the projects in question allows decision-makers in various locations to 
insert prices that reflect the value of the required resources in their own situations and get a 
sense of the opportunity costs of different reforms in their own areas (Rice, 2001; Rice and 
Hall, 2008).  In the next section, I turn to a discussion of my data collection strategies, and in 
35 I calculated these percentages by reviewing grant information from the TIF office.  
94 
 
                                                 
 
the subsequent section, I outline the ways in which I created cost templates that outlined the 
resources required to implement these three projects. 
Data Collection 
I collected a variety of data from the three sites.  In this section, I provide information 
regarding this study’s Institutional Review Board approval, describe the study’s data, and 
discuss measures I took to ensure the reliability and validity of these data. 
Institutional Review Board Approval 
I conducted this study with the approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 
the University of Maryland, College Park.  I received initial approval for the study on 
January 18, 2013 and continued approval on December 23, 2013 and December 10, 2014.  
Copies of IRB approval letters are in Appendix A.  Part of the IRB approval process included 
IRB review of the data collection instruments (interview protocols and interviewee 
worksheets).  Appendix B contains copies of IRB approved data collection instruments. 
Consistent with IRB requirements, I adhered to accepted standards of research ethics 
regarding the consent and confidentiality of study participants.  Prior to conducting any 
interviews with participants, I obtained informed consent; copies of IRB-approved consent 
forms are located in Appendix C.  I protected the confidentiality of study participants by 
storing personally identifiable data (including signed consent forms as well as study data) in 
protected locations.  I stored electronic files that contained personally identifiable data on an 
encrypted, password-protected drive, and I stored documents that contained personally 
identifiable information in a locked file box.  I also protected the confidentiality of study 
participants in this written report.  I did not use participants’ names in this report, nor did I 




reporting detailed information about data in order to privilege the participants’ confidentiality 
above specificity. 
Overview of Data 
I collected a variety of field data to gather information about the resources required to 
implement the incentive projects, the extent to which TIF and non-TIF sources supplied these 
resources, and the presence of human costs associated with implementing the projects.  These 
field data come from two main sources: (a) document review and (b) individual and focus 
group interviews with key personnel.36  I describe each below table 3, which presents a 
summary of field data and how they relate to study purposes.   
Table 3. Relationship of field data to study objectives 
Study Objective Field Data Source(s) 
Identify full range of resources required to 
implement incentive projects 
Documents; Interviews with key personnel 
Identify extent to which TIF and non-TIF 
sources supplied resources 
Documents; Interviews with key personnel 
Identify presence of human costs associated 
with project implementation 
Interviews with key personnel 
 
Documents.  For all three study sites, I obtained TIF grant applications, summer 2013 
TIF annual performance reports (APRs), individual-level administrator and teacher payout 
data for the 2012-13 school year, and project budget information (if it was not included in 
detail on the 2013 APR).  I also collected district-level project handouts (e.g., policy 
manuals, brochures, and explanations of project payout structures), external project 
evaluations, and an article from a local newspaper.37  In addition to these site-specific 
36 While I describe what types of data I collected in this section, I describe how I used these data later, in the 
section on data analysis. 
37 In order to keep the identity of the districts in this study confidential, I cannot provide the name of this 
newspaper or the author of the article. 
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documents, I collected appropriations and grant information on the whole TIF program from 
the TIF program office within the U.S. Department of Education. 
Interviews.  I conducted individual and focus group interviews with key personnel in 
order to get a sense of how the projects operated and the resources – fiscal and otherwise – 
required to implement them.38  Key study participants from all sites included district 
administrators who managed the projects.  When I spoke with these participants, I focused on 
district-level project administration in addition to what was required to implement the 
projects.  I worked with district administrators to solicit study participation from building 
administrators and teachers who worked at schools that implemented one of the incentive 
projects in the study.  In order to get a sense of the TAP model and what it might require of 
implementers, I reached out to and spoke with a representative from the external project 
developer.  Finally, in order to gather information about the TIF program in general, I 
reached out to and spoke with representatives from the U.S. Department of Education. 
I conducted interviews with a total of 26 participants between September 2013 and 
April 2014 (table 4).  Nine of these participants were from the TAP project.  In the TAP 
project, I conducted an in-person interview with a district administrator, a phone interview 
with a representative from the external project developer, an in-person interview with a 
school administrator, and an in-person focus group with six participants (one school 
administrator and two master teachers, one mentor teacher, and two career teachers).  Nine 
participants were from the JR project.  In the JR project, I conducted an in-person interview 
with a district administrator, in-person interviews with two school administrators, and an in-
person focus group with six teachers.  In the non-JR project, I conducted an in-person 
38 I discuss the data collection instruments I used to collect these data in the next section on the reliability and 
validity of data.  Appendix B has copies of the data collection instruments. 
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interview with a district administrator, an in-person interview with a school administrator, 
and an in-person focus group with four teachers.  I also conducted a focus group interview 
with two officials from the U.S. Department of Education.  These interviews ranged from 
approximately 40 minutes to approximately two hours in length.  With the permission of 
participants, I audiotaped all in-person interviews and created near-verbatim transcript logs 
from these audio recordings (see Merriam, 1998 for a discussion of transcript logs); I took 
detailed notes during the phone interview and created a record of the discussion immediately 
after we finished speaking. 






Number of focus 
group interview 
participants Total 
TAP Project 3 6 9 
JR Project 3 6 9 
Non-JR Project 2 4 6 
U.S. Department of Education 0 2 2 
Total 8 18 26 
 
Reliability and Validity of Data 
High-quality studies need to ensure that the data are reliable and valid.  Reliability, or 
the ability of a measure to “[yield] the same results when applied on repeated occasions to 
the same individuals” (Levin & McEwan, 2001, p. 110), ensures that the results of a study 
will be consistent.  Validity, or the ability of a measure to “[bear] a close correspondence to 
the underlying concept that it is intended to reflect” (Levin & McEwan, 2001, p. 111), 
ensures that the results of a study will be accurate.  I took a number of steps to enhance the 




In order to ensure that the data that I collected across sites were reliable, I used two 
types of data collection tools (Appendix B).  One of these tools was a set of interview 
protocols that were comparable across sites.  I only changed the protocols as necessary to fit 
project context (i.e., I did not ask about master/mentor teachers at the project that did not 
include a job redesign).  During individual and focus group interviews at all three sites, I 
used the questions from the protocol to guide the conversations.  The second data collection 
tool was a set of worksheets that I used to facilitate discussion with school-based personnel 
(administrators and teachers).  I distributed these worksheets to study participants at the 
beginning of the interviews and allowed the participants to review or fill them out quietly 
before the start of the discussion.  The purpose of these worksheets was to assist participants 
in thinking about the work they had to perform to implement the projects and the resource 
demands that were associated with this work.  I used the same worksheets (again, only 
changing details such as the project’s name and only including relevant project components) 
across sites.  My use of the same protocols and worksheets across sites allowed me to collect 
data that were comparable across the three projects in the study. 
I used two methods to enhance the validity of my findings.  First, whenever possible, 
I triangulated data that I gathered through interviews with data that I gathered through 
documents.  In general, when I found discrepancies between interview data and documentary 
data, I relied on data from documents unless the interview respondent specifically discussed 
reasons for an apparent mismatch between what s/he said and what I would find in 
documentary data and explained why the information that s/he provided was more 
trustworthy.  Second, I engaged in a member check.  That is, I shared site-specific 




district administrators at each of the study sites.  I encouraged the district officials to provide 
feedback on the preliminary findings, and asked them to share such feedback especially if 
any of the findings did not fit with their experiences of project implementation.  Feedback 
from district officials in two of the study sites39 generally confirmed my findings and allowed 
me to provide additional clarity and nuance to the study’s findings.  For instance, in response 
to a question about how I calculated a particular study finding, I inserted additional detail and 
explanation regarding that finding into the text.  Still, none of the district officials’ feedback 
suggested that I had fundamental flaws in the data I used in this study. 
Data Analysis 
This dissertation presents findings regarding the magnitude of fiscal and monetized 
non-fiscal costs associated with TIF-funded educator incentive projects and the extent to 
which TIF and non-TIF sources bore those costs.  It also involves a brief discussion of the 
human costs associated with these reforms.  Because I used different approaches to obtain 
these sets of results, I discuss them separately below.  
Magnitude of Costs and Division of Costs between TIF and Non-TIF Sources 
The majority of findings from this dissertation stem from a resource-cost analysis that 
relied on the “ingredients” approach outlined by Levin and McEwan (2001) and used in 
studies such as those done by Hollands and colleagues (2014), Levin and colleagues (2007), 
and Rice and Hall (2008).  This approach involves unpacking the variety of resources 
required to implement a program and realize its anticipated outcomes.  In order to present a 
systematic account of the magnitude of opportunity costs associated with project 
implementation, I engaged in a multi-step process that aligned with the recommendations in 
Levin and McEwan (2001) and in the studies I described earlier (Hollands et al., 2014; Levin 
39 District officials in one of the study sites did not provide feedback on the preliminary findings. 
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et al., 2007; Rice & Hall, 2008).  I discuss the process in detail in the next section, but in 
brief, I first created raw cost templates, or comprehensive lists of the resources necessary to 
implement the educator incentive projects and the site-specific prices of those resources.  
Then, I standardized these cost templates by replacing the site-specific prices with national 
average prices.  This standardization of prices was necessary in order for me to identify costs 
across a range of project designs, since the prices of goods and services vary across 
geographical locations.  The creation of these raw and standardized data templates required 
many steps; I explain these steps and the major decisions I made throughout the analytic 
process below and provide more detail in a decision rule document in Appendix D.  The cost 
templates themselves are located in Appendix E. 
The cost templates I created were also the foundation for analyses regarding the 
division of project costs across TIF and non-TIF sources.  A note about the distribution of 
project costs is warranted at this point.  While not all cost studies provide information about 
the distribution of costs across stakeholders, some do, and those that do discuss cost 
distribution provide valuable information regarding the distribution of burden associated with 
implementing a program.  In general, cost studies that pay attention to the distribution of 
costs across relevant stakeholders provide cost burden information for an array of 
stakeholders.  For instance, Rice & Hall (2008) describe how much of the cost of National 
Board Certification support programs was shouldered by program staff and participants (in 
terms of uncompensated time), various levels of government (state, district, school, and 
university), and other sources (union, grant, businesses, and the National Board itself; p. 




In this study, I do not present findings regarding the distribution of costs across all 
relevant stakeholders.  Instead, I present findings regarding the proportion of costs 
shouldered by TIF and the proportion borne by non-TIF sources.  I made this choice based on 
limitations in my data regarding the distribution of costs between districts and 
administrators/teachers within them.  In interviews with project participants, I did not focus 
on the extent to which they performed project-related work during school and/or working 
hours and the extent to which they performed project-related work on their own time.  When 
school administrators and teachers performed project work during the workday, their salaries 
(paid by the district) covered their time.  When school administrators and teachers performed 
the work outside of working hours, they bore the cost of the work.  Because I did not collect 
interview data on the issue of how much work participants performed during paid and unpaid 
time, and because my documentary data did not illuminate this issue, I was not able to 
discern the distribution of project costs between the districts and employees within them.  I 
attempted to correct for this limitation by searching for previously-released studies that 
detailed the amount of time that educators spend on activities like evaluation and 
professional development during their contract hours and outside of them.  Unfortunately, I 
was able to find no systematic, national-level studies that detailed the proportions of 
compensated and uncompensated time on these sorts of activities.  Therefore, in this study, I 
am only able to present the TIF/non-TIF share of costs associated with the projects.  While 
this decision does limit my findings, understanding of the proportion of costs borne by TIF is 
very useful information given the TIF requirement that grantees assume larger amounts of 
project cost over time40 and given the fact that, as a grant program, TIF support will no 
40 Recall that only cohorts 1, 2, and 3 include an increasing share requirement (Humphrey et al., 2012).  Cohort 
4 does not include a cost-sharing requirement (U.S. Department of Education, 2012a). 
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longer exist for projects in the future.  Knowledge regarding the extent to which TIF supports 
these programs is vital to planning for the eventual absence of TIF funds.  I explore this issue 
in more detail in Chapter 5. 
In the following paragraphs, I discuss the steps I took to create the raw and 
standardized data templates, which were the data organization and analytic tools that formed 
the basis for results regarding the magnitude of project costs and the distribution of those 
costs across TIF and non-TIF sources. 
Raw data templates.  Creating the raw data templates involved creating the list of 
required resources, determining the prices associated with those resources, and determining 
the TIF/non-TIF division of the costs.  I discuss each below. 
Creation of list of required resources.  Prior to data collection, I used literature on 
educator incentive programs to create preliminary cost templates for each site; these 
spreadsheets unpacked the “ingredients” that were likely to be required to implement the 
incentive projects, based on findings from implementation studies of other incentive plans.  I 
used Excel to create these spreadsheets, and I organized the required resources (such as 
personnel, facilities, materials, travel, and other inputs) that were associated with each of the 
project components (in this case, project administration, demonstrated performance, and 
investments in or extensions of practice, and educator supply and distribution components).   
I refined these preliminary cost templates after I collected field data.  I used 
information from participant interviews and project documents, such as annual reports and 
budgets, to refine the lists of resources that I included on each of the templates.  I outlined 
these resources in “the most natural and descriptive units possible” (Rice, 2001, p. 468) so 




were actually required to implement the incentive plans.  In this way, I ensured that each 
template contained a comprehensive account of the types of resources required to implement 
the projects for one year and the amount of each resource that those who were associated 
with the projects needed to perform their work.   
Two considerations regarding the lists of resource I included on the raw data 
templates deserve attention.  First, each of the three projects changed in some way from year 
to year.  To the extent possible, I attempted to determine project components and related 
resources for the 2012-13 school year, because that is the year for which I had payout data 
for all three sites.  Accordingly, this analysis only sheds light on the costs associated with 
implementing the projects during the third year of their TIF grant period.  Second, while it 
would have been ideal to include not only annual operating costs but also project start-up 
costs and project evaluation costs in this study, lack of access to documents and key 
individuals at each site with information about these topics precluded me from including 
them. 
Determining site-specific prices associated with required resources.  After I had 
compiled the list of resources (personnel, facilities, materials, travel, and other) required to 
administer and implement the projects, I filled the raw cost templates with site-specific prices 
for each of the resources.  Although I do not present these site-specific values in the findings 
section of this dissertation, I performed this step in order to provide the district officials with 
site-specific values for the member check (see above, in the section on data validity). 
I gathered price information from a variety of sources.  I used documentary data such 
as the projects’ APRs, budget documents, project handouts, and payout records to gather 




grant-related documents), data management systems, professional development resources, 
and project payouts.41  I relied on vendor websites42 to obtain price information for materials 
like electronics.  For the most part, when I assigned prices to educators’ time, I used human 
resource information regarding average educator compensation (salary and benefits) in the 
districts that I obtained from correspondence with district officials or from online information 
posted by district and/or state educational agencies.43  I converted the price of administrators 
and teachers to hourly prices (so that I could isolate the costs associated with the work they 
had to do to implement the projects) by gathering information about the length of 
administrators’ and teachers’ contracts from the districts and dividing their compensation by 
the amount of time they were contracted to work.44 
In Chapter 2, I explained that cost analyses need to account for issues associated with 
time.  I faced time-related issues in the construction of the raw cost templates given the fact 
that many of the resources were used across a period of multiple years; therefore, I needed to 
annualize these multi-year costs.  For tangible resources that have a life of more than one 
year (for instance, computers and laptops), I annualized the cost by multiplying the price of 
41 I relied on the local newspaper story for some of these prices in one of the sites.  This newspaper story 
provided the amount that the school district paid to a vendor for an electronic data management system and 
online professional development modules. 
42 I obtained information about the price for computers and laptops from Lenovo (www.lenovo.com), for 
Microsoft Office software through Microsoft (www.office.microsoft.com), for tablets from Apple 
(www.apple.com), projectors and document cameras from Epson (www.epson.com), and for reference books 
for standards-based evaluation from Amazon (www.amazon.com).  I obtained assessment information from the 
Northwest Evaluation Association (www.nwea.org).  I obtained information on each site’s sales tax rates from 
each state’s tax website.  I obtained site-specific office space rental rates through LoopNet (www.loopnet.com). 
43 Two of the districts did not provide average compensation for assistant principals; in these cases, I obtained 
geographically appropriate information regarding median assistant principal compensation from Salary.com.  I 
chose this source because it (a) provided information for assistant principals, (b) included information about 
benefits as well as salary, and (c) provided estimates for the cities/counties where the projects in this study are 
located. 
44 For some project components, students needed to devote time.  I did not monetize this resource but rather left 
it in hours.  This approach aligns with the decision of King (1994), who points out that “there is no market value 
for unemployable individuals.  It stands to reason that the most valuable alternative use of student time involves 
learning rather than earning opportunities.  However, the economic value of foregone learning opportunities is 
hard to quantify and does not necessarily lend itself to a dollar metric” (p. 8). 
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the item by an annualization factor of 0.23 (the factor obtained using assumptions of a five-
year life for the equipment and an interest rate of five percent).45  I also annualized the cost 
of intangible resources that did not recur in the short run (for instance, initial training on the 
standards-based evaluation tools, which occurred in all three study sites).  While the districts 
did not necessarily have to invest in training each year, I chose to include an annualized cost 
for training because the projects would not have been able to operate had key personnel not 
received these trainings.  Thus, even though the costs did not necessarily recur over time, 
they were a necessary cost, and just like equipment and supplies, deserved consideration for 
subsequent years of project implementation.  I chose to divide the price of these initial 
trainings by five, in order to align with the five-year-life assumption I made for tangible 
resources and to reflect the fact that, in the face of employee turnover, initial training 
expenses would need to re-occur in the long run.     
Determination of the extent to which TIF and non-TIF sources covered project 
costs.  After I had determined the magnitude of costs associated with one year of project 
implementation for each site, I used budget documents and interview data to determine the 
extent to which TIF and non-TIF sources bore the costs associated with various resources.  
Despite the fact that all of the projects under study received federal grants to implement their 
projects, TIF dollars did not cover all of the costs associated with project implementation.  
Districts, the personnel within them (such as school administrators and teachers), external 
personnel (such as community members who served on advisory panels), and students 
45 Levin and McEwan (2001) provide the annualization formula (p. 69): 




where r = interest rate and n = lifetime of asset for depreciation.”  I use an unrounded annualization value in my 
calculations. 
This formula attempts to “[estimate] an average of the combination of depreciation and interest on the 
undepreciated portion [of the equipment] over the life of the [equipment]” (p. 67). 
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contributed fiscal and non-fiscal resources to project implementation.  Together, these 
stakeholders constitute the “non-TIF sources” that bore some of the opportunity costs 
associated with implementing the incentive projects under study.  Since cohort 3 TIF grant 
requirements specified that grantees had to assume an increasing share of payout obligations 
each grant year, districts were responsible for some of the opportunity costs associated with 
distributing payouts to incentive plan participants.  In order to determine these district payout 
responsibilities for the year under study, I used project-generated annual performance reports 
to determine what percent of payouts were required to be borne by the grantee in 2012-13 
and, for the most part, multiplied payout totals by each parties’ percent to determine the 
distribution of payout costs between the districts and the TIF grant.46   
Standardized data templates.  In the previous section, I outline the steps that I took 
to (a) determine the whole range of resources required to implement the projects, (b) 
determine the site-specific prices associated with these resources, and (c) determine the 
extent to which TIF and non-TIF sources bore the costs associated with various resources.  In 
this section, I only discuss one analogous step – determining standardized prices associated 
with various resources – because in order to standardize prices, I did not need to alter the list 
of resources required to implement the project, nor did I need to alter the determination of 
which source (TIF or non-TIF) bore the costs of implementation for various resources.  I 
discuss the steps I took to determine standardized prices in the following paragraphs.   
 As I note in Chapter 2, prices for goods and services vary across geographic 
locations.  Thus, in order to understand cost differences across projects in different locations, 
it is necessary to separate policy-relevant differences in project implementation cost from 
46 The JR project includes payouts for some personnel who are not covered by the TIF grant language (e.g., 
district administrators, transportation and maintenance personnel, and other district employees).  For these 
payouts, I allocated the entire cost of the payouts to the district. 
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differences in cost that are driven by geography (which is outside of the control of local 
policymakers; Taylor & Fowler, 2006).  In order to ensure that the costs I present were 
comparable across projects and potentially useful to policymakers at other sites, I substituted 
uniform prices for project-specific prices to create standardized data templates (Appendix E).  
For the standardized data templates, I kept the types and amounts of resources from the raw 
data templates but inserted new prices for most of the resources, such as personnel (at both 
the district and the school levels), facilities (project office space), and materials (such as 













47 While there were very few prices that I did not standardize, some did exist.  Prices that I kept the same on the 
raw and standardized cost templates included payouts (which I retrieved from district-provided data), the price 
of the data management systems (which I retrieved from budgets/APRs), contracts with professional 
development providers and other external consultants (which I retrieved from budgets/APRs), site-specific 
materials (such as the Teacher Toolkit for the TAP project, which I retrieved from a budget/APR), and 
allocations for substitute teachers (due to site-level variance in how the projects dealt with substitute teacher 
allocations for release time, which I retrieved from budgets/APRs). 
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Table 5. Sources for standardized price information 
Price Information Source Value 
U.S national average salary for 
public school teachers 
Digest of Education Statistics Advance 
Release of Selected 2013 Digest Tables; 




U.S. national average salary for 
public school assistant 
principals 
2012 Statistical Abstract of the United 
States; U.S. Census Bureau (2012) 
$100,079 
 
U.S. national average salary for 
public school principals 
NCES Schools and Staffing Survey; 
Bitterman, Goldring, & Gray (2013) 
$114,782 
 
U.S. national average salary for 
education administrators 
May 2013 National Occupational 
Employment and Wage Estimates; Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (2013) 
$113,338 
 
U.S. national average salary for 
administrators for instructional 
services 
2012 Statistical Abstract of the United 
States; U.S. Census Bureau (2012) 
$133,372 
 
U.S. national average salary for 
deputy/associate 
superintendents 
2012 Statistical Abstract of the United 
States; U.S. Census Bureau (2012) 
$178,728 
 
U.S. national average salary for 
school superintendents 
2012 Statistical Abstract of the United 
States; U.S. Census Bureau (2012) 
$209,708 
 
U.S. national average salary for 
administrative assistants 
May 2013 National Occupational 
Employment and Wage Estimates; Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (2013) 
$47,813 
 
U.S. national average asking 
rent for office space 
Cassidy-Turley Realtors; Thorpe, Edwards 
& Rockey (2014) 
$22/square 
foot 
U.S. national average sales tax Thomson Reuters (2013) 8.451% 
 
Desktop computer with 




Laptop computer with 




Tablets Apple (www.apple.com) $640 
Document cameras and 
projectors 
Epson (www.epson.com) $426 
 
Reference books for educator 
evaluation 
Amazon (www.amazon.com) $67, 
$31 
Note: I present dollar values in this table rounded to the nearest whole number, but I used unrounded values in 
my calculations.  In this table, compensation includes salary (from the relevant source) and benefits (which I 
calculated as 25 percent of salary). Different projects relied on different types of district administrative staff to 
engage in project administration and evaluation of school leaders.  I used the salary for “education 
administrators” for those district administrators who managed the incentive projects.  I used the salary for 
“administrators for instructional services” for the TAP project, where district-level administrator supervisors 
evaluated principals.  I used the salary for “deputy/associate superintendents” for the non-JR project, where an 
associate superintendent performed principal evaluations.  I used the salary for “school superintendents” for the 




In Chapter 2, I note that, since inflation affects the price of goods and services, 
researchers should take care to adjust for inflation when they gather price information from 
different years (Fowler & Monk, 2001).  Given this consideration, when necessary, I used the 
Consumer Price Index to convert prices to 2013 dollars.  For instance, as shown on table 5, 
many of the data sources that provided salary information were published before 2013; in 
these cases, I converted prices forward to 2013 dollars.  Additionally, because I looked up 
prices for materials (e.g., electronics, reference books) from online vendors in 2014, I 
converted those prices back to 2013 dollars. 
Like the raw data templates, the standardized data templates include hourly personnel 
costs.  I calculated standardized hourly personnel costs for district administrators, school 
administrators, and teachers.  Table 6 presents a list of sources I used to gather information 
for hourly wage calculations. 
Table 6. Sources for calculations of hourly personnel costs 
Time Information Source 
Number of hours in a full-time work year Office of Personnel Management (n.d.) 
Average number of days in administrators’ 
contracts 
National Center for Education Statistics 
(n.d.), Schools and Staffing Survey (2011-
12) web tables 
Average number of days in teachers’ 
contracts 
Allegretto, Corcoran, & Mishel (2004); Rice 
& Brent (2002) 
 
In order to calculate hourly wages, I divided the compensation information outlined 
in table 5, which includes salary and benefits,48 by the estimated number of hours in the 
employees’ contracts.  I assumed that district administrators worked year-round; accordingly, 
I divided their compensation by 2,087 (the number of hours used by the Office of Personnel 
Management for calculating hourly rates of pay).  The most recent administration of the 
48 In order to obtain a total compensation (salary plus benefits) amount for personnel costs, I assume that 
benefits are 25% of salary.  See Rice and Brent (2002) for precedent. 
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NCES Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) reports that school administrators’ contracts 
average 230 days (National Center for Education Statistics, 2014).  I used the NCES contract 
information and assumed that school administrators worked for eight hours each day to arrive 
at an estimated 1,840 hours per year for school administrators, and I computed school 
administrators’ hourly wage by dividing their compensation by 1,840.  In order to compute 
an hourly wage for teachers, I relied on an estimated number of teacher contract days from 
Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel (2004) and Rice and Brent (2002), who use 190 as the 
length of teachers’ contracts.  I use this teacher contract length information and assume that 
teachers worked for eight hours each day to arrive at an estimated 1,520 hours per year for 
teachers.  I computed an hourly wage for teachers by dividing teachers’ compensation by 
1,520.49  Table 7 presents the hourly personnel prices I used in this dissertation. 
Table 7. Hourly personnel costs 
Personnel Hourly price 
Teacher $46 
Assistant principal $54 
Principal $62 
Education administrator, elementary and secondary schools $54 
Administrators for instructional services $64 
Deputy/associate superintendent $86 
Superintendent $100 
Note: I present dollar values in this table rounded to the nearest whole number, but I used unrounded values in 
my calculations. 
 
As I noted in the introductory paragraph to this section, the process of standardizing 
prices for the standardized cost templates did not affect my determination of which source 
(TIF or non-TIF) bore the costs associated with various resources.  Because I used Excel to 
construct my cost templates, when I adjusted the site-specific prices to the standardized 
49 This is only one of many approaches to the computation of an hourly rate for teachers and does not 
necessarily match approaches to compute hourly rate for other workers with different work, contract, and/or 
compensation structures.  Thus, the hourly rate of teachers that I use in this dissertation should not be used in 
cross-profession wage comparisons.  For a discussion regarding the challenges of comparing teachers’ 
compensation to the compensation of other professionals, please see Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel (2004). 
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prices, the formulas I used in the spreadsheet automatically updated the information 
regarding the costs borne by TIF and non-TIF sources. 
Human Costs 
The focus of the individual and focus group interviews that I conducted was on the 
resources required to implement the educator incentive plans in each of the sites.  Given that 
focus, conversations often highlighted issues associated with participants’ investment of time 
and effort in project implementation.  Also, given that focus, conversations did not often deal 
with participants’ reactions to other aspects of educator incentive plans (such as their reaction 
to the appropriateness of linking compensation to performance or a number of other issues 
that other studies of educator incentive plans have highlighted as common areas of concern; 
see Malen et al. 2009; 2011).  Accordingly, in this dissertation, while I acknowledge that 
other aspects of educator incentive plans may be associated with human costs, I focus solely 
on the human costs of investing time and effort in the projects. 
To analyze data regarding the human costs of investing time and other resources into 
these educator incentive plans, I used a multi-stage, dual-direction (deductive and inductive) 
coding process to analyze interview and focus group data.  The deductive stage of my 
analysis included two steps, both of which relied upon the human cost framework outlined in 
Rice and Malen (2003).  I first analyzed each interview log and identified all data that related 
to any burden associated with project implementation.  After I had collected these references 
to project-related burdens, I began to categorize the data into Rice and Malen’s (2003) three 
human cost categories.   When participants discussed challenges that they faced due to their 




of task costs.50  When participants discussed burdens that dealt with interpersonal 
relationships (e.g., negative impacts of the projects on their relationships with colleagues), I 
categorized the data as reflective of social costs.  When participants discussed burdens that 
dealt with internal feelings (e.g., guilt) associated with project implementation, I categorized 
the data as reflective of psychological costs. 
As I attempted to separate the human cost data into the three categories outlined by 
Rice and Malen (2003), I determined that some data might not fit neatly into any of the 
categories or might display multiple characteristics (e.g., they may have had related to time 
and effort required to implement the projects – a characteristic of task costs – and to their 
own feelings – a characteristic of psychological costs).  Accordingly, I began an inductive 
coding process, wherein I searched for themes in the data that would help me identify the 
types of human costs that existed in my dataset.  I looked for themes that aligned with the 
categories by Rice and Malen (2003) and I also looked for new themes.  Once I had gathered 
participants’ sentiments into clusters of human cost themes, I arrayed the data in narrative 
form and selected quotations that most clearly reflected each theme to use in the report of 
findings. 
Limitations Associated with Data and Methods 
Four key limitations accompany the data and methods that I used in this study.  First, 
my interview and focus group data come from a purposeful sample of project participants.  
While these participants are knowledgeable about the projects and their implementation, they 
may differ from other participants, and their experiences regarding resource use and human 
costs may also differ.  The experiences of the study participants, though, are valuable insofar 
50 Note here that the important idea is to highlight challenges associated with investing time and effort in 
project implementation.  These challenges are distinct from the time itself, which I account for in my analysis of 
the resources required to implement the incentive projects. 
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as they paint a picture of the resources required to implement the projects in good faith and 
with fidelity. 
Second, lack of access to key individuals across study sites precluded me from 
analyzing the costs associated with project planning and evaluation.  Opportunity costs 
accompany these activities, but because I was unable to gather information about them, I do 
not uncover those opportunity costs in this study.  Thus, this dissertation provides a 
comprehensive account of the costs associated with the implementation of the projects, but it 
does not provide an account of the costs associated with the whole projects. 
Third, this dissertation presents findings regarding the extent to which the districts 
used TIF and non-TIF sources to cover implementation costs rather than findings regarding 
the distribution of costs across all relevant stakeholders.  I do not provide a breakdown of 
non-TIF stakeholders due to data limitations regarding the extent to which district salaries 
covered project work and the extent to which employees performed project work during 
uncompensated time.  Despite this limitation, the study provides insight into the extent to 
which districts used TIF grant money to cover project costs in 2012-13, which has 
implications for the sustainability of projects in later grant years (when the districts needed to 
pick up an increasing share of the incentive payments) and when the grant expires. 
Finally, this dissertation’s human cost findings only examine the burdens associated 
with investing time and energy into project implementation.  Investing energy into project 
implementation is only one facet of project implementation that might bring about human 
costs; other issues, such as the process of tying student achievement to compensation, might 




necessitated targeted conversations, but it is important to note that other human costs might 
exist beyond those that I raise in this study. 
Summary 
The preceding sections provide details regarding how I approached site selection, data 
collection, and data analysis for this dissertation.  The purpose of each of these activities was 
to allow me to understand the full range of resources required to implement different types of 
educator incentive projects, the opportunity costs associated with those resources, the extent 
to which TIF and non-TIF sources bore the costs, and whether or not the implementation of 
educator incentive projects in this study was associated with the presence of human costs.  




CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
 
This chapter presents the major findings in this study in four sections.  The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the projects’ structures and the resources required for 
implementation.  The second part of the chapter presents findings regarding how much it cost 
to implement the projects for one year; in this section, I describe the projects’ overall 
implementation costs and the costs of implementing each of the projects’ components.  In 
order to discuss the costs of projects in different locations, I use estimates from the 
standardized rather than raw (geographically distinct) data templates, and, in most cases, I 
report per-participant costs to control for the size of the projects.  The third part of the 
chapter presents findings regarding the extent to which TIF and non-TIF sources covered the 
projects’ one-year implementation costs.  Again, I present results for the projects overall and 
by component.  The final section of the chapter presents findings about the human costs 
associated with investing time and effort in project implementation.  To preserve the 
confidentiality of study participants, I pool responses from all three sites and present a 
comprehensive rather than project-specific picture of the human costs of implementing 
educator incentives. 
Description of Project Resources 
The projects in this study are complex reforms that contain multiple components 
whose implementation requires a variety of resources.  Table 8 provides an overview of the 
resources required for each of the three projects in this study.  More detailed information 




Table 8. Key resources associated with implementing the educator incentive projects: 2012-13 
 TAP Project JR Project Non-JR Project 
Project administration 
Personnel • Two full-time district administrators 
and one part-time district 
administrator 
• Part-time clerical support 
• Two people from external program 
developer who provide support for 
project implementation 
• Advisory council comprised of 
representatives from the district and 
external program developer 
• One full-time district administrator 
• Part-time clerical assistance 
• Part-time (summer) administrative 
assistance 
• Advisory council comprised of 
community leaders 
 
• One full-time district administrator 
• Planning teams comprised of 
district officials, a representative 
from the teacher association, and 
building administrators 
Facilities Office space for four district 
employees (administrators and 
clerical support) 
Office space for two district 
employees (administrator and clerical 
support) 




• Data management system 
• Office supplies 
• Computers, laptops, and tablets for 
district administrators 
• Data management system 
• Office supplies 
• Computer and laptop for district 
administrator 
• Data management system 
• Office supplies 




• Travel to TIF meetings  
• Travel to school sites for 
implementation assistance  
• Travel to TAP sites in other districts 
(district and school personnel) 
• Travel to TIF meetings 
• Travel to school sites for 
implementation assistance 
• Travel to job fairs for recruitment 
efforts 
• Travel to TIF meetings  
• Travel to school sites for 
implementation assistance 
Demonstrated performance component 
Personnel • District administrators (evaluate 
school administrators) 
• School administrators (attend 
evaluation training, spend time on 
• District superintendent (evaluate 
school administrators) 
• Framework for Teaching trainers 
• Vanderbilt Assessment of 
• District associate superintendent 
(evaluate school administrators) 
• Framework for Teaching trainers 




own evaluations, perform standards-
based evaluations) 
• Teachers (fill out surveys for 
administrator evaluations, spend 
time on own formal evaluations – 4 
formal evaluations per year) 
Leadership in Education (VAL-
ED) trainer 
• School administrators (attend 
evaluation training, spend time on 
own portfolios and evaluations, 
perform standards-based 
evaluations, plan school culture 
activities) 
• Teachers (plan school culture 
activities, fill out surveys for 
administrator evaluations, spend 
time on own portfolio and formal 
evaluations – 2 formal evaluations 
per year) 
• External consultant (review 
administrator and teacher 
portfolios) 
• Students (fill out school climate 
surveys) 
evaluation training, spend time on 
own portfolios and evaluations, 
perform standards-based 
evaluations) 
• Teachers (conduct peer 
observations, spend time on own 
portfolios and formal and informal 
evaluations – 2 formal and 5 
informal evaluations per year)  






• Teacher evaluation manuals 
• Tablets (for school administrators 
and master/mentor teachers, who 
perform teacher evaluations) 
• TAP observer applications for 
tablets 
• Portfolio supplies (sheet protectors, 
ink, paper, binders) 
• Reference books on the 
Framework for Teaching 
• VAL-ED surveys 
• Miscellaneous materials for school 
culture/celebratory activities 
• Reference books on the 
Framework for Teaching 
• Tablets (for administrators and 
teachers) 
• Portfolio supplies (sheet protectors, 
ink, paper, binders) 
• Contract with testing company for 
additional assessment 
Other inputs Payouts for demonstrated 
performance 
Payouts for demonstrated 
performance 
Payouts for demonstrated 
performance 
Investments in or extensions of practice 




initial and ongoing training for 
project implementation, coordinate 
professional development [PD] 
efforts for year, attend TAP 
Leadership Team [TLT] meetings) 
• Teachers (weekly PD “cluster” 
meetings) 
• Substitute teachers (provide 
coverage for certain teachers to 
attend weekly PD meetings) 
(assist with program planning and 
recordkeeping) 
• Substitute teachers (provide 
coverage for teachers who need 
release time for PD or other project 
activities) 
 
training to be able to work in project 
schools; provide coverage for 
teachers who need release time for 




• TAP PD portal 
• TAP training materials for TLTs 
• Contracts with Teachscape, 
Mindsteps, Simple K-12, 
Educational Impact, and other PD 
providers 
• Laptops, tablets, document 
cameras, and projectors for master 
teachers 
Contracts with Teachscape and 
Coalition of Essential Schools for PD 
Travel and 
transportation 
Travel expenses for TLTs to attend 
TAP Summer Institute and TAP 
National Conference 
Travel expenses for master teachers 
and peer coaches to attend 
professional conferences 
Travel expenses for administrators 
and teachers to attend professional 
conferences 
Other inputs Payouts for master and mentor 
teachers 
• Payouts for master teachers and 
peer coaches 
• Payouts for attendance, PD, 
leadership, teacher-led PD, and 
curriculum projects 
• Payouts for PD 
• Payouts for teachers on planning 
team 
 
Educator supply and distribution component 
Other inputs Retention bonus N/A Retention bonus 
Note: Resources are based on implementation during the 2012-13 school year.  While the JR project documents did discuss a signing bonus and technology 
stipend, all new teachers, regardless of their choice to participate in the JR project, would receive these bonuses.  Both the JR project and the non-JR project have 
planning councils that include teacher representation; teacher investment in these planning councils is listed under the “investments in or extensions of practice” 




In the 2012-13 school year, all three educator incentive projects included in this study 
needed to allocate resources to project administration, and all three included a demonstrated 
performance component and investments in or extensions of practice.  Two of the projects 
(the TAP and non-JR projects) awarded retention bonuses to qualifying project participants.  
While the JR project documents discussed a signing bonus and technology stipend for 
teachers who were new to the district, recipients of these bonuses would not need to 
participate in the JR project to receive them.  Therefore, I do not include these recruitment 
bonuses in the costs of JR project implementation. 
While the three projects’ structures were similar, their approaches to each of the 
project components differed.  Project administration, for instance, was handled by a different 
number of staff in each site, which impacted personnel costs and also material and travel 
costs, since the addition of personnel required additional computers and additional funds for 
travel, particularly travel to school sites to provide implementation assistance.51  While all 
three projects used data management systems to manage project information, each of the 
projects used a different type of software. 
  While all projects based demonstrated performance calculations on standards-based 
evaluations and student performance, they did not use the same evaluation approaches; some 
of these differences impacted resource requirements.  For instance, the administrator 
evaluation for the TAP project required the time of district administrators who were principal 
supervisors, whereas the administrator evaluations for the JR project and non-JR project 
required a district superintendent and district associate superintendent, respectively.  The 
number of teacher evaluations per year varied across sites – four formal evaluations per year 
51 The addition of administrators did not impact travel for TIF meetings, since more than one person went to 
TIF meetings across sites.  That is, district administrators who were not necessarily responsible for the incentive 
projects sometimes attended TIF meetings. 
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for teachers in the TAP project, two formal evaluations per year for teachers in the JR 
project, and two formal plus five informal (comprised of external, peer, and self) evaluations 
per year for teachers in the non-JR project. This variation impacted the amount of time that 
administrators and teachers spent on evaluation activities.  The JR project and the non-JR 
project educator evaluations required portfolios; the TAP project did not.  Furthermore, while 
the TAP and JR projects’ student performance component used data only from the existing 
state achievement tests, the non-JR project’s student performance component used data from 
the existing state achievement test and an additional student assessment that the district 
purchased. 
Similarly, the three projects invested in and extended practice in many different ways.  
For instance, the TAP project involved master and mentor teachers who led required weekly 
professional development meetings (called “cluster” meetings) for career teachers in their 
buildings.  The JR project employed master teachers and peer coaches who were available to 
assist other teachers with professional development, but participating teachers were able to 
choose their own professional development from an array of choices, some of which were 
accessible through online vendors.  The non-JR project did not include master or mentor 
teachers.  Like the JR project, it allowed for a wide variety of professional development 
opportunities for participating teachers. 
The projects’ varied choices regarding how to approach project administration, 
demonstrated performance, investments in or extensions of practice, and educator 
distribution components affected project costs.  In the following sections, I provide additional 





Magnitude of Project Costs 
 In this section, I provide estimates of the opportunity costs associated with 
implementing each of the three projects for the 2012-13 school year.  First, I discuss the costs 
associated with the whole projects, and then I discuss the costs associated with each project 
component (project administration, demonstrated performance, investments in or extensions 
of practice, and educator distribution).52 
Overall Costs 
Estimated annual operating costs for the projects in this study ranged from a low 
estimate of just under $1.6 million in the JR project to a high estimate of over $6 million in 
the TAP project (table 9).  When adjusted for the number of participants, the JR project 
remained the lowest-cost project of the three ($4,246 per participant), but the non-JR project 
outranked the TAP project as the highest-cost project ($13,307 per participant in the non-JR 
project; $8,077 per participant in the TAP project).  
Table 9. Project costs and fiscal outlays, overall and per participant: 2012-13 
 
TAP Project JR Project 
Non-JR 
Project 
 n = 747 n = 371 n = 155 
Costs    
  Total costs $6,033,547 $1,575,359 $2,062,543 
  Cost per participant $8,077 $4,246 $13,307 
Fiscal outlays    
  Total expenditures $3,696,551 $1,063,173 $1,765,302 
  Expenditures per participant $4,949 $2,866 $11,389 
Note:  For more information regarding which resources were associated with an expenditure, see the text below; 
see the decision rule document in Appendix D and the standardized data templates in Appendix E for additional 
details. 
 
52 Throughout the dissertation, I have referred to “educator supply and distribution.”  Both of the projects that 
had payments in this category used retention bonuses, which are more explicitly tied to the goal of improving 
educator distribution than they are to the goal of improving the supply of educators.  Consequently, in order to 
make the figures easier to read, in this chapter, I simply refer to “educator distribution.” 
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Table 9 indicates that not all costs associated with the projects’ implementation 
translated into fiscal outlays.  Expenditures did not include the time that school 
administrators and teachers spent on project-related activities that were not associated with 
an explicit payout (i.e., time that administrators and teachers spent performing standards-
based evaluation and, for administrators in all three sites and administrators and teachers in 
the TAP project who did not receive payouts for professional development, time on 
professional development).53  This time was either covered by educators’ salaries (when it 
took place during contract hours) or was uncompensated (when it took place outside of 
contract hours).  In either case, it represented a cost but not a new expenditure.  When it was 
covered by salary, it was not a new expenditure (since the district would pay the salary 
anyway), but it represented an opportunity cost to the district due to the fact that the 
educators were spending time on the incentive project rather than other district goals.  When 
it was uncompensated time, it represented a cost to the educators themselves, who could not 
use that time for other activities. 
Although not all costs were associated with new fiscal outlay, a number of project 
costs did translate into expenditures.  The projects required a variety of fiscal outlays, 
including project administration personnel (district administrators, clerical assistants, and in 
the case of TAP, assistance from TAP personnel); materials and supplies for project 
administration (including data management software), evaluations, and professional 
development; a variety of travel activities (to TIF meetings, for professional development, to 
school sites for implementation assistance, for recruitment); contracts with professional 
53 Participants’ time is the main example of a resource that is associated with a cost but not an expenditure, but 
it is not the only resource.  For instance, across all three projects, the office space used for project 
administration is associated with cost but not expense.  To view all resources associated with project 
costs/expenses, see the data templates in Appendix E. 
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development and other consultants; substitute teachers; a student assessment (for the non-JR 
project, which used an additional assessment besides the state test administered to all 
students); and payouts.  The expenditure pattern was similar to the cost pattern; both total and 
per-participant expenditures were lowest for the JR project, whereas total expenditures were 
highest for the TAP project and per-participant expenditures were highest for the non-JR 
project.     
As one might expect, major drivers of project costs were the incentive payouts 
associated with the projects.  The three projects in this study provided different types and 
sizes of payouts to participants, which led to differences in per participant payout amounts 
across the projects (table 10). 
Table 10. Project payouts, overall and per participant: 2012-13 
 TAP Project JR Project Non-JR Project 
Total payouts $2,747,403 $580,931 $1,355,192 
Average payout per participant $3,678 $1,566 $8,743 
Note: Per participant estimates use the following participant numbers: 747 participants in the TAP project, 371 
participants in the JR project, and 155 participants in the non-JR project. 
 
Similarly, payouts as a proportion of overall (non-participant-adjusted) 
implementation costs varied across projects.  In 2012-13, 46 percent of one-year operating 
costs went to payouts in the TAP project; 37 percent of one-year operating costs went to 
payouts in the JR project; and 66 percent of one-year operating costs went to payouts in the 





Figure 2. Payouts as a proportion of overall project cost: 2012-13 





Detailed Costs by Component 
As I mention above, the projects in this study took varied approaches to their multiple 
components (administration, demonstrated performance, investments in and extensions of 
practice, and educator distribution).  The TAP project was administered by personnel from 
both the district and NIET.  It had a demonstrated performance component that relied on 
student achievement and standards-based evaluation with multiple observations; a job 
redesign (master/mentor teacher) component; 54 and large but selective retention bonuses.  
The JR project was administered only by district personnel.  It had a demonstrated 
performance component that included standards-based evaluation, student achievement, and 
other student outcomes; both job redesign (master teacher and peer coaches) and job 
54 Due to the fact that master and mentor teachers in the TAP project performed formal observations as part of 
the standards-based evaluations of teachers in their buildings, some costs that might otherwise have accrued to 
the demonstrated performance component were actually in the investments in or extensions of practice 












Payouts All other costs
Note: Payouts for the TAP project include payouts for standards-based evaluation, student 
achievement, retention, and for serving as master/mentor teachers.  Payouts in the JR project include 
effectiveness payouts, district achievement payouts, school culture payouts, a variety of payouts for 
investments in or extensions of practice, and payment for serving as a master teacher or peer coach.  
Payouts in the non-JR project include payouts for standards-based evaluation payouts, student 
achievement payouts, student behavior/attendance payouts, retention payouts, payments for 
professional development, and for teachers serving on a project-related planning team.  
125 
 
                                                 
 
expansion opportunities; and no recruitment or retention bonus.55  The non-JR project was 
administered only by district personnel.  It included a demonstrated performance component 
that included student achievement, other student outcomes, and standards-based evaluations 
with multiple formal and informal observations; job expansion opportunities; and large and 
widely accessible retention bonuses.  Figure 3 shows per-participant project costs for each of 
these project components including (where applicable) costs associated with payouts. 
Figure 3. Per-participant project costs, by component: 2012-13 
 
The most costly component across all three projects was the demonstrated 
performance component, which reached a high of $6,350 per participant in the non-JR 
project.  While the second most costly component in the TAP and JR projects was 
investments in or extensions of practice ($3,556 and $1,594, respectively), the second most 
55 While the JR project documents did discuss a signing bonus and technology stipend, all new teachers, 


















Investments in or Extensions of
Practice
Educator Distribution
Note: I do not include an educator distribution component for the JR project.  While the JR project documents 
do discuss a signing bonus and technology stipend, all new teachers, regardless of their choice to participate in 
the JR project, would receive these bonuses.  Per participant estimates use the following participant numbers: 




                                                 
 
costly component in the non-JR project was the educator distribution component ($3,239).  
For the JR56 and non-JR projects, the least costly component was project administration 
($536 and $924, respectively), whereas the least costly component for the TAP project was 
the educator distribution component ($165). Variation in the types of resources required for 
different parts of project implementation drove variation in costs across project components 
and across projects for each component.  In the next sections, I describe in more detail the 
resource categories that drove costs for project administration, demonstrated performance, 
investments in or extensions of practice, and educator distribution components. 
Project administration.  In each model, project administration included resources 
such as district (and, in the case of the TAP project, external) administrators, materials such 
as data management systems, and travel to TIF meetings.57  Personnel costs drove the cost of 
project administration in all three districts (figure 4).  In fact, in all three sites, the per-
participant cost of project administration personnel was higher than the per-participant costs 
of all other project administration resources (facilities, materials, and travel) combined.   
Participant-adjusted personnel costs were highest in the non-JR Project, which had the fewest 
participants.  Per-participant personnel costs in the TAP project and the JR project were both 
under $500; the TAP project had higher total costs due to the presence of multiple district 
and external administrators involved in project implementation, but the JR and non-JR 
projects had fewer participants over which to distribute administrative costs.  Costs 
associated with materials, equipment, and supplies were proportionally high for the JR 
56 Technically, the least costly component for the JR project was the educator distribution component, since it 
had a per-participant cost of $0.  Accordingly, for the JR project, the project administration component was the 
least costly component that had a cost higher than zero. 
57 Study participants explained that requirements to travel for TIF meetings had declined across the life of the 
grant as the Department of Education moved away from in-person meetings to virtual meetings.  Still, during 
the 2012-13 school year, some travel was necessary.  In this study, I assume that participants from each district 
had to travel to two TIF meetings. 
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project due to the fact that the JR project’s data management system was more costly than the 
corresponding systems in the TAP project and the non-JR project. 
Figure 4. Per-participant costs of project administration, by resource category: 2012-13 
 
Demonstrated performance.  The projects’ demonstrated performance component 
provided payouts to building administrators and teachers for their performance on standards-
based evaluations, for their students’ performance on standardized achievement tests, and, in 
the JR and non-JR projects, for other desired student outcomes such as improved behavior, 
increased attendance, or improved perceptions of school climate.  In the TAP project and the 
non-JR project, the highest per-participant costs were associated with educators’ performance 
payouts ($2,345 and $4,222, respectively; figure 5).  In the JR project, however, the highest 
category of per-participant costs was associated with personnel ($1,309), and while personnel 
costs did not outpace payout costs in the TAP and non-JR projects, they were still substantial 





















Note: Per participant estimates use the following participant numbers: 747 participants in the TAP project, 




performed formal observations as part of teachers’ standards-based evaluations, some costs 
that might otherwise show up in the demonstrated performance component were shifted to 
the investments in or extensions of practice component. 
Figure 5. Per-participant costs of demonstrated performance, by resource category: 2012-13 
 
 Though some of the personnel costs displayed in figure 5 were associated with 
expenditures (for instance, in the JR and non-JR projects, some of these costs were associated 
with initial training on the Framework for Teaching carried out by consultants from the 
Danielson Group), most of these personnel costs were associated with school administrators 
and teachers performing work associated with the complex evaluation systems.58  The largest 
drivers of demonstrated performance personnel costs were the costs associated with 
educators spending time on their own evaluations and on evaluating others.   
58 In all three projects, a small portion of demonstrated performance personnel costs were associated with 

















Note: These estimates do not include student time investments, which existed for the JR project and the non-JR 
project.  Per participant estimates use the following participant numbers: 747 participants in the TAP project, 371 
participants in the JR project, and 155 participants in the non-JR project.
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Educators (both administrators and teachers) spent substantial amounts of time on 
their own evaluations (figure 6).  Hour estimates are highest (46 hours for each principal and 
assistant principal) in the TAP project, where building administrators underwent two sets of 
observation-based evaluations.59  Estimates for each principal and assistant principal were 
over 20 hours per year in the JR project, where both principals and assistant principals 
underwent observation-based and portfolio-based evaluations (and where principals also 
spent time filling out online self-evaluations for the VAL-ED).  The lowest administrator 
estimates, in the non-JR project, were still over 10 hours per year, where administrators 
underwent portfolio- and observation-based evaluations but reported lower time estimates 
associated with these activities.  Teachers’ estimates, too, illustrate a substantial investment 
of time.  In the two districts whose projects required teachers to create portfolios of practice, 
each teacher spent an estimated 28 and 21 hours on his or her own evaluation (in the JR and 
non-JR projects, respectively).  In the TAP project, where teachers did not create portfolios 










59 School administrators in the TAP project underwent a standards-based evaluation that aligned with the 
administrator evaluation in the district, and they also underwent an evaluation of the extent to which they 
implemented TAP with fidelity.  The majority of the hours associated with administrator evaluation in the TAP 
project (43 of the 46 hours) were associated with the district-aligned evaluation. 
130 
 
                                                 
 
Figure 6. Average number of hours that educators spent on their own evaluations per year: 
2012-13 
 
While the time estimates for educators performing work for their own evaluations 
were noteworthy, they were completely overshadowed by time estimates associated with 
building administrators (principals and assistant principals) conducting formal teacher 
evaluations (figure 7).60  These estimates depend on (a) the amount of time it takes to 
complete a formal observation cycle, (b) the number of observation cycles embedded within 
each project, and (c) the number of teachers who participated in the project.  In all three sites, 
the estimated time that each administrator spent on teacher evaluation responsibilities was 
over 100 hours per year.  In the TAP project, each administrator spent an estimated 178 hours 
per year performing teacher evaluations;61 in the JR project, each administrator spent an 
60 In the TAP project, master and mentor teachers also conducted formal teacher evaluations.  Time estimates 
for master/mentor teachers conducting formal evaluations are similar to but slightly lower than estimates for 
school administrators, since I allocated responsibility for teachers’ summative conferences (part of the 
evaluation process) to school administrators rather than master/mentor teachers. 
61 This estimate takes into account the fact that non-administrators (master and mentor teachers) also performed 
formal evaluations in TAP Project.  If master and mentor teachers did not perform this work, the estimates here 

























Note: These time estimates include both formal and informal evaluations, when applicable, and only apply 
to evaluations required by the incentive projects in the study.
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estimated 106 hours per year; and in the non-JR project, each administrator spent an 
estimated 141 hours per year.   
Figure 7. Average number of hours that school administrators spent on teacher evaluations 

















TAP Project JR Project Non-JR Project
Note: These estimates represent the total number of hours that one administrator spends on all 
teacher evaluation activities.  I derived them by estimating the total amount of time associated with 
one teacher observation cycle, calculating the total number of teacher observations that 
administrators needed to perform, and dividing those observations evenly across all participating 
administrators.  These estimates do not include teacher observations performed by master and 
mentor teachers in the TAP project or informal observations in the non-JR project.  For the TAP 
project's master and mentor teachers, time estimates for conducting formal evaluations were similar 
to but slightly lower than estimates for school administrators, since I allocated responsibility for 





Investments in or extensions of practice.  The costs for investing in or extending 
practice varied widely across the three projects (figure 8); this variation reflects the diverse 
approaches that the three sites took to this project component.  Personnel costs were high in 
the TAP project, due mainly to educators’ investment of time in professional development 
activities (TAP Leadership Team meetings for administrators and master/mentor teachers and 
weekly cluster meetings for career teachers) for which they were not compensated.  While 
educators in the JR and non-JR projects also participated in a great deal of professional 
development, they received payouts for this investment.  Therefore, I do not count these costs 
in the personnel category but rather the payout category.  Still, personnel costs in the non-JR 
project remained considerable despite teachers’ receipt of payouts for professional 
development due to a heavier investment in the training and employment of substitute 
teachers for those schools that provided teachers release time for common planning and 
development.   
Materials costs for the JR and non-JR projects were relatively high, because these 
districts contracted with external professional development providers; the same was not true 
for the TAP project in the 2012-13 school year.  However, while travel costs were relatively 
low in the JR and non-JR projects, travel costs were higher in the TAP project, since some 
professional development required that members of TAP Leadership Teams travel for 
training.   
Payouts for investing in or extending practice were relatively high in all three sites.  
While payout costs for the JR project were lower than payouts in both the TAP and non-JR 
projects, they represented the largest investment or extension cost for that particular model, 




serving as master teachers and peer coaches, and for participation in a variety of job 
expansion activities.  Payouts in the TAP project were driven by salary augmentations for 
master and mentor teachers; payouts in the non-JR project were driven by payments to 
teachers for professional development (either as actual payments or as release time) and for 
stipends for those teachers who served on the district-level project planning committee. 




Perhaps unexpectedly, per-participant payout costs were higher in the non-JR project 
than they were in either the TAP project or the JR project, despite the fact that the non-JR 





















Note:  In the TAP project, payouts reflect the costs of salary augmentations for master and mentor teachers.  In the 
JR project, payouts cover costs of payouts for employee attendance, payment for attending professional 
development (PD), bonuses for master teachers and peer coaches, and payouts for various job expansion activities 
(leadership, leading PD, engaging in a curriculum project).  In the non-JR project, payouts are for attending PD and 
job expansion (serving on the district-level planning team).  Costs associated with PD payments in the non-JR 
project may reflect actual payments to teachers for outside-of-contract-hours PD or it may reflect release time for 
participating in within-contract-hours PD.  In either case, the cost reflects the amount of time that teachers would 
get for outside-of-contract-hours PD.  Per participant estimates use the following participant numbers: 747 




were not associated with a job redesign, payouts were available to non-JR project participants 
for investments in or extensions of practice (in the form of payouts for professional 
development or stipends for serving on the district-level planning committee).   
Educator distribution.  The TAP and non-JR projects included retention bonuses, 
but eligibility for these bonuses and the size of the awards varied across the projects.  In the 
TAP project, teachers in select TAP schools (not all TAP schools) were eligible for a $3,000 
retention bonus if they remained in the school.  In the non-JR project, all participating 
educators (building administrators and teachers) were eligible for retention bonuses.  
Teachers’ bonus amounts increased during each year of project participation; in 2012-13, 
teachers who had participated in the project for two years (which would have been the vast 
majority of teachers) were eligible for a $4,000 retention bonus; teachers who had just joined 
the project that year were eligible for a $2,000 bonus.  Administrators in the participating 
schools were eligible for a $2,000 bonus.  Thus, the expansive eligibility, large bonuses, and 
smaller overall participant numbers in the non-JR project make the per-participant costs of 












Figure 9. Per-participant costs of educator distribution: 2012-13 
 
Summary: Magnitude of Project Costs 
The findings I report above illuminate total societal opportunity costs for the 
implementation of the educator incentive projects that topped $1 million in all three sites.  
Total societal opportunity costs were considerably higher than expenditures due to the fact 
that many resources required for the projects’ implementation were not associated with an 
explicit financial payment; still, because the districts employed those resources to implement 
the incentive projects, they reflect an opportunity cost, insofar as the districts could not use 
those same resources for other purposes. 
Payouts consumed a substantial portion of annual project costs, but they did not 
consume more than two-thirds of the cost in any site; they consumed less than two-fifths of 
project costs in one site.  Because the projects approached each component (project 
administration, demonstrated performance, investments in or extensions of practice, and 
educator distribution) differently, they displayed a variety of per-participant costs for each of 
$165 
$3,239 




Note: The JR project does not have an educator distribution component.  While the JR project documents do discuss a 
signing bonus and technology stipend, all new teachers, regardless of their choice to participate in the JR project, would 
receive these bonuses.  Per participant estimates use the following participant numbers: 747 participants in the TAP 




these components.  One striking finding that was shared across all three sites, however, was 
that personnel costs associated with implementation of the demonstrated performance 
component were relatively high due, in large part, to immense investments of time on the 
part of school administrators and teachers to implement the complex standards-based 
evaluations. 
TIF and non-TIF Responsibility for Project Costs 
As a grant program, the purpose of the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) is to cover (at 
least some) project costs.  However, the TIF grant is finite – it only supports the incentive 
projects for five years and, in the case of these cohort 3 projects, supports a decreasing share 
of the incentive payouts over the course of those five years.62  Given concerns highlighted in 
the literature regarding the ability of educator incentive projects (particularly those supported 
by TIF) to sustain themselves over time (see Chapter 2 for a review of this literature), it is 
important to understand the extent to which TIF supports these projects.  This knowledge is 
key for discussions of project sustainability since the TIF funds will not support the projects 
forever. 
The following sections demonstrate that, in general, projects used TIF funds to 
support the majority of project costs.  However, not all project implementation costs were 
borne by TIF, and the proportion of costs that TIF dollars funded varied across project 
components.  In this section, I detail how each projects’ costs were distributed across TIF and 
non-TIF sources.63 
 
62 Remember from Chapter 2 that cohort 3 grantees faced a requirement that they assume an increasing 
responsibility for incentive payouts over the life of the grant. 
63 In this section, I only discuss a split between TIF and non-TIF sources due to data limitations.  Non-TIF 
sources include districts, external agencies, building administrators, and teachers.   
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TIF and non-TIF Share of Overall Costs 
The estimated split of costs across TIF and non-TIF sources varied across the three 
projects in this study (table 11).  Costs were most evenly split in the TAP project, where 
project implementers used TIF dollars to cover 56 percent of project costs and non-TIF 
sources covered 44 percent of the costs.  In the JR project, about three-fifths of costs (62 
percent) were supported by the TIF grant and almost two-fifths (38 percent) were covered by 
non-TIF sources.  Costs were least evenly split in the non-JR project, where non-TIF sources 
covered less than one quarter (21 percent) of the costs and TIF supported over three quarters 
(79 percent) of project costs.  While non-TIF sources covered at least 20 percent of the costs 
in each district, fiscal outlays associated with the projects were covered almost entirely by 
the TIF grant in all three districts; non-TIF sources covered less than 10 percent of 
expenditures in each of the three study sites. 
Table 11. Division of project costs and fiscal outlays between TIF and non-TIF sources: 
2012-13 
 
TAP Project JR Project Non-JR Project 
 
Dollars Percent Dollars Percent Dollars Percent 
Costs 
        TIF  $3,350,996  56%  $976,917  62%  $1,626,074  79% 
  Non-TIF  $2,682,551  44%  $598,442  38%  $436,469  21% 
  Total  $6,033,547  100%  $1,575,359  100%  $2,062,543  100% 
Fiscal outlays 
       TIF  $3,350,996  91%  $976,917 92%  $1,626,074  92% 
  Non-TIF  $345,555  9%  $86,256  8%  $139,228  8% 
  Total  $3,696,551  100%  $1,063,173  100%  $1,765,302  100% 
 
Different components of the projects relied more or less heavily on TIF support 
(figure 10).  A few patterns emerged across sites.  For instance, in all three sites, project 




support 89 percent of project administration, the JR project used TIF dollars for 85 percent of 
project administration, and the non-JR project used TIF funds to cover 84 percent of project 
administrations.  TIF dollars were also used to support most of the costs of the educator 
distribution component in the districts with retention bonuses (the TAP and non-JR projects).  
Across all three sites, non-TIF sources supported a substantial amount of demonstrated 
performance costs (46 percent in the TAP project, 62 percent in the JR project, and 36 
percent in the non-JR project).  The districts exhibited different cost distribution patterns for 
investing in or extending practice.  While non-TIF sources bore almost half of these costs in 
the TAP project, they bore much smaller portions of these costs in the JR project (14 percent) 
and the non-JR project (2 percent).  I examine each of the components in more detail in the 
next section. 










































PA DP IE ED
Non-JR Project
TIF Non-TIF
Note: PA=Project Administration; DP=Demonstrated Performance; IE=Investments in or Extensions 
of Practice; ED=Educator Distribution. The JR project does not have an educator distribution 
component.  While the JR project documents do discuss a signing bonus and technology stipend, all 






TIF and non-TIF Share of Costs by Component 
Differences in who bore the costs of project components were driven by the types of 
resources that these components required.  The next sections outline how the projects divided 
the costs of various resources (i.e., personnel, facilities, materials, travel, and other) across 
TIF and non-TIF sources for each of the project components. 
Project administration.  In all three sites, project administration required personnel, 
facilities, and travel.  The TIF/non-TIF division of costs was similar across sites for some of 
these resources and dissimilar for others (figure 11).  Specifically, all three projects used TIF 
money to cover nearly all personnel costs (excluding costs for clerical assistance in the TAP 
project and costs of some advisory committee members in all three sites), and non-TIF 
sources (in this case, the districts that operated the projects) covered all facilities costs.  The 
TIF/non-TIF division of costs for materials and travel, however, varied across the sites.  The 
TAP and JR projects used TIF dollars to cover all of the project administration materials 
costs, but TAP dollars only supported 13 percent of these costs in the non-JR project.  The 
reason for this difference was that the non-JR project district paid for the data management 
software as part of a district-wide contract, while the data management software in the TAP 
and JR projects was used only for the educator incentive projects and was covered by the TIF 
grant.  In the case of travel costs, while the TAP and non-JR projects used TIF dollars to 
cover the majority of travel, the TIF grant only covered 31 percent of travel costs in the JR 
project.  This difference was driven by the fact that travel to job recruitment fairs was a key 
part of the JR project district administrator’s job, and the district could not use TIF money to 




Figure 11. Division of project administration costs between TIF and non-TIF sources, by 
resource category: 2012-13 
   
Demonstrated Performance.  In all three sites, the demonstrated performance 
component required personnel, materials, and other inputs.  While the division of costs 
between TIF and non-TIF sources looked similar across sites for personnel and other inputs, 
the TIF/non-TIF divisions were not uniform across sites for materials (figure 12).  In all three 
districts, personnel costs were largely borne by non-TIF sources.  The JR and non-JR projects 
used TIF money to cover some personnel costs in the form of payments to consultants who 
provided training to district educators on the standards-based evaluation tool; still, districts 
and educators within them bore the vast majority of personnel costs for these projects.64  The 
other inputs resource category was comprised of payouts to project participants for their 
demonstrated performance.  All three sites used TIF to cover most of these costs; districts 
were responsible for some payout costs due to the TIF requirements that grantees cover a 
64 In the previous section, I describe the time requirements associated with performing and receiving standards-
based evaluations.  The costs associated with those investments of time were borne either by the districts, which 
provided salaries to administrators and teachers, or by the educators themselves, when they performed 


































P F M T
Non-JR Project
TIF Non-TIF
Note: P=Personnel; F=Facilities; M=Materials, equipment, and supplies; T=Travel and transportation. 
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share of the payouts and, in the JR project, for project participants who are not covered by 
the grant language.   
The TIF/non-TIF division of costs for materials for demonstrated performance 
differed across the three sites in this study.  While all three sites used TIF money to cover the 
cost of evaluation training materials and the non-JR project used TIF money to pay for the 
additional student assessment, TIF funds did not cover all performance materials costs for the 
JR and non-JR projects.  In these districts, part of educators’ evaluation scores depended on a 
review of portfolios of practice.  To create these portfolios, educators had to use materials 
such as binders, paper, ink, and so forth.65  Educators in both districts bore the costs 
associated with these materials. 
Figure 12. Division of demonstrated performance costs between TIF and non-TIF sources, by 
resource category: 2012-13 
   
 
65 In Non-JR Project, some educators chose to make electronic rather than physical portfolios.  Those educators 



































Note: P=Personnel; M=Materials, equipment, and supplies; O=Other inputs (payouts).  These estimates do not 




                                                 
 
Investments in or extensions of practice.  The projects’ investments in or 
extensions of practice components required personnel, materials, travel, and other inputs.  All 
three sites relied upon TIF money to cover all or nearly all of the costs associated with 
materials, travel, and other inputs (which, for this project component, include various job 
expansion payouts and payments for master and mentor teachers; figure 13).  The division of 
costs for personnel, however, varied across the projects.  In the JR and non-JR projects, 
teachers received payouts for attending professional development.  Thus, the costs associated 
with attendance at professional development accrued not to the “personnel” category or to 
educators themselves but rather to the TIF grant, since these costs became payouts in the 
“other inputs” resource category.66  In the JR project, though, school-level educators served 
as site team leaders and site team members, and non-TIF sources covered this cost.  In the 
TAP project, participants did not receive payouts for professional development.  Therefore, 
the costs associated with attendance at professional development in that district accrued to 
the district (when the educators accessed professional development during contract hours, 
which was the case for teachers, due to the structure of cluster meetings) or to the educators 
themselves (when they accessed professional development outside of contract hours or when 
they had to make up work that they normally would have done during the time that they 
spent engaging in professional development).67   
66 For the non-JR project, educators would not receive payments for professional development that occurred 
during contract hours.  The cost in this case would be a personnel cost, because substitute teachers covered for 
teachers who were out of the classroom engaging in professional development.  TIF covered the cost of the 
substitute teachers. 
67 The small portion of TIF-covered costs was associated with substitute teachers who covered for those 
teachers who had to attend cluster meetings during class periods that were not their planning periods. 
143 
 
                                                 
 
Figure 13. Division of investments in or extensions of practice cost between TIF and non-TIF 
sources, by resource category: 2012-13 
   
 
Educator distribution.  Most of the costs associated with retention bonuses were 
borne by TIF.  Given the TIF “increasing share” requirements, the districts that had retention 
bonuses did have a responsibility to cover a portion of payout costs for these retention 
bonuses, just like they did for demonstrated performance payouts and for payouts associated 
with investments in or extensions of practice.  In the 2012-13 school year, project-specific 
agreements between grantees and TIF stipulated that the TAP project was responsible for 17 
percent of payouts, whereas the non-JR project was responsible for 10 percent of payouts 
(figure 14).68  
68 For more information about 2012-13 requirements regarding the extent to which grantees had to bear the 
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Figure 14. Division of educator distribution costs between TIF and non-TIF sources: 2012-13 
 
Summary: TIF and Non-TIF Responsibility for Project Costs 
The findings in this section highlight that while the districts relied upon TIF dollars to 
cover almost all project fiscal outlays, the TIF grants did not cover all project costs.  Some 
TIF/non-TIF distribution differences across projects were driven by idiosyncratic 
circumstances (e.g., the TAP and JR projects used TIF funds to cover the data management 
software, but the non-JR project used data management software that it obtained through a 
district contract), but one distribution pattern was clear.  Except for the project administration 
component, where the districts used TIF to cover most of the personnel costs, non-TIF 
sources generally covered personnel costs.  In general, educators themselves and the districts 
that employed them bore the personnel costs associated with implementing the demonstrated 
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Note: The JR project does not have an educator distribution component.  While the JR project documents 
do discuss a signing bonus and technology stipend, all new teachers, regardless of their choice to participate 




noteworthy for the demonstrated performance component, given the heavy investments of 
time that educators made to implement the standards-based evaluations embedded within the 
projects.  I investigate the challenges that accompanied these investments of time more in the 
next section. 
Human Costs 
This section describes findings regarding the human costs associated with investing 
time and effort to implement these three projects.  The focus here is not on the time itself, 
which I discussed above and captured in estimates regarding the magnitude of project costs.  
Rather, the focus here is on the burden that accompanies educators’ investment of time and 
energy into performing work associated with these multifaceted projects.  Recall from 
Chapter 2 that human costs are “reform-related sacrifices made by individuals and groups of 
individuals in [an] organization” (Rice & Malen, 2003, p. 639).  Rice and Malen (2003) 
highlight three interrelated categories of human costs: (1) “task costs,” or “the time and effort 
that individuals in the organization expend to meet work demands” (p. 640); (2) 
“psychological costs,” or “burdens borne by individuals often in the form of a general loss of 
professional efficacy and self-worth” (p. 640); and (3) “social costs,” or “tolls paid 
collectively in the form of worker turnover and loss of community, trust, and collegiality 
between employees” (p. 640).   
Three observations are noteworthy in this discussion of the presence of human costs 
associated with investing time, effort, and energy into implementing the educator incentive 
projects in this study.  First, because this analysis only investigates the human costs of 
investing time and effort in the incentive projects, it does not illuminate whether or not other 




evaluation systems, project eligibility requirements) may incur human costs.  Second, 
participants, particularly those at the school level, noted that the costs they described were 
not necessarily only due to the incentive plans.  They were also due to the layering of the 
incentive plans on top of other initiatives that were present in their contexts.  While 
participants did argue that the education profession, in general, was stressful, the quotes I 
selected for this section came from contexts in which respondents were talking directly about 
the incentive plans or clearly distinguished teaching in general from the incentive plans.  
Third, while this section focuses on the human costs of project implementation, study 
participants often discussed corresponding benefits, such as more nuanced teacher evaluation 
systems, more opportunities for helpful and high-quality professional development, and extra 
money. 
Individual and focus group interview data revealed the presence of task costs 
associated with investing time and effort into implementing these incentive projects.  Across 
sites, many study participants at both the district and school level indicated that their 
educator incentive projects required considerable time and effort to implement.  During one 
conversation, a study participant referenced his/her interview notes and said, 
These numbers are going to blow people’s minds.  Because it was blowing my mind, 
just writing it down. 
 
Sentiments regarding intense time investments were especially salient with respect to 
the standards-based evaluation component; for instance, a participant in one site described 
parts of the evaluation training and evaluations themselves as “cumbersome,” and a 
participant in another site described the standards-based teacher evaluation system as 




The task costs reported by study participants took a variety of forms.   At times, 
participants linked the time and effort that they put into the projects with physical 
consequences.  For instance, one participant noted that challenges associated with project 
implementation impacted his/her “stress level.”  Another respondent expressed a view that 
participating teachers were “stretched to the max, stretched so very thin.”  Another study 
participant linked the standards-based evaluation system embedded within the incentive 
project to physical exhaustion: 
I think the [evaluation] process has helped me overall to become a better teacher.  The 
process is a hard process, it is an exhausting process. …It’s not just the evaluation, I 
think just teaching in general just wears you out anymore.  …I think [the evaluation] 
has helped [me] overall.  Is it exhausting? Yes. 
 
 These sentiments regarding increased stress, being stretched, and feelings of 
exhaustion indicated that some of the task costs associated with these projects had physical 
consequences.  To these participants, investing time and effort into the incentive plans meant 
dealing with stress and fatigue. 
In some instances, the task costs associated with investing time and energy into 
implementing the incentive projects manifested themselves as burdens in participants’ 
personal lives.  In these cases, participants noted that work associated with implementing the 
incentive projects cut into their personal time.  These comments highlight the ways in which 
task costs can spill outside the workplace.  The comments below from both district and 
building educators reflect this position: 
I’ve had no life.  I’ve had no life for the last two years. 
We’re biting into personal time and lives to make sure this thing works. 
 
This [workload] is crazy.  I mean, it’s crazy!  It’s a point of feeling almost conflicted, 
I mean we all have families at home … I play with my kids ’til they go to bed, and 




And … I save one day of the weekend that’s totally work-free, but [I work on] 
Saturday or Sunday anywhere from an hour to three or, very occasionally, more, very 
rarely more.  … My priorities aren’t always what I want them to be. 
 
Comments like these suggest that participants’ investments of time and effort 
impacted their interpersonal relationships outside the school building.  That is, time spent on 
projects replaced time spent on other interpersonal activities (e.g., a life outside of work, 
family activities).   
Third, in a small number of instances, participant comments suggested that task costs 
may have manifested themselves in psychological ways.  These comments highlighted how 
investments of time and effort into project implementation impacted participants’ feelings 
and perceptions of themselves as professionals.  For instance, one participant described 
feeling guilty because s/he perceived that s/he had too many teachers to support and not 
enough time to support them all: 
I spend time feeling guilty each week …[because] I can’t give the attention to the 
teachers like I want or like they deserve. 
 
Another comment from the same participant highlights tradeoffs between time and 
professional efficacy: 
I’ve asked, how do we catch a break here? And the answer is basically … do less 
would be the way to do that.  Don’t do as well.  And that’s not the way we roll here.   
 
This comment highlights a perception that the only way to reduce the burden 
associated with investing time in the projects would be to “do less”; however, this participant 
did not think that “do[ing] less” was compatible with standards of professional practice to 
which s/he and his/her colleagues subscribed. 
Despite the presence of the task costs highlighted above, study participants often 




evaluation systems that were part of the projects.  What one study participant described as a 
“love/hate relationship” emerged: while participants highlighted the immense time burdens 
associated with carrying out the evaluations, they situated these burdens within a larger 
discussion of the perceived benefits of the new systems. According to building educators: 
You know, initially … you get a little aggravated because [the evaluation is] so much, 
it seems like at certain times, but in the long run if you really step back and are 
honest, I think it’s beneficial.  …  And if those students benefit, then just because I’m 
inconvenienced or I have some other stuff to do, that really doesn’t matter.  If I didn’t 
want to do that, you know, I should have gotten a job someplace else.  So this is part 
of the job. 
 
[The teacher evaluation] takes a long time, and if you’re doing it right, … it takes a 
lot of energy, but it is making an impact in classrooms.  And as far instruction goes, 
in student learning.  And so, overall, I think it’s a great process. 
 
These quotes suggest that project-related task costs existed in the study sites.  While 
the participants who discussed these costs also may have had an awareness of and 
appreciation for perceived benefits associated with the projects (and, in some cases, the 
standards-based evaluations embedded within them), the costs were real. 
Conversations regarding human costs were limited to a small sample of study 
participants and occurred during a small portion of interviews and focus groups.  Still, these 
data suggest that investing time and effort in project implementation actually imposed 
additional costs to participants – costs over and above the value of the time spent on project 
implementation.  These task costs impacted participants in physical, personal, and 
psychological ways. While difficult to quantify, they existed, and understanding them is an 
important part of understanding project implementation. 
Summary 
This chapter presents findings regarding the total societal opportunity costs associated 




first section of the chapter briefly identifies the resources required to implement the projects.  
The second section of the chapter highlights the magnitude of the total societal opportunity 
costs associated with using those resources to implement the incentive projects rather than 
using them to pursue other goals.  In the third section of the chapter, I discuss the extent to 
which TIF bore these total societal opportunity costs and the extent to which it did not.  In 
the final section of the chapter, I present findings regarding the presence of human costs 
associated with implementing these complex reforms.  While the numerical cost estimates in 
the early part of the chapter capture the time that participants invested in the implementation 
of these complex projects, they do not reflect the burdens that accompanied the investment of 
time and effort into project implementation.  A recognition of the existence of these human 
cost burdens is key to understanding the full range of costs associated with project 
implementation.   
In this chapter, I report that implementing the three incentive projects during the 
2012-13 school year required a variety of resources (personnel, facilities, 
materials/equipment/supplies, travel/transportation, and other) for project administration, 
demonstrated performance, investments in or extensions of practice, and educator 
distribution.  I estimate that the total societal opportunity costs associated with these 
resources were just over $1.5 million for the JR project, $2 million for the non-JR project, 
and $6 million for the TAP project.  These costs included fiscal outlays of approximately $1 
million for the JR project, almost $1.8 million for the non-JR project, and nearly $3.7 million 
for the TAP project.  The ways in which these costs manifested themselves for the 
administration, demonstrated performance, investments in or extensions of practice, and 




most costly component was the demonstrated performance component.  Costs associated 
with the projects’ demonstrated performance components were driven by performance 
payouts and the time that personnel (mainly school administrators and teachers) needed to 
devote to performing standards-based evaluations.  TIF funds were used to cover more than 
50 percent of costs in all three sites and more than 90 percent of fiscal outlays in all three 
sites.  Participants reported the presence of human costs associated with investing time and 
energy in project implementation; these task costs manifested as burdens over and above the 
time itself and impacted physical, personal, and psychological aspects of participants’ lives.   
I draw upon these findings about the magnitude and TIF/non-TIF division of project 
costs and the presence of human costs in the next chapter, in which I discuss the findings’ 





CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter builds on the findings I report in Chapter 4 to provide insights into the 
ways in which this study contributes to the conversations surrounding educator incentive 
plans and cost analysis of educational interventions.  First, I review the study’s key findings.  
Next, I describe this study’s implications for both research and practice.  I then outline a 
number of study limitations and describe how these limitations impact conclusions that can 
be drawn from the study.  I finish with suggestions for future research. 
Key Findings 
The previous chapter describes this study’s findings in detail.  Briefly, this study 
shows that the three educator incentive projects required a variety of resources for project 
administration, demonstrated performance, investment in or extensions of practice, and (for 
the TAP and non-JR projects), educator distribution components.  These resources were 
associated with high total societal opportunity costs; estimated one-year operating costs were 
over $1 million in all three sites, and implementation of the costliest project required 
resources valued at over $6 million.  These costs were considerably higher than fiscal 
outlays, which illuminates the presence of “hidden” opportunity costs, or costs that will not 
show up on budgets or performance reports but exist nonetheless. 
Because the projects, at times, approached the components differently, the factors that 
drove each project’s cost varied.  For investments in or extensions of practice, for instance, 
the JR and non-JR projects’ decisions to contract for professional development services 
impacted their materials costs, while the TAP project’s required, weekly professional 
development requirement impacted personnel costs.  While both the TAP project and the 




to participating educators, choices regarding the size of those bonuses and how many 
educators were eligible for them affected the per-participant costs associated with these 
awards.  While total societal opportunity costs varied across projects, one finding that was 
consistent across sites was that the demonstrated performance component was costly – it was, 
in fact, the most costly project component across all three projects – and that a substantial 
portion of these demonstrated performance costs were associated with educators’ investment 
of time to implement the new standards-based evaluation systems. 
For all three projects included in the study, the districts used TIF money to cover 
almost all fiscal outlays related to project implementation, but the districts did not use their 
TIF grants to cover all opportunity costs.  In fact, the TAP project used TIF money to support 
only 56 percent of one-year implementation costs.  Across projects, TIF funds were used to 
support the majority of the payout costs and personnel costs for project administration.  
However, the districts generally relied more heavily on non-TIF funds to support personnel 
costs for other components, especially for the demonstrated performance component.  Again, 
this finding is related to the heavy time requirements associated with administrators’ and 
teachers’ work to implement the complex new standards-based evaluation tools. 
These significant investments of time and effort into project implementation – be it 
for the demonstrated performance component or other components – were associated with 
human costs.  Participants’ comments regarding the work they performed for project 
implementation highlighted task costs that were manifest in physical, personal, and 
psychological ways; still, participants often presented a nuanced view of these costs as they 
simultaneously (a) expressed the challenges associated with such a heavy implementation 




that were part of the demonstrated performance components) for perceived improvements in 
teaching and learning.   
In sum, the structure of the incentive components (demonstrated performance, 
investments in or extensions of practice, and educator distribution), eligibility for the projects 
and their components, and the size of the awards drove the total societal opportunity costs of 
the incentive plans.  Those who were involved in the projects invested a great deal of time 
and energy into making them work, and these investments were associated with the presence 
of human costs.  These findings have significance for research and policy, which I describe 
in more detail in the next section. 
Significance and Implications 
This study provides several key insights into the costs associated with implementing 
TIF-supported educator incentive projects.  Some of these insights have implications for 
theory and research, whereas other insights have implications for policy and practice. 
Implications for Research 
 This study has two sets of implications for research.  The first set of research 
implications has to do with literature on educator incentive plans, and the second set of 
research implications has to do with the body of research on the cost analysis of educational 
interventions.  I discuss each of these in the following sections. 
Literature on educator incentives.  As I highlight in Chapter 2, current research on 
educator incentive plans sheds light on the theory of action behind these programs 
(Glazerman, 2004; Malen et al., 2009), the design of the programs, including the potential 
bases for financial awards (Heneman, Milanowski, & Kimball, 2007; Humphrey et al., 2012), 




retention and student achievement (Glazerman & Seifullah, 2012; MacAllum et al., 2011; 
Wiley et al., 2010), and the implementation challenges that these projects have faced, such as 
issues associated with capacity and stakeholder support (Malen et al., 2011; Malen et al., 
2015; Rice et al., 2012).  This study recognizes that investigation of the opportunity costs 
associated with educator incentives, too, should be part of the discussion surrounding 
educator incentive plans.  Without such knowledge, the research community cannot engage 
in informed discussions regarding the implications of investing in one set of projects as 
opposed to another set of projects.  Furthermore, this study adds to the extant body of 
literature by extending the discussion of capacity and stakeholder support issues.  In the 
following paragraphs, I describe the ways in which this study contributes to the research 
community’s knowledge about the capacity and stakeholder support challenges associated 
with educator incentive plans.  
Capacity.  A more comprehensive understanding of the total societal opportunity 
costs (not just the fiscal outlays) related to incentive projects is a key part of understanding 
their implementation, since capacity to implement the projects and sustain them long enough 
to realize the long-term outcomes proposed by the theory of action requires access to and 
adept deployment of a variety of resources.  This study’s findings regarding the magnitude of 
project costs adds to the research base on the capacity of districts to implement and sustain 
educator incentive plans by showing that (a) the total societal costs associated with these 
projects were substantial (over $6 million in total for the TAP project and over $13,000 per 
participant in the non-JR project, for example); and (b) at the time of the study, the costs 
associated with these projects exceeded their fiscal outlays.  Especially given earlier findings 




finding has notable implications for future research regarding district and educators’ capacity 
to bear the opportunity costs associated with the projects and to implement the programs with 
fidelity. 
Findings related to the TIF/non-TIF division of costs also have implications for 
research on the capacity of districts to implement and sustain these types of programs.  This 
study found that the districts used TIF funds to cover a substantial portion of the projects’ 
fiscal outlays during the study year.  At least in these sites and in this year, grantees were 
relatively dependent on the grant funds for fiscal resources to implement their programs. 
Given TIF requirements69 that grantees had to contribute an increasing share of funds to 
support the performance incentives and given the fact that the TIF grant, like any other grant, 
is only available for a finite period of time, this finding adds to the body of literature that 
highlights sustainability as a capacity challenge that can undercut the ongoing viability of 
educator incentive projects (see, for instance, MacAllum et al., 2011; Malen et al., 2011; 
2015).  When the TIF support lessens or goes away entirely, previously-supported projects 
will need to secure other funds or reallocate existing funds if they hope to keep the plans in 
place over time. 
This study also finds that, while the districts used TIF to cover nearly all of the fiscal 
outlays associated with project implementation, they did not use TIF money to cover all 
project costs.  This finding has implications for research that attempts to identify the societal 
costs of educator incentive projects.  Understanding levels of public investment in 
government-sponsored programs is important, but that understanding alone likely will not 
uncover the entirety of costs to members of the society in which the project operates.  This 
69 Recall that increasing share requirements were only in place for the first three rounds of TIF grantees; cohort 




                                                 
 
study illuminates that, despite each of the projects’ receipt of a sizeable federal grant, all of 
the incentive plans required the investment of additional resources that came from sources 
other than the TIF funding stream.  Perhaps most notably not covered by TIF were the 
personnel costs associated with school administrators and teachers spending time 
implementing the new, time-intensive standards-based evaluation systems.  A variety of 
evaluations of educator incentive projects across the United States (Humphreys et al., 2012; 
MacAllum et al., 2011; Malen et al., 2011, 2015; Springer et al., 2010) have found that these 
types of projects often face issues related to project sustainability.  Given that this study finds 
that districts, educators within them, and outside partners needed to bear some of the costs 
associated with project implementation, it adds to the body research regarding the feasibility 
of project implementation and the issues of project capacity, in general, and sustainability, in 
particular. 
The human cost findings in this dissertation also have implications for the capacity of 
districts and those who work in them to implement and sustain educator incentive initiatives.  
Prior research has already demonstrated that the implementation of educator incentive 
programs place heavy demands on educators’ time (see, for instance, Malen et al., 2009, 
2011, 2015).  This study confirms that finding for additional incentive plans and frames the 
finding in the lens of human cost.  This finding suggests that, if not addressed, human cost 
concerns can undercut districts’ capacity to implement these types of reforms.  If 
administrators and educators burn out, then they may not be able to work effectively toward 
implementing the projects and sustaining them long enough to realize their desired outcomes. 
Stakeholder support.  Findings related to the magnitude of project costs and the 




support for educator incentive plans.  Given that districts have access to finite resources, a 
district’s choice to implement an educator incentive plan reduces its ability to invest in other 
desired policies or programs.  Insights from this study regarding (a) just how much programs 
like this can cost and (b) the ways in which districts that have implemented these projects 
have leveraged TIF and non-TIF sources to support these projects could influence how 
important stakeholders view these programs and their willingness to support them amid a 
context of other potentially promising initiatives.70 
Human cost findings also shed light on issues of stakeholder support.  If participants 
do, in fact, face burdens associated with investing time and effort into implementing the 
incentive projects (in other words, if they face task costs), and if these task costs manifest 
themselves such that they impact participants in physical, personal, and psychological ways, 
then important stakeholders may be unwilling to support these programs.  As noted in 
Chapter 2, programs that lose the support of key stakeholders may lose political viability if 
influential stakeholders remove their endorsement of the program and may lose practical 
viability if those who need to implement the program are unable or unwilling to do so.  
Furthermore, stakeholder support issues can undercut the goals of incentive programs if high-
quality educators – the administrators and teachers that incentive programs aim to reward or 
induce into the profession – become disenchanted, offended, or unmotivated. 
Literature on opportunity cost analysis.  This study’s use of the cost template 
approach provides an opportunity for continued conversation surrounding the costs 
associated with implementing educator incentive plans.  Additionally, this dissertation 
tackles an issue that is not commonly addressed in cost analyses of educational interventions.  
70 Of course, cost is only one factor that impacts the desirability of a potential policy option.  Information about 
the policy’s effectiveness could also impact the extent to which stakeholders are willing to invest in a particular 
course of action.  I turn to the issue of program effectiveness later in this chapter. 
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In both ways, it adds to the literature on the opportunity costs of educational reforms and the 
implications of cost for the implementation and sustainability of incentive pay systems for 
educators. 
The utility of the cost template approach.  This study serves as an example of how a 
resource-cost study can systematically uncover the opportunity costs associated with 
educational interventions.  In this resource-cost study, I used a cost template to organize and 
array the full range of resources required for one-year implementation of three educator 
incentive projects that displayed a range of program designs.  I also used the cost template to 
outline the costs associated with these resources and the division of these costs between TIF 
and non-TIF sources.  Because the cost template approach affords transparency, it opens the 
door for a continued discussion regarding the costs associated with educator incentives.  This 
transparency makes it possible for others who wish to study incentive projects to replicate the 
analysis.  It also allows other analysts to impose different conditions – such as those 
associated with a particular geographical context – on the analysis and investigate the impact 
of these different conditions on the cost of implementing the incentive projects.    
As part of the growing number of cost studies in the field of education, this 
dissertation provides additional evidence that researchers can tackle the “paradoxes and 
possibilities” associated with uncovering the opportunity costs of education reforms (Rice, 
1997).  Adding to the body of cost analysis of educational research is a valuable endeavor; 
research on the costs associated with different education reforms is vital in the pursuit of an 
informed debate on the ways in which choices to invest in one set of policies or practices 




Human costs.  Investigation of human costs is not a common focus in the cost 
analysis literature.  The findings in this study, however, suggest that the human costs of 
educational reform may be an important consideration.  While these costs are difficult or 
perhaps impossible to quantify, these costs are nonetheless real.  This dissertation confirms 
the presence of human costs associated with implementing the educator incentive projects in 
the three districts in the study.  Participants highlighted challenges they faced due to the time 
and effort they needed to invest in the implementation of the educator incentive plans in their 
districts.  These task costs (Rice & Malen, 2003) had physical, personal, and psychological 
impacts on project participants.  Understanding the existence of these human costs is an 
important contribution to the discussion of the opportunity costs of the reforms in this study 
because they constitute part of the full range of resources associated with implementing these 
educator incentives.   
Policy Implications 
 This study’s findings also contain implications for policy and practice.  In this 
section, I discuss how this study suggests that policymakers and practitioners should take a 
comprehensive view of cost when they consider policy alternatives such as incentive pay.  I 
also outline the ways in which this study highlights possibilities for resource substitution. 
 Comprehensive view of cost.  The results of this study suggest that policymakers 
and practitioners who are currently implementing educator incentives or who are considering 
implementing incentive plans should take a more comprehensive view of what constitutes 
program costs (if they have not already adopted a more comprehensive perspective).  This 
research finds that implementation of these plans involved a range of resources; it further 




expenditures.  When costs do not present themselves as transfers of money from one party to 
another, they can remain hidden.  Hidden though they may be, these costs are real: in the case 
of the projects in this study, non-TIF sources (districts and the educators within them) bore 
many opportunity costs associated with implementing the incentive plans, especially the 
demonstrated performance component (and, sometimes, investing in or extensions of 
practice).  Districts (and the taxpayers who fund them) bore some of these opportunity costs 
through the salaries that they paid to their employees.  When the project participants were 
engaging in project-related work, they were not engaging in other tasks that the districts 
might have also valued.71  Educators themselves bore these opportunity costs when they had 
to do project work during the evening or on weekends.  During those periods, because their 
salaries were not covering their time, they essentially subsidized the work and lost the 
opportunity to focus on other goals that may have been important to them.  Policymakers and 
practitioners who do or may implement educator incentives should realize that the projects 
come with (relatively high) opportunity costs, that these costs are associated with resources 
that are integral to program operation, and that failing to acknowledge them may lead to 
challenges in securing the resources necessary for project implementation.  They may also 
gain a deeper understanding of what these comprehensive program costs might look like in 
their contexts by swapping the standardized prices on the cost template for localized prices. 
 Substitutability of resources.  This study also has implications for how 
policymakers and practitioners might think about resources and the extent to which they 
consider the substitutability of resources.  The different projects in this study used resources 
71 It is possible that the incentives encouraged employees to make more productive use of their time, which 
would be a benefit to the district and its taxpayers.  Even if the incentives do encourage productivity – one of 
the purposes of the incentives in the first place – they encourage it to one particular end and an opportunity cost 
is still incurred, since the productive use of time is focused on that end and not other potential priorities both 
within the district and within the community at large. 
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in different ways, and these choices impacted the magnitude and distribution of project costs.  
For instance, in the TAP project, teachers underwent four formal observations per year as 
part of the standards-based evaluation process.  School administrators (principals and 
assistant principals) shared responsibility for conducting these evaluations with master and 
mentor teachers.  Not only did this choice reduce the overall cost of the project (since the 
salaries of master and mentor teachers are lower than the salaries of building administrators), 
but this choice also temporarily shifted this cost from the district (which pays school 
administrators’ salaries) to the TIF grant (which pays for the master and mentor teacher 
salary augmentations), which has implications for sustainability over time.  Additionally, 
choices that the study sites made about the provision of professional development impacted 
costs.  Specifically, the JR and non-JR projects relied on contracts with external providers for 
professional development.  This choice shifted costs away from personnel and into materials, 
and it also temporarily shifted costs away from the districts and onto the TIF grant. 
Additional resource substitution considerations may exist.    For instance, districts 
could choose to rely more heavily on assistant principals than principals to engage in teacher 
evaluation; since assistant principals’ salaries are lower than principals’ salaries, shifting this 
responsibility to assistant principals would lower the overall project cost.  Districts could also 
work to decrease the risk of employee burnout by shifting the cost burden away from some 
personnel and distributing it to other personnel.  For example, at the district level, districts 
could attempt to reduce the implementation burden on project administrators by hiring 




development, evaluate project data, or support schools as they implement the project.72  At 
the school level, districts could hire additional evaluators (principals, assistant principals, 
master or mentor teachers, or other personnel who could serve the role of evaluators) so that 
it would not be necessary for employees to engage in project work during the evening or on 
weekends.  While I do not have evidence that projects in this study engaged in all of these 
types of substitutions, they could have.  These choices would have had implications for both 
the magnitude and the distribution of costs.  Because these choices could also impact the 
effectiveness of the initiative (if policymakers or practitioners replace a more effective 
resource with a less effective resource) or the equity of the initiative (if policymakers 
distribute work more or less equitably across employees), policymakers should exercise 
caution when they consider resource substitutions. 
Summary: Research and Policy Implications 
The findings in this dissertation have implications for both research and policy.  On 
the research side, this study adds to the literature on educator incentive projects by focusing 
on their opportunity costs, which is, to date, an understudied aspect of these projects.  
Findings regarding the magnitude of project costs, the TIF/non-TIF division of project costs, 
and the human costs of investing time and effort into project implementation have 
implications for capacity and stakeholder support issues that have arisen as challenges facing 
educator incentive plans.  This dissertation’s reliance on the cost template approach provides 
an opening for future analysis of these types of policies, and its identification of the presence 
of human costs suggests that cost analysis should pay more attention to these poorly 
understood aspects of project cost.  On the policy side, this dissertation illuminates the 
72 The JR project did engage in this type of activity when the district hired summer clerical assistance.  
Additionally, while I do not discuss it in detail in this dissertation since it occurred after the 2012-13 school 
year, the district also allocated part of a data analyst’s time to the JR project. 
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resources and costs associated with implementing these projects, which can inform 
policymakers who are interested in understanding the feasibility of educator incentives in 
their local contexts.  It also calls attention to resource substitutability considerations, which 
can be important issues for those who might want to consider ways to reduce project costs, to 
shift the cost burden from one set of stakeholders to another, or to align projects with existing 
or available resources. 
Limitations 
Several considerations shape the generalizability of this study’s conclusions.  These 
considerations are related to (a) the scope of the study, (b) the discussion of the magnitude of 
project costs, (c) the discussion of the extent to which TIF and non-TIF sources bore project 
costs, and (d) the discussion of human costs.  I discuss each below. 
Scope of Study 
This study is limited to particular projects and specific aspects of these projects’ 
implementation, which is impactful for three reasons.  First, the sites in this study are only a 
particular subset of the types of organizations that operate educator incentive plans.  All three 
study sites are traditional public school districts; implementation in these contexts may differ 
from implementation in places like states, non-traditional local education agencies (such as 
charter school districts), individual public schools, and private school settings.  Additionally, 
as I note in Chapter 3, none of the study districts is a large urban district, and all of the 
districts are in the South.  While, in general, cost studies are not intended to be generalizable 
to contexts that are unlike those under study, the characteristics of the sites in this study are 




Second, due to data limitations, this study only focuses on one year of project 
implementation, not on the process of obtaining the project funds, project planning, or project 
evaluation.  Costs associated with these aspects of educator incentive plans could be 
substantial and may likely vary across different projects.  For instance, the process of 
obtaining a grant such as TIF may incur costs, and these costs might vary across projects 
depending on the types of personnel (e.g., grant writers, other district personnel) who are 
involved in that process.  Project planning costs might vary depending on factors such as 
whether or not the implementers also design the project, since those who design their own 
plans would need to invest time in initial planning.  Evaluation costs could vary based on 
issues surrounding study design and the availability of researchers in the location of the 
project.  Because planning and evaluation clearly incur costs, this study does not provide a 
picture of all of the costs associated with educator incentive plans in the study sites but rather 
is limited to the costs associated only with implementing them.  Additionally, because this 
study focuses only one year of project implementation (2012-13), it only captures one 
snapshot of the phase-out of TIF support for the incentive payouts.  Given TIF requirements 
that cohort 3 grantees assume an increasing share of the responsibility for payouts each year, 
the TIF/non-TIF division of costs will be different for all projects in the following year of 
project implementation. 
Finally, this study does not focus on the effectiveness of project implementation, 
because evidence on the outcomes of the particular projects involved in the study is neither 
readily available nor standardized across the sites.  Thus, due to a lack of focus on project 
outcomes, while the analysis above suggests that these projects were costly, it does not 




benefits associated with these projects outweighed the costs.  Unlike cost-benefit analyses, 
which directly compare the costs and benefits of an initiative, this study does not permit 
conclusions regarding the projects’ absolute worth (i.e., whether the benefits of the projects 
outweigh their costs).  Additionally, unlike cost-benefit analyses of multiple initiatives or 
cost-effectiveness analyses, which provide ratios of costs to effectiveness for a range of 
projects with similar outcomes, this study does not permit conclusions regarding the projects’ 
relative worth (i.e., whether the extent to which the benefits outweigh the costs is greater for 
these projects than for alternative policy options). 
Despite these limitations regarding the scope of the study, this dissertation 
systematically investigates the resources required to implement these particular educator 
incentive plans and provides estimates regarding the opportunity costs associated with these 
resources; even without generalizability to other educational institutions and even absent 
information about project outcomes, such systematic information about resources and costs is 
important in a landscape where such information is often not widely available. 
Estimates of Cost Magnitude 
Another set of considerations surrounds this study’s discussion of the magnitude of 
project costs.  In this dissertation, I relied upon the experience of key individuals involved in 
project implementation to gather information to fill in the resource-cost templates.  The 
strength of this approach lies in its ability to garner information from knowledgeable 
participants who have particular insights about project implementation.  They understand the 
program and its varied components, they know how the program operates, and they have a 
clear sense of what they need to ensure that the program operates well.  While this approach 




and other methods (e.g., a survey of all participants, regardless of level of engagement with 
the project) might generate different estimates of how much of each resource is required for 
project implementation.73 
Additionally, each of the three projects underwent changes as implementation 
progressed, and the structure of the projects appeared to be somewhat fluid across years.  I 
attempted to discuss costs during one set time period (2012-13); however, since the projects’ 
structures changed from year to year, so too did the resources necessary to implement them.  
Therefore, conclusions based on this study’s findings are valid only for the projects as they 
were structured during school year under study, not for other years in which the projects may 
have operated differently. 
TIF and non-TIF Responsibility for Costs 
This dissertation’s analysis of who bore which project costs is limited to TIF and non-
TIF sources, which obscures the cost burden for the variety of non-TIF stakeholders who 
were associated with the incentive plans in the study, such as school districts and their staff 
(district administrators, school administrators, and teachers).  Given lack of data regarding 
the amount of time that building educators spent on activities like evaluations and 
professional development during compensated and uncompensated time, it was difficult to 
distinguish the extent to which districts covered these costs (through the payment of salaries 
to the educators who were carrying out the tasks) and the extent to which educators 
themselves took on this burden.  Therefore, while the results of this study suggest that both 
districts and staff within them bore these costs, they do not illuminate how the cost burden 
73 Still, it is important to note that the time estimates associated with school administrators conducting formal 
standards-based evaluation that I report in this study are in line with similar estimates from a study of the 
implementation of Chicago’s REACH educator evaluation system (Sporte et al., 2013) even though I relied on 
reports from key personnel and the Chicago study relied on widely-distributed surveys. 
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was distributed between districts and their staff.  This distinction has implications for 
districts’ budgets and employee burnout. 
Despite an inability to discern the extent to which various non-TIF stakeholders bore 
costs associated with project implementation, this study highlights the extent to which TIF 
did and did not support the projects, which is a key first step in understanding the viability of 
grant-supported programs.  Understanding how much the grant supported the incentive plans 
is important for sustainability planning, since (for the first three cohorts of TIF grantees) the 
proportion of project costs supported by the grant would decline over the award period by 
design and since (for all grantees) the TIF grant will end after five years and will no longer 
support the incentive plan at all.   
Human Costs 
A final set of limitations surrounds this study’s discussion of the human costs of the 
educator incentive plans.  Given the fact that the participants in this study represented a 
subsample of project participants and that interviews and focus groups addressed a wide 
range of topics (not just human costs), this study provides information on the presence of 
human costs but does not illuminate how widespread these costs are.  From this study alone, 
it would not be appropriate to conclude that these costs exist in all schools or for all 
educators.  Interpretations about the breadth of human costs across the study sites are not 
possible from the data that I gathered.  Furthermore, because of limited time for interviews, I 
only gathered data on the human costs associated with investing time and effort into project 
implementation.  I did not investigate the extent to which other key aspects of the projects, 
including but not limited to the process of tying educator compensation to their own or their 




Accordingly, this study only sheds light on a portion of the potential human costs that 
accompany the introduction of an incentive plan into an educational organization.  Additional 
costs may well exist; the fact that I do not highlight them here does not make them less real 
or consequential for the lives of those who implement these reforms.  Despite these 
considerations, this study’s illumination of the existence of human costs is a noteworthy 
contribution to the collection of resource-cost studies, which do not typically highlight these 
aspects of project costs. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This study represents an important first step in gathering information about an 
understudied aspect of educator incentive projects and is an addition to the growing body of 
resource-cost studies in education.  It also suggests several areas for future research.  I 
outline several possibilities below.    
First, future research should work toward the creation of a clear, coherent typology of 
educator incentive models that takes into account multiple aspects of program design 
(beyond program designer and bases for awards).  The typology should also take into account 
multiple funding structures, since multiple funding sources exist for educator incentives and 
since one main source – TIF – has changed requirements over time.   Researchers could then 
create a database that would allow investigation of the range of costs associated with each of 
the models contained within the typology.  As scholars continue to build the knowledge base 
regarding the effectiveness of these types of programs (which I address in more detail in the 
next paragraph), they can use the database to pair information regarding program outcomes 
with the information on the costs of a range of incentive projects to gather a set of cost-




Second, in order for  future cost analyses to link the costs of projects to their 
outcomes,  researchers need to come to a greater consensus on common, comparable 
outcomes (such as comparable measures of teacher and principal recruitment, teacher and 
principal retention, or improved student achievement) that would be part of these studies.  
While reaching this consensus might be difficult, and while multiple challenges exist with 
respect to collecting data on these outcomes, cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit analyses that 
rely on high-quality outcome information could shed light on the extent to which some 
designs are more cost-effective than others and whether these projects are prudent 
investments of public resources. 
Third, future research on educator incentives should help shed light on the 
distribution of costs between districts and educators within them.  Studies should illuminate 
how much time or what portion of time school-based educators spend on activities 
surrounding evaluation and professional development.  Improved understanding of how 
much time educators spend (or are expected to spend) on this work would help to clarify the 
extent to which districts support the costs of these important activities and the extent to 
which principals, assistant principals, and teachers shoulder the weight of this work. 
Finally, research should continue to investigate the human costs of education reform, 
more generally, and educator incentive plans, in particular.  Future research should attempt to 
verify the presence of human costs associated with education reforms and should work to 
identify additional categories of human cost or nuances within existing categories.  Future 
work should also investigate the human costs associated with project implementation more 
broadly (as opposed to focusing solely on the burdens associated with investing time and 





This dissertation represents a first step in filling the gap in knowledge regarding the 
full range of resources required to implement educator incentive projects and the opportunity 
costs associated with investing those resources in incentive plans rather than other potential 
policy options.  In doing so, it adds to the collection of studies that investigate these 
prominent education reforms, extends the research community’s knowledge about what it 
takes to implement these projects, and provides baseline information for considering these 
projects’ cost-effectiveness.  This dissertation also adds to the collection of cost studies in 
education and demonstrates how analysts can apply the resource-cost method to evaluations 
of education reforms.  As a first step, this study suggests multiple avenues for future studies 







































APPENDIX B: IRB-APPROVED DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 
 
Guiding Questions for Protocol Development: District Administrator Interviews 
General Questions About Program 
• What are the goals of [program name]? 
 
• How many people participate in [program name]? 
o Building administrators (principals, assistant principals, other school 
administrators)? 
o Teachers 
o Other staff in schools 
 
• How is [program name] structured?  What does [program name] look like? 
o Does [program name] offer professional development?  If so, what types of 
professional development? 
o Does [program name] have an administrator or teacher leadership component?  
If so, how does that leadership program work? 
o Does [program name] use a standards-based evaluation system for teachers? 
For building administrators?  If so, how does that evaluation system work? 
o Does [program name] tie payouts to student performance? If so, how? 
o Does [program name] include a hard-to-staff component?  If so, how does that 
work? 
 
• How do payouts work in [program name]? 
o What do program participants receive payouts for in [program name]?   
o Are awards directed to individual participants? To groups/grades/schools? 
o What are the maximum payout amounts for each of these categories? 
o What is the total amount of payouts [program name] issued in one program 
year?  How does this total break down by program component? 
o Who provides the money for the payouts? 
 
• Who covers the costs of [program name]? Does some of this shift over time? (Try to 
get at all sources, percentages, and changes of cost distribution over time.) 
o Federal government.  Percent covered: ___________ 
o State.  Percent covered: ___________ 
o District. Percent covered: ___________ 
o School. Percent covered: ___________ 
o Private organization. Percent covered: ___________ 
o Other. Percent covered: _____________ 
 
Program Administration 




o Do any of the staff members in the [program name] office split their time with 
other offices?   
o If so, how many, and what percentage of their time is devoted to [program 
name]? 
 
• Who covers the salaries for the members of this office? 
 
• What are the key roles and responsibilities of your office?  How do you manage these 
roles and responsibilities? 
o Program recruitment? 
o Program implementation (and implementation of various components of 
program)? 
o Data management? 
o Calculation/delivery of payouts? 
o Other? 
 
• In any given year, how much time do you (or members of your office) spend: 
o Recruiting participants for [program name]? 
o Calculating payouts for [program name]? 
o Coordinating and/or providing professional development for [program name]? 
o Communicating with the Department of Education? 
o Other? 
 
• In any given week, how much time do you (or members of your office) spend: 
o Communicating with participants regarding questions about [program name]? 
o (If applicable) Communicating with the program developers? 
o Traveling to schools to help implement [program name]? 
o Managing data associated with [program name]? 
o Other? 
 
• What sorts of physical materials (e.g., office space, office machines, office 
equipment, electronic hardware, electronic software, other) do you and the other 
members of your office need to perform your job? For each resource, make sure to 
cover: 
o How many/much of the resource devoted to program? 
o In the case of materials, can you use them for more than one year? 
o Who covers the cost of these resources/materials? 
 
• Do you need to travel for your job?   
o If so, what is the purpose of this travel?  
o Where do you travel?   
o How often do you travel?   
o How long are the trips?   






Standards-Based Evaluation, Job Redesign, and Professional Development 
 
• What role, if any, do you have in facilitating the administration of the standards-based 
evaluation tool for teachers and administrators? 
o How much time does this take? 
o What kinds of materials do you need?   
 How much of those materials do you need?   
 Can you reuse any of those materials across multiple years? 
 
• (If applicable) What role, if any, do you have in making the leadership component 
work well? 
o How much time does this take? 
o What kinds of materials do you need?   
 How much of those materials do you need?   
 Can you reuse any of those materials in multiple years? 
 
• Above, you told me a bit about your role in coordinating/providing professional 
development for [program name].  Are there any other professional development 
tasks that you do? 
o How much time does this take? 
o What kinds of materials do you need?   
 How much of those materials do you need?   
 Can you reuse any of those materials across multiple years? 
 
Grant and Program Development 
 
• What was the process for writing the TIF grant? 
o Who was involved in that decision-making process?  
 (try to uncover) Types of people? 
 (try to uncover) Number of people? 
o How much time did that process take? 
 
• (If program was developed externally) [District] uses the [externally developed 
program] model.  How did you choose to use that program model? 
o Who was involved in that decision-making process?  
 (try to uncover) Types of people? 
 (try to uncover) Number of people? 
o How much time did that process take? 
o Did you have to pay [program developer] to use the model? If so, how much 
did you have to pay? 
 
•  (If program was developed internally) How did [district] create [program name]? 
o What did that process look like? 
o Who was involved in that process?  
 (try to uncover) Types of people? 




o How much time did that process take? 
 Time on program creation outside of committee work? 
 Time on meetings? 
 Other? 
 
• How did you start to implement the program and deal with: 
o Phasing in the program? 
o Developing the infrastructure (data management, evaluation instruments, 
performance assessments, etc.) to manage the program? 
o Training people to participate in the program? 
o Evaluating/revising program design? 
 
• For all of the early implementation activities we just discussed, 
o What types of people and how many people were involved? 
o How much time did it take? 





• How do you plan to evaluate [program name]? 
o Internal evaluation? 
 How many people work on that? 
 How long does it take? 
o External evaluation/contract? 
 How much do you have to pay for that? 
o Formative evaluation? 





Guiding Questions for Protocol Development: School Administrator Interviews 
Program Administration 
• What, if any administrative activities do you engage in so that you can participate in 
[program name]? 
• What, if any, administrative activities do you engage in so that your employees 
(teachers or other staff) can participate in [program name]? 
• How many people in your school participate in [program name]? 
 
Standards-Based Evaluation 
• (If necessary) Can you describe the process through which your performance is 
evaluated? 
o What are the steps in the process? 
o Who is involved in the process? 
o What activities do you have to complete in order to finish the process? 
o How long does the process take? 
o What, if any, materials do you use to complete the process? (e.g., training 
manuals, data management spreadsheets or software, etc.)  How many/much 
of these materials do you need? 
o Do you get paid extra to do this? (If so, who pays for that? District? Grant? 
Other?) 
o What is your reaction to this process? (If applicable, use follow-up questions 
to get at human cost information) 
 
• Can you describe the process through which you evaluate your staff’s (teachers or 
other) performance? 
o Did you have to undergo any training to complete this process?  If so, can you 
explain that process? (Location, duration, etc.) 
o What are the steps in the process? 
o Who is involved in the process? 
o What activities do you have to complete in order to finish the process? 
o How long does the process take? 
o What, if any, materials do you use to complete the process? (e.g., training 
manuals, data management spreadsheets or software, etc.)  How many/much 
of these materials do you need? 
o Do you get paid extra to do this?  (If so, who pays for that? District? Grant? 
Other?) 
o What is your reaction to this process? (If applicable, use follow-up questions 
to get at human cost information) 
 
Job Redesign 
• Does [program name] involve a leadership component for administrators?  If so, are 




o Required time? How much? Do you get paid extra to do the leadership work? 
o Required materials? How many/much? Who provides the materials? 
 
• Are there any activities you do in order to allow the teachers in your school to 
participate in the leadership associated with [program name]? 
o Required time? How much? Do you get paid extra to oversee these leadership 
activities? 
o Required materials? How many/much? Who provides the materials? 
• What is your reaction to this process? (If applicable, use follow-up questions to get at 
human cost information) 
 
Professional Development 
• What types of administrator professional development are associated with [program 
name]? 
o Can you describe the process? 
o Who is involved? 
o Required time? How much? 
o Required materials? How many/much? 
o Required travel? 
o Do you receive compensation for any of the time you spend on professional 
development? 
o What is your reaction to this professional development? (If applicable, use 
follow-up questions to get at human cost information) 
 
• Are there any activities you do in order to allow teachers in your school to participate 
in [program name]’s professional development component? 
o Required time? How much? Do you get paid extra for this? 
o Required materials? How many/much? Who provides these materials? 
o What is your reaction to this professional development? (If applicable, use 
follow-up questions to get at human cost information) 
 
Other Program Components 
 
• Do you have to do anything for the [program’s name for measure used to link student 
scores to educator payout]? 
o If so, how much time/materials does that take? 
o What is your reaction to this program component? (If applicable, use follow-
up questions to get at human cost information) 
 
• (If applicable) Do you have to do anything for [program’s name for hard-to-staff 
component]? 
o If so, how much time/materials does that take? 
o What is your reaction to this program component? (If applicable, use follow-




Guiding Questions for Protocol Development: Teacher Focus Groups 
Standards-Based Evaluation 
Can you describe the process through which you undergo a standards-based 
evaluation? 
o Did you have to undergo any training to participate this evaluation process?  If 
so, can you explain that process? (Location, duration, etc.) 
o What are the steps in the process? 
o Who is involved in the process? 
o What activities do you have to complete in order to finish the process? 
o How long does the process take? Do you get paid extra to go to the 
meetings/trainings (different than getting paid for a high evaluation)? 
o What, if any, materials do you use to complete the process? (e.g., training 
manuals, data management spreadsheets or software, etc.)  How many/much 
materials do you need? Who provides the materials? 
o What is your reaction to this process? (If applicable, use follow-up questions 
to get at human cost information) 
 
Job Redesign 
• Do you participate in [program name]’s leadership component? If so, what does that 
process look like? 
o Who is involved? 
o What sorts of activities do you perform? 
o How long does the process take? 
o What materials do you use to complete the process? How many/much? Who 
provides the materials? 
o How do you get paid for this work? 
o What is your reaction to this leadership component? (If applicable, use follow-
up questions to get at human cost information) 
 
• Regardless of whether you personally participate in [program name]’s leadership 
component, do you participate in activities that help any of your colleagues advance 
on a career ladder? 
o Who is involved? 
o What sorts of activities do you perform? 
o How long does the process take? 
o What materials do you use to complete the process? How many/much? Who 
provides the materials? 
o Do you get paid extra to participate in your colleagues’ work? 
o What is your reaction to this leadership component? (If applicable, use follow-






What types of professional development are associated with [program name]? 
o Can you describe the process? 
o Who is involved? 
o Required time? How much? 
o Required materials? How many/much? Who provides them? 
o Required travel? 
o Do you receive compensation for any of the time you spend on professional 
development? 
o What is your reaction to this professional development? (If applicable, use 
follow-up questions to get at human cost information) 
 
Other Program Components 
 
• Do you have to do anything for the [program’s name for measure used to link student 
scores to educator payout]? 
o If so, how much time/materials does that take? 
o What is your reaction to this program component? (If applicable, use follow-
up questions to get at human cost information) 
 
• (If applicable) Do you have to do anything for [program’s name for hard-to-staff 
component]? 
o If so, how much time/materials does that take? 
o What is your reaction to this program component? (If applicable, use follow-




Guiding Questions for Protocol Development: External Program Developer 
• Can you describe your interaction with the people who implement [program name] in 
[program location]? 
o Telecommunication? 
o In person communication? 
o In person training/professional development? 
o How much time do you spend on these activities? 
 
• What sorts of assistance, if any, do you provide to people with [program name]?  
How much time do you spend on these activities? 
 
 
Guiding Questions for Protocol Development: Staff Member in U.S. Department of 
Education TIF Office 
 
Overseeing the TIF Program 
 
• Can you describe the roles and responsibilities of the TIF Office? 
 
• Can you describe your roles and responsibilities within the TIF Office? 
 
• What sorts of information do you gather from the TIF grantees?  
 
• What sorts of activities do you and your colleagues complete in order to administer 
the program?  What resources are required (time, physical materials, physical space, 
and so forth) do you use to administer the program?  How many/much? 
 
 
Interacting with Particular Program Implementers (if applicable) 
 
• Can you describe your interaction with the people who implement [program name] in 
[program location]? 
o Telecommunication? 
o In person communication? 
o In person training/professional development? 
o How much time do you spend on these activities? 
 
• What sorts of assistance, if any, do you provide to people with [program name]?  






Interview/Focus Group Worksheet 
 
Note: I will pass out this worksheet to study participants at the beginning of the 
conversations.  The purpose of this worksheet is to help study participants begin to think 
about their interaction with the educator incentive program in terms of resource investment.  
I will tailor the worksheet to the particular programs in which the participant is enrolled, 
and I will include as many sections as needed (e.g., for standards-based evaluation 
components, professional development components, and so forth).  All sections will follow 
the format below. 
 
Thank you for participating in this study! Before we begin the conversation, please take a 
moment to jot down some responses to the following questions about [program name]. 
 
Think about what you have to do for [program component]. 
 











Think about what you have to do for [program component]. 
 










Think about what you have to do for [program component]. 
 









APPENDIX C: IRB-APPROVED CONSENT FORMS 
Consent Form for Federal and District Administrators 
Project Title 
 
A Cost Analysis of Educator Incentive Programs Funded by the 
Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) 





This research is being conducted by Jennifer King Rice and Kathleen 
Mulvaney Hoyer at the University of Maryland, College Park.  We are 
inviting you to participate in this research project because you have 
experience with the resources required to implement an educator 
incentive program that is funded, in part, by the federal government’s 
Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF).  The purpose of this research project is to 
understand TIF-funded educator incentive programs, the range of costs 
associated with these programs, and the distribution of these costs 





The procedures involve speaking with the researchers about the resources 
required to implement an educator incentive program.  We may ask you to 
fill out a survey or a worksheet about program-related resources.  We may 
ask to have an interview with you to talk about the costs associated with 
your educator incentive program.  We may hold these interviews with you 
individually or in joint interviews with your colleague(s).  Examples of 
questions in the surveys/interviews include: 
• What sorts of activities do you and your colleagues complete in 
order to administer the program?   
• What resources are required (time, physical materials, physical 
space, and so forth) do you use to administer the program? 
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
While the researchers will take steps to minimize the risk associated with 
loss of your confidentiality, there is a possible risk of identification due to 
the public nature of your position.  However, potential participant 
identification comes with no known risks, because the researchers 
intend to gather information from you about the programs and their 
required investments (e.g, time, effort, money) instead of information 
about you (e.g., your  feelings, your opinions on the desirability of 
the programs). 
Potential Benefits  This research is not designed to help you personally. However, we 
hope that, in the future, other people might benefit from this study through 
improved understanding of the full range of resources required to 





Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing data in a 
secure location such as a locked office/cabinet or on a password-protected 
device.  Data will be filed under code names, not participants’ real names. 
 
Your identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible in written 
products associated with this research.  However, the public nature of your 
position may limit the confidentiality that this study can provide.  Your 
information may be shared with representatives of the University of 
Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or someone 




Right to Withdraw 
and Questions 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  You may 
choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this research, 
you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not to participate in 
this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized 
or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.  
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the 
research, please contact the investigator(s):  
Jennifer King Rice 
2110B Benjamin Building 
University of Maryland 




Kathleen Mulvaney Hoyer 
2110A Benjamin Building 
University of Maryland 
College Park, MD 20742 
(301) 405-4883 
khoyer@umd.edu 
Participant Rights  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to 
report a research-related injury, please contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, 
College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects. 
Statement of Consent 
 
Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have 
read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have 
been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate 
in this research study. You will receive a copy of this signed consent form. 
 
If you agree to participate, please sign your name below. 
Signature and Date 
 
NAME OF SUBJECT 
[Please Print] 
 











Consent Form for School Educators (Building Administrators, Teachers, 
and Other School Staff) 
Project Title 
 
A Cost Analysis of Educator Incentive Programs Funded by the 
Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) 





This research is being conducted by Jennifer King Rice and Kathleen 
Mulvaney Hoyer at the University of Maryland, College Park.  We are 
inviting you to participate in this research project because you have 
experience with the resources required to implement an educator 
incentive program that is funded, in part, by the federal government’s 
Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF).  The purpose of this research project is to 
understand TIF-funded educator incentive programs, the range of costs 
associated with these programs, and the distribution of these costs 





The procedures involve speaking with the researchers about the resources 
required to implement an educator incentive program.  We may ask you to 
fill out a survey or a worksheet about program-related resources.  We may 
ask to have an interview with you to talk about the costs associated with 
your educator incentive program.  We may hold these interviews with you 
individually or in joint interviews with your colleague(s).  Examples of 
questions in the surveys/interviews include: 
• How much time does it take to complete standards-based 
performance evaluations for participating educators? 
• What types of professional development are associated with the 
program? How much time does this professional development 
take?  
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
There are no known risks associated with participating in this research 
project.  
Potential Benefits  This research is not designed to help you personally. However, we 
hope that, in the future, other people might benefit from this study through 
improved understanding of the full range of resources required to 





Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing data in a 
secure location such as a locked office/cabinet or on a password-protected 
device.  Data will be filed under code names, not participants’ real names. 
 
Your identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible in written 
products associated with this research.  Your information may be shared 
with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or 
governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are 









and Questions choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this research, 
you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not to participate in 
this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized 
or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.  
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the 
research, please contact the investigator(s):  
Jennifer King Rice 
2110B Benjamin Building 
University of Maryland 






Kathleen Mulvaney Hoyer 
2110A Benjamin Building 
University of Maryland 
College Park, MD 20742 
(301) 405-4883 
khoyer@umd.edu 
Participant Rights  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to 
report a research-related injury, please contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, 
College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects. 
Statement of Consent 
 
Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have 
read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have 
been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate 
in this research study. You will receive a copy of this signed consent form. 
 
If you agree to participate, please sign your name below. 
Signature and Date 
 
NAME OF SUBJECT 
[Please Print] 
 














A Cost Analysis of Educator Incentive Programs Funded by the 
Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) 





This research is being conducted by Jennifer King Rice and Kathleen 
Mulvaney Hoyer at the University of Maryland, College Park.  We are 
inviting you to participate in this research project because you have 
experience with the resources required to implement an educator 
incentive program that is funded, in part, by the federal government’s 
Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF).  The purpose of this research project is to 
understand TIF-funded educator incentive programs, the range of costs 
associated with these programs, and the distribution of these costs 





The procedures involve speaking with the researchers about the resources 
required to implement an educator incentive program.  We may ask you to 
fill out a survey or a worksheet about program-related resources.  We may 
ask to have an interview with you to talk about the costs associated with 
your educator incentive program.  We may hold these interviews with you 
individually or in joint interviews with your colleague(s).  Examples of 
questions in the surveys/interviews include: 
• What sorts of assistance, if any, do you provide to people who 
implement your program model? 
• How much time do you spend on providing this assistance? 
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
There are no known risks associated with participating in this research 
project.   
Potential Benefits  This research is not designed to help you personally. However, we 
hope that, in the future, other people might benefit from this study through 
improved understanding of the full range of resources required to 





Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing data in a 
secure location such as a locked office/cabinet or on a password-protected 
device.  Data will be filed under code names, not participants’ real names. 
 
Your identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible in written 
products associated with this research.  Your information may be shared 
with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or 
governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are 











and Questions choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this research, 
you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not to participate in 
this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized 
or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.  
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the 
research, please contact the investigator(s):  
Jennifer King Rice 
2110B Benjamin Building 
University of Maryland 






Kathleen Mulvaney Hoyer 
2110A Benjamin Building 
University of Maryland 
College Park, MD 20742 
(301) 405-4883 
khoyer@umd.edu 
Participant Rights  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to 
report a research-related injury, please contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, 
College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects. 
Statement of Consent 
 
Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have 
read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have 
been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate 
in this research study. You will receive a copy of this signed consent form. 
 
If you agree to participate, please sign your name below. 
Signature and Date 
 
NAME OF SUBJECT 
[Please Print] 
 










APPENDIX D: DECISION RULE DOCUMENT AND DATA TEMPLATE NOTES 
 
Notes that apply to all projects’ templates: 
 
- I tried whenever possible to report costs for 2012-13, the year for which I had payout 
data.  
 
- Compensation includes both salary and benefits.  I assume that benefits are 25 percent 
of the salary. 
 
- When I noticed a conflict between information in an interview and information 
contained on a document (for instance, a budget), I used the information on the 
document, unless the respondent in the interview explicitly acknowledged the 
discrepancy and provided a reason that the oral response was the accurate number. 
 
- For tangible equipment and materials, I annualized with a five percent interest rate 
and an estimate of a five-year life of the equipment. 
 
- For office space, I assumed 200 square feet per employee and an additional 200 
square feet for filing/storage space. 
 
- I included an estimate for travel to 2 TIF meetings per year, due to the fact that travel 
to TIF meetings was more common in the early portion of the grant. 
   
- For the distribution of costs, I divided payouts between TIF and the district based on 
the district’s increasing share match requirements for 2012-13.  I obtained the Year 3 
required increasing shares from the APR.  My estimates reflected what the grantee 
was required to contribute in matching shares, not necessarily what the grantee 
actually did contribute.  The only deviations to this pattern were in cases where 
payouts went to employees who were not covered by the TIF grant language; in these 
cases, I allocated all of a payout share to the district.  For year 3, the TAP project’s 
matching share split was 83% TIF and 17% district; the JR project’s matching share 
split was 95.7% TIF and 4.3% district; and the non-JR project’s matching share split 
was 90% TIF and 10% district. 
 
- On the standardized data templates, I used the district administrator hourly rate for 
advisory council members, regardless of whether they worked for the district or for 
another entity. 
 
- I did not standardize the costs of substitute teachers; differences in the ways that 
districts reported costs for substitute teachers made it difficult to determine an 
appropriate standardized value for these personnel.  
 
- Asterisks in the distribution section of the data templates indicate a potential split of 




between districts and educators depends on the extent to which educators performed 
work on their own time. 
 
 
Notes that apply to the TAP project: 
 
- A study participant noted that project administration required travel to school sites, 
but budget documents did not provide an estimated cost for this resource.  For travel 
to sites for implementation assistance in for the TAP project, I used the value for 
travel for one administrator listed on budget materials for another study site and 
multiplied that value by the number of administrators in the TAP project. 
 
- I calculated responsibility for formal teacher evaluations in the TAP project in the 
following manner: each teacher received four observations per year, and respondents 
indicated that the same evaluator did not conduct all four observations.  I allocated 
one evaluation per teacher to a school principal, one evaluation to an assistant 
principal, one evaluation to a master teacher, and one evaluation to a mentor teacher.  
Two of the observations were announced (and therefore came with a pre-conference 
and work associated with the pre-conference), and two were unannounced.  Because I 
assumed that different evaluators performed announced/unannounced observation for 
different teachers (so that each type of evaluator performed some announced and 
some unannounced observations throughout the course of the year), I split the time 
associated with the pre-conference (the meeting itself and preparations for it) in half.  
For the first announced observation, half of the time went to principals and half went 
to assistant principals; for the second announced, half of the time went to master 
teachers and half went to mentor teachers.  Each teacher also has two summative 
conferences per year; for these summative conferences, I assumed that the assistant 
principal performed one and the principal performed the other. 
 
- When I divided the number of teachers to evaluate among the number of 
administrators for a per-administrator estimate of evaluation workload, I included the 
number of master/mentor teachers in the overall number of teachers, since I assumed 
that master and mentor teachers also had to undergo teacher evaluations. 
 
- For cost estimates for teachers doing work for their own evaluations, I used the 
hourly cost for career teachers (as opposed to masters and mentors).   
 
- I assumed there were 129 master/mentor teachers in 2012-13.  The FY2013-14 
budget listed augmentations for 48 masters and 86 mentors, and the July 2013 APR 
noted the addition of 5 masters/mentors (3 masters and 2 mentors).  Thus, the number 
of masters/mentors in 2012-13 (the study year) was 48+86-5=129.  Additionally, 
according to 2012-13 payout data, there were 45 school-level administrators, so the 
total number of TAP Leadership Team members in 2012-13 was 174. 
 
- Expenditures were associated with all resources that TIF supported as well as clerical 




implementation assistance, and the district’s share of payouts for standards-based 
evaluation, student achievement, and the educator retention bonus. 
 
Notes that apply to the JR project: 
 
- I assumed that all teachers make a physical portfolio of practice for their Framework 
for Teaching evaluations. 
 
- For teacher evaluations: the teachers had two unannounced observations a year, and 
they also had one overall pre-meeting a year (this meeting was a post-reflection 
meeting rather than a pre-observation conference).  I split the observations (and 
associated work/meetings) between principals and assistant principals, and I allocated 
the time to have the overall pre-meeting to principals. 
 
- Expenditures were associated with all resources that TIF supported as well as the 
district administrator’s travel to job recruitment fairs, materials for school culture 
activities and for educators’ portfolios of practice, and the district’s share of payouts 
for effectiveness, school culture, attendance, district achievement, professional 
development, leadership, teacher-led professional development, and curriculum 
projects. 
 
Notes that apply to the non-JR project: 
 
- Project administration required travel to school sites, but budget documents did not 
provide an estimated cost for this resource.  For travel to sites for implementation 
assistance in the non-JR project, I used the value listed on budget materials for 
another site.  
 
- I assumed that half of the teachers made a physical portfolio of practice (since 
respondents indicated that some of them make electronic portfolios).   
 
- I split the cost of the data management/professional development software between 
project administration and professional development, since the district used the 
software for both purposes. 
 
- There may have been more costs to administrators for providing professional 
development to their teachers than is listed on the template.  Administrators were not 
required by the project to provide professional development to teachers, but some 
administrators may have chosen to do so.  
 
- Expenditures were associated with all resources that TIF supported as well as the data 
management/professional development software, travel to sites for implementation 
assistance, and the district’s share of payouts for standards-based evaluation, student 






APPENDIX E: STANDARDIZED DATA TEMPLATES 
TAP Project Standardized Data Template: Magnitude of Project Costs 
   






For non-annual intangible 
resources 
   










Amount of resource 
(or amount of tasks 
per person, for 














Personnel Project director full-time 
    





    





    
0.8 113338 90670 
 
 
Clerical support part-time 
    








    







evaluates fidelity of 
project 
implementation 
    
1 14000 14000 
 
 
Advisory council 3 additional people 
from project 
developer; 2 
additional people from 
district; 2 people from 
community 2 6 
  
1 54 652 
 Facilities Project office space 
     





     




     




   
0.23 
 




   
0.23 
 




   
0.23 
 





   






For non-annual intangible 
resources    










Amount of resource 
(or amount of tasks 
per person, for 

















2 TIF meetings; 3 
night trip  2   2 1420 5680  
 
Travel to sites for 
implementation 
assistance 
     
3 1000 3000 
 
 






(district personnel); 3 
night trip  3 
  
1 1420 4260 
 
 






(educators); 2 night 
trip  7 
  
2 1165 16310 








state tool 41.5 1 
  




first-year training on 
teacher evaluation 28.8 14 
 





first-year training on 
teacher evaluation 28.8 31 
 




performing work for 
own TAP evaluation 3 14 
  





performing work for 
own TAP evaluation 3 31 
  




performing work for 
own state evaluation 43 14 
  





   






For non-annual intangible 
resources    










Amount of resource 
(or amount of tasks 
per person, for 
















performing work for 




principal on state 
evaluation 41.5 14 
  






and related activities 11 14 
  







and related activities 11 31 
  




performing work for 
own evaluation 2.25 702 
  





administrator survey 0.25 702 
  
1 46 8138 
 Materials/Equipment/Supplies Teacher Toolkit evaluation manual 
    









174 640 25730 
 
 
Observer app for 
tablet 










     
1 936218 936218 





     






   






For non-annual intangible 
resources    










Amount of resource 
(or amount of tasks 
per person, for 













Investments in or Extensions of Practice 
Professional Development Activities 
Personnel School principals 












evaluations) 43.2 31 
 




ongoing PD on project 
implementation 24 14 
  





ongoing PD on project 
implementation 24 31 
  






year 16 14 
  







year 16 31 
  
1 54 26978 
 
 
School principals TLT meetings 90 14 
  




principals TLT meetings 90 31 
  
1 54 151750 
 
 
Career teacher cluster meetings 36 573 
  




     
1 55884 55884 
 
Materials/Equipment/Supplies TAP portal 
for teachers to access 
PD materials 
    
1 14000 14000 
 
 
NIET TAP training 
supplies 
PD materials for TLT 
members 
    





   






For non-annual intangible 
resources   
 










Amount of resource 
(or amount of tasks 
per person, for 













Travel/transportation Summer Institute 
3 night trip, plus 
conference 
registration  140   1 1820 254800  
 National Conference 
3 night trip, plus 
conference 
registration  80   1 1820 145600  
Job Redesign Activities 
Other inputs 
Payouts for master 
teachers      45 11000 495000  
 
Payouts for mentor 
teachers 
     
84 4500 378000 




     
1 123000 123000 
 TOTAL COST 6033547 
 TOTAL EXPENDITURES 3696551 
 
           COST PER PARTICIPANT 8077 
 EXPENDITURES PER PARTICIPANT 4949 






TAP Project Standardized Data Template: Distribution of Project Costs 
  









Personnel Project director full-time 113338 
      District administrator 2 full-time 113338 
      District administrator 3 part-time 90670 
      Clerical support part-time 
 
23906 
     External project developer (project 
lead) 
provides on-site technical 
assistance 3750 
      External project developer  
(implementation evaluator) 
evaluates fidelity of project 
implementation 14000 
      Advisory council 3 additional people from project 
developer; 2 additional people 




   Facilities Project office space   
 
19737 
    Materials/Equipment/Supplies Data management system   28000 
      Office supplies   500 
      Computer   465 
      Laptop   562 
      Tablet   444 
     Travel/transportation Travel for training/meetings - ED/TIF 2 TIF meetings; 3 night trip 5680 





     Travel to other TAP sites for training/observation of project 
implementation (district 
personnel); 3 night trip 4260 
      Travel to other TAP sites for training/observation of project 
implementation (educators); 2 
night trip 16310 




Personnel District administrator (principal 
supervisor) 

























































   School principal performing one teacher 





   School assistant principal performing one teacher 
















 Materials/Equipment/Supplies Teacher Toolkit evaluation manual 31140 
      Tablet for members of TAP Leadership 
Teams 25730 
      Observer app for tablet to assist with teacher observations 2210 
     Other inputs Standards-based evaluation payouts   777061 159157 
    Student Achievement     
      Other inputs Student achievement payouts   676604 138582 
    Investments in or Extensions of Practice 
  
Professional Development Activities 
  
Personnel School principals first-year training on project 






   School assistant principals first-year training on project 
























































  Substitute teachers   55884 
     Materials/Equipment/Supplies TAP portal for teachers to access PD 
materials 14000 
      NIET TAP training supplies PD materials for TLT members 1562 
     Travel/transportation Summer Institute 3 night trip, plus conference 
registration 254800 
      National Conference 3 night trip, plus conference 
registration 145600 
     Job Redesign Activities     
      Other inputs Payouts for master teachers   495000 
      Payouts for mentor teachers   378000 
     Educator Distribution   
      Other inputs Payouts for recruitment/retention   102090 20910 
    TOTAL COST    3350996 2682117 434 * * 0 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES    3350996 345555 0 0 0 0 
*Due to data limitations, it is not clear how much of these costs were borne by the district and how much of these costs were borne by personnel within them.  While I have recorded these costs in the 
“district” column, it is likely that some portion of the costs are borne by the staff themselves (i.e., through uncompensated time). 










JR Project Standardized Data Template: Cost Magnitude 
   






For non-annual intangible 
resources 
   













amount of tasks 
per person, for 














Personnel Project director full-time 
    
1 113338 113338 
  Clerical staff part-time 
    
0.14 47813 6694 






1 7.25 1160 
  Advisory Council community leaders; 
sustainability planning 3 6 
  
1 54 978 
 Facilities Project office 
space 
 
    
600 21.93 13158 




    
1 40000 40000 




1 1006 232 




1 811 187 
  Office supplies  
    
1 1500 1500 
 Travel/transportation Travel for 
training/meetings 




2 1420 5680 




    1 1000 1000  





    
1 15000 15000 









   






For non-annual intangible 
resources 
   













amount of tasks 
per person, for 













Personnel (continued) Initial training by 
Danielson 
consultants 
first-year FFT training 
   
0.2 1 5000 1000 
  Consultant from 
Discovery 
Education 
first year VAL-ED training 
   
0.2 1 20000 4000 
  School principals first-year FFT training 64 6 
 
0.2 1 62 4791 
  School assistant 
principals 
first-year FFT training 
64 8 
 
0.2 1 54 5570 
  School principals ongoing PD on the FFT 45 6 
  
1 62 16843 
  School assistant 
principals 
ongoing PD on the FFT 
45 8 
  
1 54 19581 
  School principals state portfolio creation time 20 6 
  
1 62 7486 
  School assistant 
principals 
state portfolio creation time 
20 8 
  
1 54 8702 
  School principals state portfolio meetings 2 6 
  
1 62 749 
  School assistant 
principals 
state porftolio meetings 
2 8 
  
1 54 870 
  School principals meet with AP about state 
portfolio 2 6 
  
1 62 998 
  School principals filling out own VAL-ED survey 1 6 
  
1 62 374 
  School principals conducting one teacher 
observation and related 
activities 3.5 6 
  
30 62 39675 
  School assistant 
principals 
conducting one teacher 
observation and related 
activities 3.5 8 
  





   






For non-annual intangible 
resources 
   













amount of tasks 
per person, for 













Personnel (continued) Teachers doing work for own 
observation 2 212 
  
2 46 39320 
  Teachers making FFT portfolio 24 212 
  
1 46 235918 
  Teachers filling out admin. evaluation 
surveys 0.67 212 
  
1 46 6586 
  External 
consultant 
reviewing administrators' and 
teachers' portfolios  
   
1 37500 37500 
 Materials/Equipment/Supplies Sheet protectors, 
paper, ink, 
binder 
for administrators' portfolios 
    
14 100 1400 
  Sheet protectors, 
paper, ink, 
binder 
for teachers' portfolios 
    
212 100 21200 
  Danielson book - 
ASCD Action 
tool 




6 67 93 








226 31 1615 
  VAL-ED surveys  
    
6 360 2160 
 Student Achievement 
Other inputs Payouts - District 
achievement 
 
    
1 8400 8400 
 Standards-Based Evaluation and Student Achievement Component (Combined) 




    
1 175821 175821 
 School Culture Activities 
Personnel School 
administrators 
planning events for staff 
2 6 
  
2 62 1497 
  Teacher planning events for students 3 12 
  





   






For non-annual intangible 
resources 
   













amount of tasks 
per person, for 













Personnel (continued) Student filling out school climate 
surveys 0.25 2887 
  
1  - - 0 722 




    
6 500 3000 
 Other inputs Payouts - School 
culture 
 
    
1 85800 85800 
 Investments in or Extensions of Practice 
Attendance Component 
Other inputs Payouts - 
Attendance 
 
    
1 92625 92625 




    
1 5440 5440 
 Materials/Equipment/Supplies Contract with 
Teachscape 
PD materials 
    
1 77444 77444 
  Contract with 
Mindsteps (and 
other programs) 
training for administrators 
and master/mentor teachers   
  
1 47683 47683 
  Contract with 
Simple K-12 
PD materials 
    
1 12000 12000 




    
1 34000 34000 
 Other inputs Payouts - PD 
attended 
 
    
1 100426 100426 
 Job Redesign Activities 






3 811 562 











   






For non-annual intangible 
resources 
   













amount of tasks 
per person, for 






















3 426 295 






3 426 295 








1 1820 47320 
 Other inputs Payouts for 
master teacher 
 
    
3 3000 9000 
  Payouts for peer 
coaches 
 
    
20 1300 26000 
 Job Expansion Activities 
Personnel Site team 




1 46 10015 





1 46 45069 
 Other inputs Payouts - 
Leadership 
 
    
1 66958 66958 
  Payouts - 
Teacher-led PD 
 
    
1 1451 1451 
  Payouts – Curr. 
Project 
 
    
1 14450 14450 
 TOTAL COST 1575359 722 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 1063173 
    
        COST PER PARTICIPANT 4246 
 EXPENDITURES PER PARTICIPANT 2866 




JR Project Standardized Data Template: Cost Distribution 








Personnel Project director full-time 113338 
  
   
 Clerical staff part-time 6694 
  
   
 Additional summer clerical staff  part-time 1160 
  
   




   




   
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Data management system  40000 
  
   
 Computer  232 
  
   
 Laptop  187 
  
   
 Office supplies  1500 
  
   
Travel/transportation Travel for training/meetings 2 TIF meetings; 3 night trip 5680 
  
   





   






   
Demonstrated Performance 
Standards-Based Evaluation 
Personnel District superintendent evaluating principals' portfolios 
 
1206     
 Initial training by Danielson 
consultants 
first-year FFT training 
1000 
 
    
 Consultant from Discovery Education first year VAL-ED training 4000 
 
    
 School principals first-year FFT training 
 
4791  *   
 School assistant principals first-year FFT training 
 
5570  *   
 School principals ongoing PD on the FFT 
 
16843  *   
 School assistant principals ongoing PD on the FFT 
 
19581  *   
 School principals state portfolio creation time 
 
7486  *   
 School assistant principals state portfolio creation time 
 
8702  *   
 School principals state portfolio meetings 
 
749  *   
 School assistant principals state porftolio meetings 
 
870  *   
 School principals meet with AP about state portfolio 
 
998  *   
 School principals filling out own VAL-ED survey 
 











Personnel (continued) School principals conducting one teacher observation 





 School assistant principals conducting one teacher observation 




















 External consultant reviewing administrators' and 
teachers' portfolios 37500 
    
 
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Sheet protectors, paper, ink, binder for administrators' portfolios 




 Sheet protectors, paper, ink, binder for teachers' portfolios 
    
21200  
 Danielson book - ASCD Action tool one for each school 93 
    
 
 Danielson book - Framework for 
Teaching, 2nd ed. 
one for each admin/teacher 
1615 
    
 
 VAL-ED surveys  2160 
    
 
Student Achievement 
Other inputs Payouts - District achievement   8400     
Standards-Based Evaluation and Student Achievement Component (Combined) 
Other inputs Payouts for effectiveness school administrators, teachers 168261 7560     
School Culture Activities 










  Student filling out school climate surveys 
     
722 
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Materials for school culture activities  
 
3000 
    Other inputs Payouts - School culture  82112 3689 
    Investments in or Extensions of Practice 
Attendance Component 
Other inputs Payouts - Attendance  74500 18125     
Professional Development Activities 
Personnel Substitute teachers  5440      
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Contract with Teachscape PD materials 77444      
 Contract with Mindsteps (and other 
programs) 
training for administrators and 
master/mentor teachers 47683 
     













Contract with Educational Impact PD materials 
34000 
 
    
Other inputs Payouts - PD attended  96107 4318     
Job Redesign Activities 
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Laptop for master teacher  562      
 Tablet for master teacher  444      
 Document camera for master teacher  295      
 Projector for master teacher  295      
Travel/transportation Travel for master/mentor teachers to 
attend conference 
3 night plus conference fee 
47320 
     
Other inputs Payouts for master teacher  9000      




     
Job Expansion Activities 










 Other inputs Payouts - Leadership  64079 2879 
     Payouts - Teacher-led PD  1389 62 
     Payouts - Curriculum project  13829 621 
    TOTAL COST   976917 574864 978 1400* 21200* 722 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES   976917 63656 0 1400 21200 0 
*Due to data limitations, it is not clear how much of these costs were borne by the district and how much of these costs were borne by personnel within them.  While I have recorded these costs in the 
“district” column, it is likely that some portion of the costs are borne by the staff themselves (i.e., through uncompensated time). 








Non-JR Project Standardized Data Template: Magnitude 
   





resources For non-annual intangible resources 
  
































    
1 113338 113338 
 
 Planning Team I 1 additional district 
admin. and 1 external 
agency person 18 2 
  
1 54 1955 
 
 Planning Team II 3 district administrators 9 3 
  
1 54 1466  
 Planning Team II principals 9 5 
  
1 62 2807  
Facilities Project office space  
    
400 22 8772  
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Data management 
software 
Also used for PD; other 
half of cost below 
  
 
0.33 0.11 195728 7092 
 
 Office supplies    
  
1 500 500  
 Computer    0.23 
 
1 1006 232  
 Laptop    0.23 
 
1 811 187  
 Tablet    0.23 
 
1 640 148  
Travel/transportation Travel for 
training/meetings - 
ED/TIF 





2 1420 5680 
 
 Travel to schools 
for implementation 
assistance 
   
  








evaluations 9 1 
  





   






For non-annual intangible 
resources 
   
































   
0.2 1 26485 5297 
 
 School principals first-year training on 
the FFT 16 5 
 
0.2 1 62 998 
 
 School assistant 
principals 
first-year training on 
the FFT 16 9 
 
0.2 1 54 1566 
 
 School principals performing work for 
own evaluation 13 5 
  
1 62 4055 
 
 School assistant 
principals 
performing work for 
own evaluation 13 9 
  
1 54 6364 
 
 School principals performing work for 
one teacher 
observation and 
related activities 7 5 
  
20 62 43979 
 
 School assistant 
principals 
performing work for 
one teacher 
observation and 
related activities 7 9 
  
20 54 69022 
 
 Teachers performing work for 
informal peer 
observations 0.75 141 
  
2 46 9807 
 
 Teachers performing work for 
own formal evaluation 5 141 
  






   






For non-annual intangible 
resources 
   




























Personnel (continued) Teachers performing work for 
own informal peer 
observation 0.25 141 
  
2 46 3269 
 
 Teachers performing work for 
own informal external 
observation 0.25 141 
  
1 46 1634 
 
 Teachers perform video self-
reflection 1 141 
  
2 46 13076 
 
 Teachers create FFT portfolio 4 141 
  
2 46 52303  
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Danielson book - 
ASCD Action tool 




5 67 78 
 
 Danielson book - 
Framework for 
Teaching, 2nd ed. 





155 31 1107 
 





155 640 22920 
 





    
14 100 1400 
 
 Materials -- binder, 
sheet protectors, 
ink, paper 
for teachers' portfolios 
    
70 100 7000 
 




    






   






For non-annual intangible 
resources 
   





























Personnel Students - 
elementary school 
time to take additional 
assessment 1.5 
   
1202 0 0 1803 
 Students - middle 
school 
time to take additional 
assessment 3 
   
1437 0 0 4311 
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Contract for MAP 
test 
additional assessment 
   
0.2 1 48894 9778 
 Other inputs Payouts for student 
achievement 
 
    
1 321942 321942 




    
1 4600 4600 
 Investments in or Extensions of Practice 
Professional Development Activities 
Personnel Training for 
substitute teachers 
first-year training for 
substitutes 
   
0.2 1 1200 240 
 
 Substitute teachers  
    
1 115000 115000  
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Contract with 
Teachscape 
also used to manage 
data (that portion of 
cost above)    0.33 0.11 195728 7092 
 




    




for conference PD 





1 1820 9100 
 
 Teacher travel to 
other sites/districts 
for PD 










   






For non-annual intangible 
resources 
   


































1 25 176250 
 
Job Expansion Activities 
Other inputs Payouts for serving 
on Planning Team II 
Teachers on Planning 
Team II 
    
25 900 22500 
 
Educator Distribution 
Other inputs Payouts Retention bonus 
payouts 
    
1 502000 502000 
 
TOTAL COST 2062543 6114 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 1765302  
         
 
 
COST PER PARTICIPANT 13307  
EXPENDITURES PER PARTICIPANT 11389  







Non-JR Project Standardized Data Template: Distribution 








Personnel Project administrator full-time 113338 
  
   
 Model C Planning Team I 1 additional district administrator and 1 
external agency person  978 978 
   




   




*   




   
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Data management software Software for data management and PD; 
other half of cost below  7092 
 
   
 Office supplies  500 
  
   
 Computer  232 
  
   
 Laptop  187 
  
   
 Tablet  148 
  
   
Travel/transportation Travel for training/meetings 
- ED/TIF 
2 TIF meetings;  3 nights 
5680 
  
   






   
Demonstrated Performance 
Standards-Based Evaluation 
Personnel District associate 
superintendent 
performing administrator evaluations 
 
10790 
























   School principals performing work for one teacher observation 
and related activities  43979 
 
* 
   School assistant principals performing work for one teacher observation 
and related activities  69022 
 
* 






















Personnel (continued) Teachers performing work for own informal peer 
observation  3269 
  
* 
  Teachers performing work for own informal external 
observation  1634 
  
* 










 Materials/Equipment/Supplies Danielson book - ASCD 
Action tool 
one for each school 
78 
      Danielson book - 
Framework for Teaching, 
2nd ed. 
one for each admin/teacher 
1107 
      Tablet for all administrators and teachers 22920 
      Materials -- binder, sheet 
protectors, ink, paper 
for administrators' portfolios 
   
1400 
   Materials -- binder, sheet 
protectors, ink, paper 
for teachers' portfolios 
    
7000 




    Student Achievement 
Personnel Students - elementary 
school 
time to take additional assessment 
     
1803 
 Students - middle school time to take additional assessment 
     
4311 
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Contract for MAP test additional assessment 9779 








    Investments in or Extensions of Practice 
Professional Development Activities 
Personnel Training for substitute 
teachers 
first-year training for Model C substitutes 
240 
 
    
 Substitute teachers  115000 
 
    
Materials/Equipment/Supplies Contract with Teachscape for educators to access PD materials; also 
used as a data management platform (see 
cost above)  7092 
    

















Travel/transportation School administrator travel 
for conference PD 
travel plus conference fee 
9100 
     
 Teacher travel to other 
sites/districts for PD 
travel plus conference fee 
29120 
     




     
Job Expansion Activities 
Other inputs Payouts for serving on 
Model C Planning Team II 
Teachers on Model C Planning Team II 
22500 
     
Educator Distribution 
Other inputs Payouts Retention bonus payouts 451800 50200 
    TOTAL COST   1626074 427092 978 1400* 7000* 6114 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES   1626074 130828 0 1400 7000 0 
*Due to data limitations, it is not clear how much of these costs were borne by the district and how much of these costs were borne by personnel within them.  While I have recorded these costs in the 
“district” column, it is likely that some portion of the costs are borne by the staff themselves (i.e., through uncompensated time). 
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